Account Of Trust Research Articles

Measuring Epistemic Trust: Towards a New Lens for Democratic Legitimacy, Misinformation, and Echo Chambers

Trust is crucial for the functioning of complex societies, and an important concern for CSCW. Our purpose is to use research from philosophy, social science, and CSCW to provide a novel account of trust in the 'post-truth' era. Testimony, from one speaker to another, underlies many social systems. Epistemic trust, or testimonial credibility, is the likelihood to accept a speaker's claim due to beliefs about their competence or sincerity. Epistemic trust is closely related to several 'pathological epistemic phenomena': democratic (il)legitimacy, the spread of misinformation, and echo chambers. To the best of our knowledge, this theoretical contribution is novel in the field of social computing. We further argue that epistemic trust is no philosophical novelty: it is measurable. Weakly supervised text classification approaches achieve F_1 scores of around 80 to 85 per cent on detecting epistemic distrust. This is also, to the best of our knowledge, a novel task in natural language processing. We measure expressions of epistemic distrust across 954 political communities on Reddit. We find that expressions of epistemic distrust are relatively rare, although there are substantial differences between communities. Conspiratorial communities and those focused on controversial political topics tend to express more distrust. Communities with strong epistemic norms enforced by moderation are likely to express low levels. While we find users to be an important potential source of contagion of epistemic distrust, community norms appear to dominate. It is likely that epistemic trust is more useful as an aggregated risk factor. Finally, we argue that policymakers should be aware of epistemic trust considering their reliance on legitimacy underwritten by testimony.

AMEP and the Burden of Compliance

This article explores the ‘burden of compliance’ experienced by providers and teachers in the Adult Migrant English Program (AMEP), a large national English as an Additional Language (EAL) program in Australia. It shows how compliance requirements have been shaped by the relationship between two groups, those who make and operationalise relevant policies (mainly politicians and public servants) and those engaged in the practice of developing and teaching English courses (mainly teachers, program providers, and academics). These two groups are engaged in a struggle for the control of a metaphoric ‘pedagogic device’ (Bernstein, 2000) which shapes curriculum documents such as the frameworks, scales and teaching resources used in the AMEP. The article examines three key teaching and assessment documents and shows how the compliance requirements attached to each have been shaped by the relationship between these two groups over time. A crucial dynamic governing this relationship is the level of trust between and within them. The article argues that changes in levels and types of trust account for many of the tensions within the AMEP. It begins by describing how compliance was raised as an issue and introduces the key concepts that inform the discussion. The second part of the article tracks changes in approaches to compliance as manifested in three AMEP curriculum documents over 75 years. The third part identifies three policy trends that contributed to compliance becoming the burden currently experienced by providers and teachers. The article concludes that there are signs that trust between stakeholders may be changing, with a potential reduction in the burden of compliance.

No need to look, trust me! Mutual trust and distrust in the European arrest warrant system

Abstract No cooperative scheme in EU law has displayed bigger tensions between mutual trust and fundamental rights protection than the EAW system. Despite the requirement developed by the CJEU for national courts to trust each other and recognise each other’s arrest warrants, the reality on the ground has shown high levels of distrust between national courts regarding Member States’ alignment with core EU values. In this contribution, we analyze how the CJEU has managed such tensions in the EAW system. To that effect, we first put the Court’s EAW case law into context by examining the broader language of mutual trust used by the Court in other fields of EU law. In doing so, we point out how the Court has espoused different levels of lawful distrust to be exercised in different circumstances under the scope of application of mutual trust. Given that broader context, it is contradictory for the Court to mainly view mutual trust as a requirement rather than a reality in need of permanent and continuing justification between national authorities. The latter conception of mutual trust is more apt to be the basis of EU horizontal cooperation, which must be value-based and sincere according to the Treaties. Therefore, we propose a bidimensional account of mutual trust as a legal principle, one that accommodates both trust and distrust as tools for managing the uncertainty and dynamic nature of trust-based cooperation. Finally, we explore how such account of mutual (dis)trust can be concretised by the Court and other political institutions.

Towards trustworthy medical AI ecosystems – a proposal for supporting responsible innovation practices in AI-based medical innovation

AbstractIn this article, we explore questions about the culture of trustworthy artificial intelligence (AI) through the lens of ecosystems. We draw on the European Commission’s Guidelines for Trustworthy AI and its philosophical underpinnings. Based on the latter, the trustworthiness of an AI ecosystem can be conceived of as being grounded by both the so-called rational-choice and motivation-attributing accounts—i.e., trusting is rational because solution providers deliver expected services reliably, while trust also involves resigning control by attributing one’s motivation, and hence, goals, onto another entity. Our research question is: What aspects contribute to a responsible AI ecosystem that can promote justifiable trustworthiness in a healthcare environment? We argue that especially within devising governance and support aspects of a medical AI ecosystem, considering the so-called motivation-attributing account of trust provides fruitful pointers. There can and should be specific ways and governance structures supporting and nurturing trustworthiness beyond mere reliability. After compiling a list of preliminary requirements for this, we describe the emergence of one particular medical AI ecosystem and assess its compliance with and future ways of improving its functioning as a responsible AI ecosystem that promotes trustworthiness.

Towards a Non-Reliance Commitment Account of Trust

Towards a Non-Reliance Commitment Account of Trust

Epistemic Trust in Scientific Experts: A Moral Dimension

In this paper, I develop and defend a moralized conception of epistemic trust in science against a particular kind of non-moral account defended by John (2015, 2018). I suggest that non-epistemic value considerations, non-epistemic norms of communication and affective trust properly characterize the relationship of epistemic trust between scientific experts and non-experts. I argue that it is through a moralized account of epistemic trust in science that we can make sense of the deep-seated moral undertones that are often at play when non-experts (dis)trust science.

Caring for Valid Sexual Consent

Caring for Valid Sexual Consent

E-wallet Transaction Framework in Malaysia: An Evaluation of Potential Shariah Issues

The finance industry's rapid growth and technological advances have led to the emergence of e-wallets, an electronic payment method for goods or services without cash. So far in the Islamic finance industry, the use of e-wallets is still in its initial stages, and there is currently no guideline or regulation that governs its transactions. Therefore, this study aims to evaluate potential Shariah issues related to e-wallet transactions as practiced in Malaysia. A qualitative method was employed through content analysis, focusing on Touch 'n Go, GrabPay, and Boost as case studies. The findings highlight crucial Shariah issues surrounding e-wallet application by non-bank issuers, issues of trust account and credit card, and the granting of rewards in the e-wallet, including the transaction for a non-compliance item.The findings contribute significantly to policymakers in formulating Shariah parameter for e-wallet transactions, providing assurance to Muslim users and encouraging them to embrace electronic payment technology with confidence.

Propensity to trust shapes perceptions of comforting touch between trustworthy human and robot partners

Touching a friend to comfort or be comforted is a common prosocial behaviour, firmly based in mutual trust. Emphasising the interactive nature of trust and touch, we suggest that vulnerability, reciprocity and individual differences shape trust and perceptions of touch. We further investigate whether these elements also apply to companion robots. Participants (n = 152) were exposed to four comics depicting human–human or human–robot exchanges. Across conditions, one character was sad, the other initiated touch to comfort them, and the touchee reciprocated the touch. Participants first rated trustworthiness of a certain character (human or robot in a vulnerable or comforting role), then evaluated the two touch phases (initiation and reciprocity) in terms of interaction realism, touch appropriateness and pleasantness, affective state (valence and arousal) attributed to the characters. Results support an interactive account of trust and touch, with humans being equally trustworthy when comforting or showing vulnerability, and reciprocity of touch buffering sadness. Although these phenomena seem unique to humans, propensity to trust technology reduces the gap between how humans and robots are perceived. Two distinct trust systems emerge: one for human interactions and another for social technologies, both necessitating trust as a fundamental prerequisite for meaningful physical contact.

Informing a sociological jurisprudence of mutual trust and confidence

Abstract The aim of this paper is to inform a sociological jurisprudence of the implied duty in the contract of employment of mutual trust and confidence. Present analyses of the emerging term have been doctrinal in nature. Such scholarship contributes a normative internal perspective to what can be understood as the jurisprudential project of guarding and maintaining law as a practice of regulation. This paper seeks to generate knowledge that will allow for an extension of the jurisprudential analysis to take into account how mutual trust and confidence may manifest in contemporary conditions of work. This is achieved by, first, presenting original sociological data of the employment relation in a work context likely to demonstrate practices that resonate with features of mutual trust and confidence – that of early-stage digital technology startups – and, secondly, contrasting this empirical account with doctrinal conceptions of the term. Findings unsettle the dominant jurisprudential account of mutual trust and confidence as positively contributing to the social goal of labour law as operating to counter the power of capital.

Keep trusting! A plea for the notion of Trustworthy AI

AbstractA lot of attention has recently been devoted to the notion of Trustworthy AI (TAI). However, the very applicability of the notions of trust and trustworthiness to AI systems has been called into question. A purely epistemic account of trust can hardly ground the distinction between trustworthy and merely reliable AI, while it has been argued that insisting on the importance of the trustee’s motivations and goodwill makes the notion of TAI a categorical error. After providing an overview of the debate, we contend that the prevailing views on trust and AI fail to account for the ethically relevant and value-laden aspects of the design and use of AI systems, and we propose an understanding of the notion of TAI that explicitly aims at capturing these aspects. The problems involved in applying trust and trustworthiness to AI systems are overcome by keeping apart trust in AI systems and interpersonal trust. These notions share a conceptual core but should be treated as distinct ones.

Trauma, trust, & competent testimony

ABSTRACT Public discourse implicitly appeals to what we call the “Traumatic Untrustworthiness Argument” (TUA). To motivate, articulate, and assess the TUA, we appeal to Hawley’s (2019) commitment account of trust and trustworthiness. On Hawley’s account, being trustworthy consists in the successful avoidance of unfulfilled commitments and involves three components: the actual avoidance of unfulfilled commitments, sincerity in one’s taking on elective commitments, and competence in fulfilling commitments one has incurred. In contexts of testimony, what’s at issue is the speaker’s competence and sincere intention to speak truthfully. The TUA targets trauma victims’ competence rather than their sincerity. According to the TUA, empirical evidence shows that trauma undermines victims’ trustworthiness with regard to speaking truthfully about their trauma by undermining their competence to remember the relevant event. We argue that what the evidence shows is rather that remembering traumatic events involves a distinct “mode of manifesting” the competence to remember particular events from the personal past. Trauma victims are competent to speak truthfully about their trauma and ought to be trusted at least with regard to the central details of the event. By suggesting otherwise, the TUA threatens an insidious form of epistemic injustice which Hawley’s account helps us locate.

Knowing, Telling, Trusting

Abstract This paper falls into three parts. The first looks at wh-constructions, focussing on the so-called factual whs, ‘X knows where… ’, ‘when’, ‘who’, ‘what’ etc. I suggest, drawing on both linguistic considerations and evidence from developmental psychology, that these constructions take things as their objects, not propositions; and that this may be why they are learned before those taking sentential complements. The second part moves to the case of telling-wh: to constructions such as telling someone who is at the door. This construction brings a very particular set of requirements, not just to tell the truth, but to tell all the relevant truths and nothing but. The third section, in a critical discussion of Katherine Hawley's work, argues that an account of trust and testimony focussing on the telling-wh construction brings better results than one focussed on the blander idea of assertion.

Post-Truth and the Rhetoric of “Following the Science”

ABSTRACT Populists are often cast as deniers of rationality, creators of a climate of “post-truth,” and valuing tribe over truth and the rigors of science. Their critics claim the authority of rationality and empirical facts. Yet the critics no less than populists enable an environment of spurious claims and defective argumentation. This is especially true in the realm of science. An important case study is the account of scientific trust offered by a leading public intellectual and historian of science, Naomi Oreskes, and the misapplication of that theory during the coronavirus pandemic.

'You have to put a lot of trust in me': autonomy, trust, and trustworthiness in the context of mobile apps for mental health

Trust and trustworthiness are essential for good healthcare, especially in mental healthcare. New technologies, such as mobile health apps, can affect trust relationships. In mental health, some apps need the trust of their users for therapeutic efficacy and explicitly ask for it, for example, through an avatar. Suppose an artificial character in an app delivers healthcare. In that case, the following questions arise: Whom does the user direct their trust to? Whether and when can an avatar be considered trustworthy? Our study aims to analyze different dimensions of trustworthiness in the context of mobile health app use. We integrate O'Neill's account of autonomy, trust, and trustworthiness into a model of trustworthiness as a relational concept with four relata: B is trustworthy with respect to A regarding the performance of Z because of C. Together with O'Neill's criteria of trustworthiness (honesty, competence, and reliability), this four-sided model is used to analyze different dimensions of trustworthiness in an exemplary case of mobile health app use. Our example focuses on an app that uses an avatar and is intended to treat sleep difficulties. The conceptual analysis shows that interpreting trust and trustworthiness in health app use is multi-layered and involves a net of interwoven universal obligations. At the same time, O'Neill's approach to autonomy, trust, and trustworthiness offers a normative account to structure and analyze these complex relations of trust and trustworthiness using mobile health apps.

Fame and redemption: On the moral dangers of celebrity apologies

Fame and redemption: On the moral dangers of celebrity apologies

A paradigm-based explanation of trust

This article offers a functionalist account of trust. It argues that a particular form of trust—Communicated Interpersonal Trust—is paradigmatic and lays out how trust as a social practice in this form helps to satisfy fundamental practical, deliberative, and relational human needs in mutually reinforcing ways. We then argue that derivative (non-paradigmatic) forms of trust connect to the paradigm by generating a positive dynamic between trustor and trustee that is geared towards the realization of these functions. We call this trust’s proleptic potential. Our functionalist approach does not only provide important insights into the practice of trust and its place in the broader web of social life, but also illuminates existing philosophical debates. First, pointing out how opposing theoretical accounts of trust each capitalise on only one of its functions, our paradigm-based approach reveals why they each contain a kernel of truth but are also deficient: the optimal realization of each function is tied to the existence of the other functions as well. Second, we show how a functionalist re-orientation can illuminate two recent disputes regarding (i) the question whether trust is explanatorily two- or three-place and (ii) whether (and to what extent) we can decide to trust others.

Trusting What Ought to Happen

This paper introduces a new account of trust and distrust. The core aim of the paper is to introduce an account of trust that places treats trust and what ‘ought’ to happen as close conceptual companions. Over the course of the paper, I develop the account and compare it with certain rival accounts.

Conceptualizing divine trust

AbstractDoes God trust human persons? Very little in philosophy of religion has been written about God's trust, which seems striking for two joint considerations. First, many of the Abrahamic faith traditions posit that union and close personal relationship with God is the telos of human life. Second, trust seems to be an essential element in ideal, close relationships between persons. While there is much in the faith literature that emphasizes the role of trust on the human side of the divine–human relationship, there is very little on divine trust. To fill this lacuna, this article addresses the conceptual issue of how divine trust could be understood within the Abrahamic faith traditions (particularly in Christianity and Judaism). I begin by examining whether an account of divine trust can be developed alongside divine attributes like divine foreknowledge. After identifying some plausible conditions of trust within the philosophical literature, I present a couple of trust scenarios as a means of demonstrating that divine trust is not only conceptually plausible (i.e. compatible with divine foreknowledge), but that divine trust is best construed as a particular trust type – therapeutic trust. That is, I argue that divine trust aims at inspiring humanity's trustworthiness.

ACCESS TO JUSTICE

ACCESS TO JUSTICE