Account Of Akrasia Research Articles

Aristotle on the Archai of Practical Thought

AbstractScholars have long debated how exactly Aristotle thinks that agents acquire the distinctive archai (“principles” or “starting‐points”) that govern their practical reasoning. The debate has traditionally been dominated by anti‐intellectualists, who hold that for Aristotle all agents acquire their archai solely through a process of habituation in the nonrational soul. Their traditional opponents, the intellectualists, focus their argument on the case of the virtuous person, arguing that in Aristotle’s view virtuous agents acquire their archai through a process of reasoning. I intervene in this debate in two main ways: first, I press a heretofore underappreciated objection against anti‐intellectualism, that it is inconsistent with Aristotle’s account of akrasia; and second, I urge that all sides in the debate would benefit from more sustained attention to Aristotle’s nonvirtuous character types. In the final section, I suggest that proper consideration of the full breadth of Aristotle’s account of character points in the direction of a new approach that I call “character pluralism,” according to which Aristotle’s moral psychology does not involve a single conception of psychic structure or moral development that is equally applicable to all character types.

Akrasia and conflict in the Nicomachean Ethics

ABSTRACTIn Nicomachean Ethics VII, Aristotle offers an account of akrasia that purports to salvage the kernel of truth in the Socratic paradox that people act against what is best only through ignorance. Despite Aristotle’s apparent confidence in having identified the sense in which Socrates was right about akrasia, we are left puzzling over Aristotle’s own account, and the extent to which he agrees with Socrates. The most fundamental interpretive question concerns the sense in which Aristotle takes the akratic to be ignorant. The received view in the literature has been the intellectualist interpretation, which takes akratic agents to be so ignorant of the wrongness of what they do as to be unaware of it. In recent decades, many scholars have identified serious problems in this interpretation and have moved towards the non-intellectualist reading, the strong version of which takes clearheaded akrasia to be possible. There is, however, a glaring shortage of discussion of the difficulties facing the strong non-intellectualist reading. In this paper, I present what I take to be the most salient reasons for rejecting strong non-intellectualism, and argue that Aristotle’s text supports a moderate non-intellectualism, according to which clearheaded akrasia is impossible.

Deviant Causal Chains, Knowledge of Reasons, and Akrasia

I begin by refuting Davidson’s classic account of akrasia, which turns on a purported distinction between judging p and judging p “all things considered.” The upshot of this refutation is that an adequate account of akrasia must turn on a distinction between different ways in which the agent can make judgments about her practical reasons. On the account I propose, an akratic agent makes an existential judgment that there is some decisive practical reason to act in a certain way without also knowing what that reason is. An agent can do what such a reason requires only by deviating from the conditions under which her action would be a response to it. The possibility of akrasia is a consequence of our concern not only to perform actions that match what our reasons require but also to manifest reasons in conduct that they inform.

Multiplicity, self-narrative, and akrasia

In this paper, I present a new account of akrasia based on the idea that human psychology and self-narrativity are more complex and layered than we have traditionally thought. I begin by arguing that, if we have at least some different beliefs, desires, preferences, etc. in different situations, then we can rationally do what we think, at the time of action, is best for, or from the standpoint of, “part of me” while acting contrary to what we think, at the time of action, is best for, or from the more comprehensive standpoint of, “me.” I then argue that many of us do, in fact, think and act this way in everyday life, and that this kind of action satisfies all the criteria for akrasia. Finally, I briefly argue that on my account of akrasia, akratic actions are not necessarily irrational or blameworthy, though they often will be.

Understanding addiction: Donald Davidson and the problem of akrasia*

The aims of this article are threefold: (i) to show how the work of American philosopher, Donald Davidson can throw light on the concept of addiction; (ii) to argue thereby that addiction is not a myth; and (iii) to help understand the addicted person's experience of feeling compelled to behave repeatedly in ways she does not want. Addictive behaviour is obviously intentional and this had led some to argue that addiction is a myth. In contrast, we propose that it is possible to see addictive behaviour as intentional while at the same time constructing a meaningful and useful understanding of addiction. The principal way this can be done is by seeing addiction as a class of akratic action, something that has been a topic of philosophical reflection since the ancient Greeks. By illustration, we summarise Davidson's enquiry into how it is logically possible to say that akratic action exists and show that, in accepting that akratic action is logically possible, it may also be possible to understand how someone can continue to carry out an addictive behaviour despite repeated resolutions that they will refrain from doing it. We compare in passing Davidson's account of akrasia with recent behavioural choice theories of addiction. We finish by focussing on Davidson's conclusion at the end of his essay that the akrates cannot understand her own behaviour and by drawing out the possible significance of this for an understanding of addicts’ reports of feeling compelled to carry out addictive behaviour.

Akrasia and Perceptual Illusion

de Anima III. 10 characterizes akrasia as a conflict between phantasia (imagination) on one side and rational cognition on the other: the akratic agent is torn between an appetite for what appears good to her phantasia and a rational desire for what her intellect believes good. This entails that akrasia is parallel to certain cases of perceptual illusion. Drawing on Aristotle's discussion of such cases in the de Anima and de Insomniis, I use this parallel to illuminate the difficult discussion of akrasia in Nicomachean Ethics VII.3, arguing that its account of akrasia as involving ignorance is compatible with, and in fact crucially supplements, the more straightforward account we find elsewhere in the corpus of akrasia as a struggle between desires.

Akrasia and self-control

According to Gary Watson (1977), if we choose not to implement a judgment about what it is best to do then we must have changed that judgment. On those grounds he rejects an otherwise plausible account of akrasia, or weakness of will, that explains it in terms of the relative strengths of the agent's desires to act against and in accordance with their evaluative judgment. However, Watson seems to assume what I call a ‘principle of closure of evaluation’, a principle that I argue can fail. The possibility of such failure of closure of evaluation means that Watson's argument can be resisted, allowing us to maintain this plausible account of akrasia.

Spinoza's Account of Akrasia

Perhaps the central problem which preoccupies Spinoza as a moral philosopher is the conflict between reason and passion. He belongs to a long tradition that sees the key to happiness and virtue as mastery and control by reason over the passions. This mastery, however, is hard won, as the passions often overwhelm its power and subvert its rule. When reason succumbs to passion, we act against our better judgment. Such action is often termed 'akratic'. Many commentators have complained that the psychological principles that Spinoza appeals to in his account of akrasia are mere ad hoc modifications to his philosophical psychology. I show, on the contrary, that these principles follow from some of the most important and interesting aspects of Spinoza's philosophy of mind.

Intention et faiblesse de la volonté

ABSTRACTAkrasia is both an intentional and an irrational phenomenon. These two characteristics can be reconciled by a careful reconstruction of practical reasoning. I undertake this task along Davidsonian lines, arguing against his critics that the notion of unconditional judgement is the key to an adequate account of akrasia. Unless akrasia is conceived as a failure of the agent to form an unconditional judgement that conforms to her best judgement “all things considered,” the intentionality of akrasia is lost. Likewise, I show how practical and theoretical reasonings concur in the production of action, and why akrasia is a problem for the philosophy of action before being a problem for moral philosophy.

Davidson, Irrationality, and Ethics

In this essay I will outline Donald Davidson's account of two forms of irrationality, akrasia and self-deception, and relate this account to ethical action and belief.1 His view of irrationality is generally a Freudian one, to the effect that agents can act akratically or believe self-deceptively only because they compartmentalize mental contents. Davidson says that agents must compartmentalize both offending particular mental contents, and governing second order principles. Irrationality is engendered when particular contents and offending principles are excluded from reasoning without justification, and so agents are free to reason so as to act akratically or to hold unwarranted beliefs, for the offending contents and governing principles are no longer considered. But Davidson also hints that his account of akrasia and self-deception might show certain normative and meta-ethical theories to be irrational, insofar as they too engender irrationality. I explore these hints, showing both that Davidson is correct about irrationality, and that his view does show some theories to be irrational as well. Kantian deontology and moral realism will engender irrationality when agents follow them. I believe this to be no great loss to ethics generally, but hopefully serves to aid our understanding of how ethical action and belief actually happen. But if I am correct here, it should be said that Davidson himself would probably not agree with me. This is because he extends his of to ethical intentions and beliefs, saying that even here everything depends finding agreement.2 He even says that when it comes to moral intentions and beliefs, he is on the side of objectivity.3 But I think that Davidson betrays a failing here. He should not try to apply his principle of charity to moral intents and beliefs, for there is little reason to think that they are subject to it. Davidson claims that akrasia is what occurs when agents intentionally do what they think is not the best thing to do, all things considered. Agents weigh the evidence and judge that a certain action is the best thing to do. They judge that they should intentionally do that particular action. Then, against this judgment, such agents do not perform that action, but rather they intentionally do something else. This other action, moreover, akratic agents concede is not best to do, but is rather undesirable. For example, imagine that night I am lying in bed with my wife. I judge this the best thing to do all things considered. I then get up, and intentionally walk all around the house in a vigilant fashion, and finally return to bed. But my view, this was not the best thing to do. I did not even want to do it, and yet I did. Davidson says the reason that akrasia is irrational is not because it flouts any convention, but because it offends against what he calls the of continence. This is just that one should not intentionally perform an action when judges the basis of what deems to be all the available considerations that an alternative and accessible course of action would be better.4 Irrationality is engendered here because I have gone against my own second order principle of continence, and because I am violating this principle without justification. Davidson says that such irrationality allows reasoning to cause action without rationalizing it.5 The reasoning is still intentional, but is not the product of any good arguments. Therefore, in my example, I should have stayed in bed with my wife, but somehow I violated my principle of continence, and got up for my evening rounds. The intentional reason why I did this caused but did not rationalize my action. Davidson's account of self-deception is similar to but not the same as his account of akrasia, for while akrasia concerns intention formation and actions, self-deception concerns belief formation and the resultant beliefs. Self-deception is the state that an agent enters when, against his own estimation of the evidence, he knowingly forms a belief that contradicts another of his beliefs. …

AKRASIA

AbstractAristotle's account of akrasia is unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. First, his account of the problem is coloured by a number of unattractive assumptions and preoccupations; second, his central claim, that akrasia involves a temporary displacement of knowledge, deals at best with only a small number of cases; third, he is wrong to suppose that the akrates is typically someone overwhelmed by passion. We need to follow Davidson in recognising that the central problem consists in a failure to convert intention into action. Any solution must involve a recognition that we are dealing with a range of very different kinds of case, which demand different kinds of treatment. For example sometimes agents are overtaken by passion; sometimes they coolly and calmly do the wrong thing; sometimes they are insincere; sometimes they are suffering from a weakness of will; sometimes they are guilty of some kind of self deception; and sometimes they may have difficulty in comparing the goods and evils available.

The Practical Syllogism and Akrasia

Aristotle is often credited with views about practical reasoning, desire, and action collectively referred to as the theory of the practical syllogism.Some commentators are skeptical about the existence of any such general theory, but most would agree that a theory of some sort is outlined in the De Motu Animalium and that it influences Aristotle’s account of akrasia in the icomachean Ethics.This paper will begin by describing the most important ideas in the De Motu Animalium discussion of the practical syllogism. The ideas are simple but I think that their implications and philosophical importance have not been appreciated. I will suggest that the practical syllogism is Aristotle’s model for the rational explanation of action. Other commentators have made this claim, but I think that it can be given a very precise sense. Aristotle thinks that an action can be rationally explained if the agent acts in response to the strength of the reasons that he sees for acting. The practical syllogism is an argument that expresses the reasons in favor of the action, so if the agent acts for those reasons the action is explained by the practical syllogism. The second part of the paper considers the work that the practical syllogism does in Aristotle’s account of akrasia. I will argue that in akrasia—at least in the most extreme kind of akrasia—the agent acts intentionally to satisfy a desire but the action cannot be explained by a practical syllogism. Aristotle distinguishes between explanation by the motivational strength of desires and explanation by a practical syllogism. The last part of this paper comments on David Charles’s interpretation of Aristotle’s views about desire, practical reason, and akrasia. Charles discusses the traditionally disputed questions in a provocative way, and more importantly his suggestions fit together into a complex and philosophically sophisticated reading of Aristotle. I disagree with his most important claims, but I can best explain and defend my own interpretation by contrasting it with his.

Is Aristotle's Account of Incontinence Inconsistent?

Included among the many topics on which Aristotle writes in the Nicomacheon Ethics is an account of incontinence or akrasia. Many controversies have arisen among interpreters of Aristotle on this issue, and a few of these disputes will be discussed in this paper. In the first part of this paper I shall indicate the usual way of reading Aristotle's account of incontinence, which I shall call the natural interpretation. In the second section I shall raise some apparent difficulties with the natural interpretation by pointing out three passages in the Nicomacheon Ethics which seem to be inconsistent with it. Finally, in the concluding three sections of this paper I shall argue that the three passages allegedly inconsistent with the natural interpretation can be shown to be consistent with the general line of argument that the natural interpretation takes Aristotle to be following. In showing how these passages can be reconciled with the usual way of reading Aristotle's account of akrasia, a much clearer and more complete picture of what his view is emerges. In addition, this reading makes Aristotle's account of incontinence more philosophically acceptable - though it is not without its problems - than it is normally supposed to be.

Aristotle on Practical Inference, the Explanation of Action, and Akrasia

In his edition of the Nicomachean Ethics John Burnet added two appendices as particularly relevant to Aristotle's discussion of akrasia (weakness). The first appendix, De Anima, III, 10, contains Aristotle's discussion of how practical reason and want combine to cause movement for the sake of something and how explanations of action can be constructed in terms of these two elements; in the other appendix, De Motu 7, Aristotle casts explanations of actions in the form of practical inferences. The relevance of these passages to Aristotle's discussion of akrasia is beyond dispute: Aristotle explicitly employs practical inferences to represent the motivations of the akrates (weak man), and he clearly regards the behavior of the akrates as a case of movement for the sake of something, a case of action. Burnet's appendices suggest what seems to me the only sound strategy for unraveling and understanding Aristotle's explanation of akrasia. We must place this explanation within Aristotle's general theory of the explanation of action and the role of practical inference in such explanation. Akrasia is a difficult case with problems peculiar to it, but all the same it is a case of movement for the sake of something, and in explaining it Aristotle follows his paradigm of the explanation of action. In this paper I wish to take full advantage of this strategy in an attempt to reconstruct in detail and take a fresh look at Aristotle's account of akrasia. The dividends of this strategy will show themselves, I hope, as I try along the way to resolve some of the textual and philosophical difficulties in Aristotle's account, difficulties traditionally and recently raised by commentators.'