Ontological Account Research Articles

Adorno on objects: towards an inclusive social theory

ABSTRACT In this paper, we draw insights from Theodor W. Adorno’s views on objects to demonstrate the relevance of the subject-object-oriented model of social theory. By engaging closely with his notion of the ‘preponderance of the object’, we develop an account of social ontology that blends substantial, relational, and processual ontologies. We highlight the usefulness of Adorno’s social ontology in addressing contemporary social concerns related to subject-object relations, such as the reification of consciousness and objectification. Furthermore, we emphasize its significance in light of distorted subject-object relations. Considering these aspects, we argue that subject-object oriented social theory is more inclusive and relevant than the intersubjective model that emerged after the linguistic turn in Critical Theory.

Varieties of Revelation, Varieties of Truth—A Comparative Ontological Study of Revelation through Music and Sciences

Accounts of revelation and contemporary views of these are based on beliefs and historical citations. These accounts shall not be limited to the understanding and interpreting of historical and other events within writings but must present the possibility of an objective analysis of the nature of revelation as a phenomenon, an object of our sensory and mental conscious experiences. This paper approaches the act or phenomenon of revelation regardless of the revealer and its nature. Can we abstract the revealer and the revealed from revelation and have an ontological account of revelation solely focusing on the occurrence itself? The central part of the discussion is based on the object/property pair as ontological categories through which the means are analyzed. A comparative method is used where Scripture, musical writings, and mathematical/physical formulae (as potential means of revelation) are scrutinized. As a result, without any need to determine the revealer, revelation can be based on and described through pure properties (not tropes) in human experience, intellect, and understanding. The possibility of revelation beyond Scripture and Jesus Christ—following a type of liberal and general theory of revelation—presents itself in arts and sciences. The “true” of a musical work, when found and experienced during musical performances and scientific truths represented by the formulae, which describe the world and a meta domain, can be derived from the chains of signs and symbols as it is through Scripture. Human cognitive faculties present a universal natural limit to our direct experiencing of the transcendent, of the supernatural. A new dualist conception of logos as a metaphysical category marks the domain bridging the non-transcendent with the transcendent.

Съзнание, предмет, значение. Външният корелат на съзнанието и въпросът за значението

This paper is focused on an ontological account of three concepts in their constitutive interrelation: consciousness, object and signification. I would like in this way to set and answer to some extent to the question “What is the object?” The article doesn’t have a historic-philosophical character but in the same time it is often referring to exemplary conceptual statements.

Dancing in Movements, Movements in Sports: a Comparative Approach Toward a Metaphysical Realist Ontology

ABSTRACT Ontological approaches to the arts have neglected art forms such as dance. This hinders analysis of the metaphysical similarities and differences between different art forms. In this paper, I develop a metaphysical realist ontological approach to dance and sport that is grounded in embodiment. I first examine the debate between descriptivism and metaontological realism in the philosophy of arts in the context of Thomasson’s descriptive approach and Dodd’s metaontological approach of folk-theoretic modesty. Following Dodd, I adopt a realist metaontological approach to dance as an art form, drawing on philosophical debates within dance. I then review metaphysical approaches to sport and argue that most such approaches are based on abstract, top-down models. I therefore propose an ontological account of sport and dance based on metaontological realism and grounded in embodied movement knowledge. Drawing on Schaffer’s concept of ground functionalism, I use this approach to compare the aesthetic and bodily aspects of sport and dance in terms of elite-level movement knowledge. I describe how the embodiment of such movement knowledge through practice permits dancers and athletes to create expert movements. Drawing on findings from neuroscientific research, I argue that dancers and athletes, through the process of physiological plasticity, acquire embodied memories that are transformed into new bodily and behavioral dispositions. I believe that the metaphysical realist ontological approach presented here could help to broaden the focus in arts ontology to encompass movement disciplines such as sport and dance. This account may also engender cross-disciplinary research and encourage philosophers to explore the role of movement in arts such as music.

The "Hard Problem of Consciousness" Arises from Human Psychology.

Consciousness presents a "hard problem" to scholars. At stake is how the physical body gives rise to subjective experience. Why consciousness is "hard", however, is uncertain. One possibility is that the challenge arises from ontology-because consciousness is a special property/substance that is irreducible to the physical. Here, I show how the "hard problem" emerges from two intuitive biases that lie deep within human psychology: Essentialism and Dualism. To determine whether a subjective experience is transformative, people judge whether the experience pertains to one's essence, and per Essentialism, one's essence lies within one's body. Psychological states that seem embodied (e.g., "color vision" ∼ eyes) can thus give rise to transformative experience. Per intuitive Dualism, however, the mind is distinct from the body, and epistemic states (knowledge and beliefs) seem particularly ethereal. It follows that conscious perception (e.g., "seeing color") ought to seem more transformative than conscious knowledge (e.g., knowledge of how color vision works). Critically, the transformation arises precisely because the conscious perceptual experience seems readily embodied (rather than distinct from the physical body, as the ontological account suggests). In line with this proposal, five experiments show that, in laypeople's view (a) experience is transformative only when it seems anchored in the human body; (b) gaining a transformative experience effects a bodily change; and (c) the magnitude of the transformation correlates with both (i) the perceived embodiment of that experience, and (ii) with Dualist intuitions, generally. These results cannot solve the ontological question of whether consciousness is distinct from the physical. But they do suggest that the roots of the "hard problem" are partly psychological.

Why Mereological Essentialism Applies to Mereological Aggregates

Abstract This article’s purpose is to defend the depiction of ordinary-sized physical objects as mereological aggregates (MAs), to clarify what the ontology of an MA is, and to show why mereological essentialism (ME) applies to MAs that seem to be ubiquitous if we are to adopt what Frank Jackson calls “Serious Metaphysics” and refuse to broaden our ontology beyond what is (allegedly) bequeathed to us by physics and chemistry. To accomplish this goal, first, I clarify certain background issues that inform what follows and I identify certain constraints that relate to the contemporary ambivalence towards ME. Second, I present a primer on Husserlian mereology that provides a superior account of parts and wholes than the inadequate approach identified in the previous section. Third, I will offer a defense of ME as the correct approach to providing an ontological account of MAs. Finally, I will evaluate two defeaters against my thesis.

Visual Asynchrony & Temporally Extended Contents

Temporal experiences, according to retentionalism, essentially have temporally extended contents: contents which represent distinct events at distinct temporal locations, and some of their temporal relations. This means, retentionalists insist, that temporal experiences themselves needn’t be extended in time: only their contents are. The paper reviews an experiment by Moutoussis and Zeki, which demonstrates a colour-motion visual asynchrony (§2): information about motion seems to be processed more slowly than information about colour, so that the former is delayed relative to the latter. This, the paper argues, raises an important difficulty for retentionalism and its account of the temporal ontology of experiences: it suggests that a central background assumption about neural processing presupposed by retentionalism is false, at least in cases of visual asynchrony. The paper then explores the general significance of this result for retentionalism (§3).

Ontology as ideology: A critique of Butler's theory of precariousness

Ontology as ideology: A critique of Butler's theory of precariousness

Understanding Hegel's Logic: On Houlgate's Hegel on Being

Understanding Hegel's Logic: On Houlgate's <scp><i>Hegel on Being</i></scp>

No Magic: From Phenomenology of Practice to Social Ontology of Mathematics

The paper shows how to use the Husserlian phenomenological method in contemporary philosophical approaches to mathematical practice and mathematical ontology. First, the paper develops the phenomenological approach based on Husserl's writings to obtain a method for understanding mathematical practice. Then, to put forward a full-fledged ontology of mathematics, the phenomenological approach is complemented with social ontological considerations. The proposed ontological account sees mathematical objects as social constructions in the sense that they are products of culturally shared and historically developed practices. At the same time the view endorses the sense that mathematical reality is given to mathematicians with a sense of independence. As mathematical social constructions are products of highly constrained, intersubjective practices and accord with the phenomenologically clarified experience of mathematicians, positing them is phenomenologically justified. The social ontological approach offers a way to build mathematical ontology out of the practice with no metaphysical magic.

Ubuntu’s Ontological Account in African Philosophy and its Cross-Tradition Engagement on the Issue of Being versus Becoming

This paper x-rays Ramose’s ubuntu ontological account in African philosophy and its cross-tradition engagement on the issue of being versus becoming (such as the Yin-Yang, Heraclitean, Nietzschean, Whiteheadean and the Buddhists’ accounts) with a view to showing how convergence and divergence of thoughts in the African, European, and Asian philosophy contexts can advance cross-cultural philosophizing or cross-tradition approach to doing philosophy. Ramose’s ubuntu ontology designates a reconstruction of reality within the framework of motion, as captured in his concept of be-ing-becoming, while the Heraclitean, Nietzschean, Whiteheadean and the Buddhists’ ontological accounts also conceive reality within the confines of endless motion, except the Yin-Yang metaphysical vision that interprets reality within the perspective of complementarity. Attempts are made, in the paper, to highlight the Ramosean ubuntu ontology and how it can constructively engage with other traditions’ ontological accounts, as mentioned above, in a fruitful encounter of the African thought tradition, which Ramose belongs to, and the European and Asian traditions of thought, which the other mentioned ontological accounts belong to.

ON A NEW APPROACH TO PEIRCE’S THREE-VALUE PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC

Even though it is obvious that mathematics involves social activities, this rather trivial fact is rarely considered as important for its subject matter, mostly due to its undesired ontological consequences. An attempted solution for this tension was developed by Julian Cole’s institutional account of mathematics, named Practice- Dependent Realism. In the present paper, Cole’s account is evaluated, and its lights and shadows assessed concerning the ontological problem that he seeks to solve. I argue that his institutional account, although failing in delivering a sufficient ontological account of mathematics, still opens an important linguistic route for explaining its practice.

The ontology of epidemics-A value-dependent realist account of epidemics.

Charters and Heitman have recently argued that epidemic status is lost once the disease becomes 'accepted into people's daily lives and routines, becoming endemic-domesticated-and accepted'. This is a normativist, subjectivist approach to epidemic classification; that is, it is both value-laden, and dependent on the attitudes of the population. In this article, we argue for an alternative approach: a value-dependent realist account of epidemic-status. We aim to provide an ontological account of epidemics, with a particular focus on their endings. We do not attempt to present a historical account of previous epidemics, or why their endings were declared, but rather consider the theoretical underpinnings of such declarations. Further, our account is meant to be more prescriptive than descriptive; that is to say, even if public health does not currently view epidemics in the manner we advocate, the metaphysic of epidemics we advocate is, we believe, that which public health should ultimately endorse. The methodologies employed in this article are primarily those common to the philosophy of public health, philosophy of medicine and metaphysics; namely, conceptual analysis grounded by practical considerations. Charters and Heitman have recently argued that epidemic status is lost once the disease becomes 'accepted into people's daily lives and routines, becoming endemic-domesticated-and accepted'. This is a normativist, subjectivist approach to epidemic classification; that is, it is both value-laden, and dependent on the attitudes of the population. In this article, we argue for an alternative approach: a value-dependent realist account of epidemic-status. To frame the argument we draw from complexity theory, arguing that human populations can be viewed as complex systems, and epidemic-status as an emergent property of a complex system. We propose aggregating the normative standards relevant to labeling a disease as an epidemic, and use this as our indicator for both the beginning, and the end of epidemics. An epidemic ends, we argue, once the burden of disease drops below an objective but distinctly normative 'epidemic threshold'.

The World in the Wave Function

<i>The World in the Wave Function</i>

Ephemeral climates: Plato's geographic myths and the phenomenological nature of climate and its changes

Historical and cultural approaches to climate generally consider climate to be a stabilising concept between weather and culture. Different historical and cultural concepts of climate signify different ways of learning to live with the weather. However, anthropogenic climate change evidences the limit of this approach: instead of stabilising, climates ephemeralise together with the ways we have come to adapt to them. Changing climates require a concept of climate that captures how climates are experienced both as stable and ephemeral. To create such a concept, I engage in an exercise of counterfactual etymology, reconstructing the concept of climate that might have emerged from the Ancient Greek term hora as opposed to klima. Central to my re-creation of phenomenological climate are Plato's myths, through which I highlight the methodological kinship between myth and phenomenology. Drawing on a later dialogue, Philebus, I provide an ontological account of climates as both stable and ephemeral. I conclude by situating my approach to climate and its changes in recent work on the relationship between weather and climate, arguing for the necessity of phenomenological climate in order to make sense of what changes with climate change. My turn to Ancient Greek philosophy and its application to the phenomenology of climate and its changes sounds out a novel approach to research in historical geography.

A Byzantine Metaphysics of Artefacts? The Case of Michael of Ephesus’ Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics

The ontology of artefacts in Byzantine philosophy is still a terra incognita. One way of mapping this unexplored territory is to delve into Michael of Ephesus’ commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Written around 1100, this commentary provides a detailed interpretation of the most important source for Aristotle’s ontological account of artefacts. By highlighting Michael’s main metaphysical tenets and his interpretation of key-passages of the Aristotelian work, this study aims to reconstruct Michael’s ontology of artefacts and present it as one instance, which is perhaps exemplary, of the Byzantine ontology of artefacts. In particular, the study shows that this commentary holds a definite position on the nature of artefacts, according to which they are neither substances nor hylomorphic compounds. Indeed, artefacts lack a form altogether and their forms exist only in thought. As a result, Michael’s commentary provides an ontological interpretation of artefacts as accidental beings, i.e., as matter which acquires a mere property as opposed to a substantial form. While such an interpretation shows originality when compared to the Aristotelian text, it also indicates adherence to the reading established by Alexander of Aphrodisias, despite important departures concerning the status of natural forms.

Dispositionalism at Work: A Causal Theory of Perception

This paper seeks to show how a proper version of dispositionalism, taking powers as basic elements of reality, may figure as a causal theory of perception. On the basis of this argument, the paper draws some further conclusions, which may indicate the explanatory competence of such a disposition-affine theory of causality, for example in terms of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, as well as an ontological account of mere potentialities of active capacities to perceive and of “privations,” respectively.

Being-With, Respect, and Adoration

According to Stephen Darwall, being with others involves an implicit, second-personal respect for them. I argue that this is correct as far as it goes. Calling on Jean-Luc Nancy’s more ontological account of being-with, though, I also argue that Darwall’s account overlooks something morally very important: right at the heart of the being-with that gives us to ourselves as answerable to others on the basis of determinate, contractualist moral principles, we encounter an irreducible excess of sense that renders those principles questionable. Following Nancy, I characterize this exposure to excess as adoration and develop some of its moral implications.

1New Materialisms

AbstractThis review of new work in the new materialisms in 2020 picks up a thread of inquiry outlined in the previous year: how to understand how human persons may live, act, and find political efficacy in a relational and intertangled material world. Each of the monographs reviewed offers a different approach to understanding how persons find agency from within the intertanglements of things. Along the way, they address questions of embodiment, of race and of gender, of the materiality of language, of the role of the imagination, of the philosophy of history, and of critical method. Following the introduction, the first three sections are 1. Lo! A Shape!; 2. Militant Vegetables; and 3. Blackness and Plasticity. Each of these offers a distinct account of human ontology, accounting both for the ways the self is moved by its world and the ways it acts within it. The last three sections are: 4. Strange Words, Strange Matter; 5. Disappearing Things; and 6. Four Degrees of History. Each of these considers a monograph which synthesizes new materialist theory with frameworks from related fields in order to offer new perspectives on human action, freedom, or thought.

John Owen as proto-social trinitarian? Reinterpreting Owen and resisting a recent trend

AbstractContrary to much of the recent literature on the trinitarian theology of John Owen, which often ascribes radical personal distinction to his account of triune relations and actions, this paper argues that Owen's account of distinct divine persons and trinitarian actions ought not to be contrasted with his theological forebears: Augustine, Thomas Aquinas and Calvin. Instead, his account of trinitarian ontology and operation is thoroughly consistent with (and dependent upon) the Augustinian principles that these interpreters suspect Owen is rejecting. The argument unfolds by presenting four putative points of strong personal distinction in John Owen's trinitarian theology and then reinterpreting each of the themes and passages that these four points are supposedly rooted in, evidencing his Augustinian account of trinitarian unity and distinction.