Accidental Generalizations Research Articles

Metaphysical Necessity in the Neo-Sadraian School and Assessment of Necessitarian Theories of the Laws of Nature

To differentiate between the laws of nature and accidental generalizations, we must adopt a view of necessity that is capable of being realized in relationships existing among natural objects. In neo-Sadraian Islamic philosophy, metaphysical necessity is accepted as part of the cause-effect relationship. This paper compares the neo-Sadraian interpretation of necessity and necessitarian theories about the laws of nature, particularly essentialism and universal theory. By resorting to specific forms al-shûrat al-naw’iyyah, the origin of the essential properties of natural objects, I argue that neo-Sadraians have proposed a perspective on metaphysical necessity that is epistemologically a posteriori.

Metaphysical Explanation Separated from Grounding

AbstractGrounding is typically associated to metaphysical explanation on the basis of the explanatory role’s being characteristic of grounding as well. Some even say that all what metaphysical explanation does is tracking the grounding relation. However, recently Maurin has argued that grounding does not “inherit” its properties from metaphysical explanation and, consequently, we should be “separatists”. In this paper separatism will be defended from the perspective of metaphysical explanation thus giving a turn to the separatist strategy. In particular, the structural difference between grounding and metaphysical explanation will be pointed out as affecting also the explanatory function. It will be shown how dispositions and essentialist claims play different roles in the two theories. Lastly, it will be claimed that the two theories diverge on accounting for law-like and accidental generalizations. Provided these arguments are sound, there will be good reason to tell metaphysical explanation apart from grounding.

Grounding and the Objection from Accidental Generalizations

Monistic grounding says that there is one fundamental ground, while pluralistic grounding says that there are many such grounds. Grounding necessitarianism says that grounding entails, but is not reducible to, necessitation, while grounding contingentism says that there are at least some cases where grounding does not entail necessitation. Pluralistic grounding necessitarianism is a very popular position, but accidental generalizations, such as ‘all solid gold spheres are less than one mile in diameter’, pose well-known problems for this view: the many fundamental grounds of such generalizations do not necessitate them. Though there is a straightforward response to this objection, I argue that it fails. Thus the objection from accidental generalizations stands, and proponents of pluralistic grounding necessitarianism face the following dilemma: either give up pluralistic grounding, or give up necessitarianism.

The Surfeit of the Stimulus: Analytic Biases Filter Lexical Statistics in Turkish Laryngeal Alternations

In an experimental task with novel words, we find that some lexical statistical regularities of Turkish phonotactics are productively extended in nonce words, while others are not. In particular, while laryngeal alternation rates in the lexicon can be predicted by the place of articulation of the stem-final stop, by word-length, and by the preceding vowel quality, this laryngeal alternation is only productively conditioned by place of articulation and word-length. Speakers’ responses in a novel word task demonstrate that although they are attuned to the place of articulation and size effects, they ignore preceding vowels, even though the lexicon contains this information in abundance. We interpret this finding as evidence that speakers distinguish between phonologically motivated generalizations and accidental generalizations. We propose that universal grammar (UG), a set of analytic biases, acts as a filter on the generalizations that humans can make: UG contains information about possible and impossible interactions between phonological elements. Omnivorous statistical models that do not have information about possible interactions incorrectly reproduce accidental generalizations, thus failing to model speakers’ behavior.*

Sober and Elgin on laws of biology: a critique

In this short discussion note, I discuss whether any of the generalizations made in biology should be construed as laws. Specifically, I examine a strategy offered by Elliot Sober (1997) and supported by Mehmet Elgin (2006) to reformulate certain biological generalizations so as to eliminate their contingency, thereby allowing them to count as laws. I argue that this strategy entails a conception of laws that is unacceptable on two counts: (1) Sober and Elgin’s approach allows the possibility of formulating laws describing any biological phenomenon whatsoever; and (2) on Sober and Elgin’s view, any interesting contrast between so-called laws and obviously accidental generalizations collapses. I conclude by offering suggestions to refine their view in order to avoid these theoretical problems.

Why Unification Is Neither Necessary Nor Sufficient for Explanation

In this paper, I argue that unification is neither necessary nor sufficient for explanation. Focusing on the versions of the unificationist theory of explanation of Kitcher and of Schurz and Lambert, I establish three theses. First, Kitcher's criterion of unification is vitiated by the fact that it entails that every proposition can be explained by itself, a flaw that it is unable to overcome. Second, because neither Kitcher's theory nor that of Schurz and Lambert can solve the problems of asymmetry and accidental generalizations, it follows that unification is not sufficient to ground explanation. Third, some good explanations are disunifying, which entails that unification is not necessary for explanation either.

The logical form of universal generalizations

First order logic does not distinguish between different forms of universal generalization; in this paper I argue that lawlike and accidental generalizations (broadly construed) have a different logical form, and that this distinction is syntactically marked in English. I then consider the relevance of this broader conception of lawlikeness to the philosophy of science.

LAWS AND DEVELOPMENT

J. J. C Smart (1963) once argued that biology is unlike the physical sciences because there are no laws in biology. While physics and chemistry can construct general theories centered on genuine laws, biology is limited to case studies that make use of the laws of physics and chemistry: biology is more like engineering than it is like the physical sciences. The debate about biological laws has continued since Smart’s condemnation of laws in biology, drawing both philosophers and biologists into its wake. For instance, Mayr (1988) argues that one of the chief differences between biology and the physical sciences is that biology has no genuine laws. Hull (1978) claims that since species and taxa are individuals and not natural kinds, no statements that refer to species or taxa can be construed as laws. Waters (1986) asserts that the principle of natural selection is not a law, and Beatty (1981) argues that the laws of population genetics are not laws. On the other side, Brandon (1981), Sober (1984), Rosenberg (1985), and Resnik (1988) argue that the principle of natural selection is a law, and Rosenberg (1985) asserts that molecular biology also contains laws. Finally, van der Steen and Kamminga (1991) discuss the tension between laws and natural history in biology. In this paper I will examine the argument against developmental laws in more depth. I will agree with the neo-Darwinian orthodoxy that the socalled developmental laws proposed by the process structuralists are not genuine biological laws, although I will not accept the standard arguments for this position. The standard arguments against biological laws claim that biological generalizations are not laws because they describe mere accidental, historical features of the living world. I will argue that, on the contrary, a statement could be a law even though it may describe accidental (or historical) features of the world. Whether a statement is a law depends on the role it plays in inquiry: laws typically play a more central role in inquiry than accidental generalizations. Thus, the reason why the laws proposed by the developmental biologists are not laws of nature is that

Natural laws and the problem of provisos

Hempel and Giere contend that the existence of provisos poses grave difficulties for any regularity account of physical law. However, Hempel and Giere rely upon a mistaken conception of the way in which statements acquire their content. By correcting this mistake, I remove the problem Hempel and Giere identify but reveal a different problem that provisos pose for a regularity account — indeed, for any account of physical law according to which the state of affairs described by a law-statement presupposes a Humean regularity. These considerations suggest a normative analysis of law-statements. On this view, law-statements are not distinguished from accidental generalizations by the kind of Humean regularities they describe because a law-statement need not describe any Humean regularity. Rather, a law-statement says that in certain contexts, one ought to regard the assertion of a given type of claim, if made with justification, as a proper way to justify a claim of a certain other kind.

The metaphysics of quantity

A formal theory of quantity T Q is presented which is realist, Platonist, and syntactically second-order (while logically elementary), in contrast with the existing formal theories of quantity developed within the theory of measurement, which are empiricist, nominalist, and syntactically first-order (while logically non-elementary). T Q is shown to be formally and empirically adequate as a theory of quantity, and is argued to be scientifically superior to the existing first-order theories of quantity in that it does not depend upon empirically unsupported assumptions concerning existence of physical objects (e.g. that any two actual objects have an actual sum). The theory T Q supports and illustrates a form of naturalistic Platonism, for which claims concerning the existence and properties of universals form part of natural science, and the distinction between accidental generalizations and laws of nature has a basis in the second-order structure of the world.

Verisimilitude vs. legisimilitude

The recent theories of truthlikeness have not paid attention to the distinction between lawlike and accidental generalizations. L.J. Cohen has expressed this by saying that science aims at “legisimilitude” rather than “verisimilitude”. G. Oddie has given a reply to Cohen by defining the notion of legisimilitude in terms of higher-order logics. This paper gives a different reply to Cohen by treating laws as physically necessary generalizations and by defining the notion of legisimilitude as closeness to a suitably chosen lawlike sentence.

Lawlikeness and the End of Science

Although our theories are not precisely true, scientific realists contend that we should admit their objects into our ontology. One justification—offered by Sellars and Putnam—is that current theories belong to series that converge to ideally adequate theories. I consider the way the commitment to convergence reflects on the interpretation of lawlike claims. I argue that the distinction between lawlike and accidental generalizations depends on our cognitive interests and reflects our commitment to the direction of scientific progress. If the sciences disagree about the lawlikeness of some generalization(s), as an argument of Davidson's suggests, it follows from the interest relatively of lawlikeness that the laws of a science do not determine the essences of their objects. I conclude that this form of scientific realism provides no metaphysical support for essentialism.

Must a Cause Be Contingently Related to Its Effects?

Most writers on causation have distinguished causal relations or natural necessities from mere correlations or accidental generalizations. I shall assume that this is a valid distinction. However, a "Dogma" of empiricism has been that natural necessity does not amount to logical necessity and that causes are contingently related to effects. In this paper I shall argue that this Dogma is mistaken.

Enunciados nomológicos y condicionales contrafácticos

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