Acceptance Of Democracy Research Articles

Faktori uspona italijanske radikalne desnice sa osvrtom na njene fašističke elemente

The topic of the paper is the Italian radical right, which won a landslide victory in last year's elections and formed the most right-wing government since World War Two. The aim of the paper is to determine the reasons for strengthening the Italian right's fascist wing through the analysis of its history and the circumstances of its activity and to show whether the fears of the European Union that fascism returned to one of its founding countries are justified. The main difference between the modern radical right and fascism is its acceptance of democracy and political pluralism. It is fundamentally different from classic fascist parties, it is characterized by populism and not elitism, nativism instead of racism, it is not autocratic but democratic. Up until the nineties, the term right was equated with fascism in Italian political discourse, so a true right did not even exist as a regular actor in political life. The conclusion of the paper is that Italy never truly broke with fascism, the process of defascification was not carried out in its entirety. The victory of the radical right, in which the youngest party, Fratelli d'Italia, which is the offspring of Mussolini's party, dominates is the result of the EU membership itself and the waves of crises it faces, the specificities of the Italian political system, the peculiarities of Italian fascism, a general weakening of liberal order with the transformation of the left and the right. The right did not win a two-thirds majority in the Parliament which is a prerequisite for the government of the right to alter the constitution without a referendum, and so the legal realization of radical policies is under control. There is minimal risk of the deterioration of relations with the European Union because, regardless of the current more moderate approach, Giorgia Meloni advocated the abandoning of the Eurozone and conceptually different structure of The Brussels regime. 6

Polarisierte Städte: Die AfD im urbanen Kontext. Eine Analyse von Wahl- und Sozialdaten in sechzehn deutschen Städten

Abstract. For the first time since 1945, with the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) a far-right party has now consolidated itself in Germany on all political scales. In the political sciences as well as sociology, but not so much in human geography, there is much debate on the funding reasons. The debate is polarized and unfolds between two positions: on the one hand economic factors are marked as principal forces, on the other a cultural backlash. Electoral analyses have focused on the spatial division of the AfD's success between urban and rural areas as well as West and East Germany. By contrast, we focus on urban divisions. We examine the AfD's results in the general election of 2017 on the scale of districts in the largest city of each federal state by analyzing the correlation of the share of AfD votes with social data. In contrast to the polarized debate in the social sciences we choose a multidimensional perspective and analyze social data related to class, migration, acceptance of democracy and age. First, the resulting picture is heterogeneous across the cities and does not show a pronounced East-West polarization. Second, economic factors as well as factors related to migration correlate with the share of the AfD, whereby the former are pronounced somewhat stronger. Third, lack of trust in democracy is the most uniform indicator for a strong showing of the AfD in our sample; and fourth, in all cities there are districts which run counter to the generalized picture. We can show that in urban settings it is primarily, but not exclusively, in marginalized districts that the AfD has its strongholds. But this does not mean that all marginalized districts are dominated by the far-right party. In order to better understand the spatially highly fragmented social processes, in particular more qualitative research is needed.

Undermining or defending democracy? The consequences of distrust for democratic attitudes and participation

ABSTRACT We can observe a well-documented decline of trust levels in Western societies: from the reputation of political representatives as being ‘not trustworthy’ to the rise of anti-system-oriented populist parties. Yet the implications of different forms of distrust for a society and democratic institutions have been theorized in conflicting ways so far. In order to illuminate existing inconsistencies in social and democratic theory, this article addresses two research questions: What are the implications of different manifestations of distrust for the acceptance of democracy and democratic institutions? How do different forms of distrust affect the motivation to become engaged in democratic decision-making and in civil society institutions? Taking empirical evidence from 25 focus groups in Germany, our findings show that growing social divisions affect the role distrust plays for political interest representation of social groups and for the acceptance of liberal representative democracy.

The Emergence of Ex-Jihadi Political Parties in Post-Mubarak Egypt

Following the overthrow of Husni Mubarak, al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya and members of Egyptian Islamic Jihad created two political parties. This article investigates these groups' organizational dynamics and internal dialogues in order to uncover the rationale of their political participation after the January 2011 uprising and its internal ideational legitimization. Based on interviews with leaders and members of these two groups and their political parties, this article argues that these formerly violent insurgent groups embraced nonviolent participation in democratic politics through an internal reassessment of the political opportunities afforded to them by Egypt's brief political opening.After decades of opposition to former president Husni Mubarak's authoritarian regime, two of Egypt's most famous armed Islamic movements, al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (the Islamic Group) and Egyptian Islamic Jihad (known officially as the Jihad Group, Jama'at al-Jihad), partially joined the political process in Egypt after the January 2011 uprising. Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, which led a low-level insurgency in the 1990s, created the Building and Development Party, while an agglomeration of individuals formerly affiliated with Egyptian Islamic Jihad, which carried out various assassinations before some of its members helped form al-Qa'ida, created the Safety and Development Party, later renamed the Islamic Party. While the study of the political inclusion of mainstream and armed Islamist movements has been widely covered in the literature, the transformation of a former jihadi organization into a political party is rare.The study of armed and mainstream Islamist movements' political participation has primarily explored groups' rationales for doing so and the ramifications of their ideological and behavioral evolution. This new case study in Egypt represents a third pattern, namely the participation of former militant groups in the political process after their partial or comprehensive rejection of armed violence. This development is a striking contrast with previous cases, which raises many questions regarding the groups' rationales, internal negotiations and legitimization, and impact on the construction of these groups' ideological outlook and political behavior.This article covers the two-year period from the January 2011 uprising to the aftermath of the July 2013 military coup. It does not endeavor to uncover the long-term ramifications of this unprecedented participation in the political process. Instead, this article investigates these groups' rationales for this shift and then explores the internal debates and decision-making processes that legitimized political participation in the eyes of these groups' members and followers.In this article, I argue that al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya and Egyptian Islamic Jihad joined the political process primarily because of their interpretations of the new political opportunities available to them, and that this decision was not preceded by an acceptance of democracy or party politics in Islam. This research then explores these groups' internal debates in order to demonstrate that this choice was not initially unanimous among either group's leaders or members. A comparison between al-Gama'a alIslamiyya and Egyptian Islamic Jihad shows that the former had institutional arrangements before 2011 that promoted debates within the organization. This facilitated the group's internal democratization, which led it to fully endorse the decision to create a political party. Conversely, the 2011 uprising caused prior divisions between Egyptian Islamic Jihad leaders and members to widen, preventing the group from endorsing a unified position over the legitimacy of the political process. Finally, this article analyzes the internal legitimization of political participation inside al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya and factions of Egyptian Islamic Jihad that endorsed the political process, arguing that these groups strived to reinterpret their original missions to demonstrate the continuity between their past commitments and the decision to create a political party after 2011. …

DIREITO AO DESENVOLVIMENTO HUMANO ENQUANTO BEM JURÍDICO GLOBAL

The objective of this paper is to analyze the right to human development as a global legal heritage. The acceptance of democracy as a universal value, the accelerated process of globalization and the need for enforcement of fundamental rights, among other henomena, demand the ability to address local problems or wide repercussions, and seek solutions, elongated and oriented manner through dialogue and instruments of the democratic tradition constantly updated. Legal guarantees accompany this dynamic. Initially will be addressed the limits and needs related to the Global Law; in a second moment, considerations will be made about the human rights these days, as well about as the human right to development and; finally,present the relation between to the right to human development with democracy. It was used for the development of this research the inductive method, operated by the techniques of operational concepts and literature.

A Return to the Iron Fist

A Return to the Iron Fist Arch Puddington (bio) In a year marked by an explosion of terrorist violence, autocrats’ use of more brutal tactics, and Russia’s invasion and annexation of a neighboring country’s territory, the state of freedom in 2014 worsened significantly in nearly every part of the world. For the ninth consecutive year, Freedom in the World, Freedom House’s annual report on the condition of global political rights and civil liberties, showed an overall decline. Indeed, acceptance of democracy as the world’s dominant form of government—and of an international system built on democratic ideals—is under greater threat than at any point in the last 25 years. Even after such a long period of mounting pressure on democracy, developments in 2014 were exceptionally grim. The report’s findings show that nearly twice as many countries suffered setbacks as registered gains, 61 to 33, with the number of gains hitting its lowest point since the nine-year erosion began. This pattern held true across geographical regions, with more declines than gains in the Middle East and North Africa, Eurasia, sub-Saharan Africa, Europe, and the Americas, and an even split in Asia-Pacific. Syria, a dictatorship mired in civil war and ethnic division and facing uncontrolled terrorism, received its worst Freedom in the World country score in more than a decade. The lack of democratic gains around the world was conspicuous. The one notable exception was Tunisia, which became the first Arab country to achieve the status of Free since Lebanon was gripped by civil war forty years ago. By contrast, a troubling number of large, economically powerful, or regionally influential countries moved backward: Russia, Venezuela, Egypt, Turkey, Thailand, Nigeria, Kenya, and Azerbaijan. There were also net declines across five of the seven categories of democratic [End Page 122] indicators assessed by the report. Continuing a recent trend, the worst reversals affected freedom of expression, civil society, and the rule of law. In a new and disquieting development, a number of countries lost ground due to state surveillance, restrictions on Internet communications, and curbs on personal autonomy. Explicit Rejection of Democratic Standards Just as disturbing as the statistical decline was the open disdain for democratic standards that colored the words and actions of autocratic governments during the year. Until recently, most authoritarian regimes claimed to respect international agreements and paid lip service to the norms of competitive elections and human rights. They now increasingly flout democratic values, argue for the superiority of what amounts to one-party rule, and seek to throw off the constraints of fundamental diplomatic principles. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, including the outright seizure and formal annexation of Crimea, is the prime example of this phenomenon. The Russian intervention was in direct violation of an international agreement that had guaranteed Ukraine’s territorial integrity. President Vladimir Putin made his contempt for the values of liberal democracy unmistakably clear. He and his aides equated raw propaganda with legitimate journalism, and treated human-rights activists as enemies of the state. In Egypt, the rise of President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has been accompanied by a relentless campaign to roll back the gains of the Arab Spring. In an unprecedented trampling of the rule of law, Egyptian courts sentenced 1,300 political detainees to death in a series of drumhead trials that lacked the most basic elements of due process. Under Sisi, a once-vibrant media sector has been bent into submission, human-rights organizations suppressed to the point where they can no longer operate, foreign scholars barred, and domestic critics (both secular and Islamist) arrested or forced into exile. In Turkey, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan consolidated power during the year and waged an increasingly aggressive campaign against democratic pluralism. He openly demanded that media owners censor coverage or fire critical journalists, told the Constitutional Court that he does not respect its rulings, threatened reporters (and rebuked women journalists), and ordered radical changes to the school curriculum. Having risen from the premiership to the presidency in August, he formed a “shadow cabinet” that allows him to run the country from the presidential palace, circumventing constitutional rules and the ministries of his own...

Evolution of the Political Culture of the Youth of Kazakhstan

This article focuses on the question whether young people's attitudes to politics of Kazakhstan. The concept of political culture is used as the theoretical framework. Reference is made to gender, age and level of education. Data from the three waves (1992, 1997 and 2003) of the ‘Youth Survey’ carried out by the Centre for Analysis and Forecasting (C.A.P.) are analysed. Each wave was based on personal interviews with approximately 7000 16- to 29-year olds. The text first describes the political involvement of young people, secondly the acceptance of democracy and, thirdly, satisfaction with the reality of democracy and trust in political or state institutions, as well as in politicians. The results show clear differences in some aspects of the political culture of young people in the Kazakhstan. In other aspects the political attitudes have become more similar, especially trust in institutions. However, the political involvement of young people is largely the same, i.e. in this respect no change has occurred.

Acceptance of democracy and public relations: Attitudes in a transitional country

The study explores the relationship between acceptance of democracy and opinions about public communication used by the private sector in television newscasts in Croatia, a country transitioning to democracy. A survey administered to students at a large University in Zagreb found inconsistent responses to the items that measured acceptance of democracy, indicating that young Croatians in the study may still be in a political “gray zone” and may not have a full understanding of the precepts of democracy. However, there was a positive correlation between opinions about public relations media practices and acceptance of democracy. The study suggests that it is not enough to use a theoretical framework of global public relations that characterizes a country as a democracy or not, but rather to recognize that democratization is a process. Many people in transitional societies may be closer on the continuum to traditional communist points of view than to newer democratic views; such understanding can help provide a theoretical understanding of transitional public relations.

Christian Democracy in Italy

This article argues that historical context can be a strong force for the origins of an ideologically and behaviourally moderate religious political party. It explores the origins of Italian Christian Democracy, following the trajectory of the Partito Popolare Italiano and Democrazia Cristiana in order to highlight a path to religious party moderation that excludes extremism and violence at all stages. That path includes the development of a moderate ideology prior to inclusion in the democratic system, influenced by efforts to reconcile Catholicism with democracy. Extremist alternatives are eliminated not through the moderating tendencies of a democratic political system but by historical events and by efforts of the moderate religious party to ensure that the democratic system does not collapse. Ideological and behavioural moderation are understood as acceptance of democracy and promotion of civil liberties, not as the notion that a party becomes in some way less religious.

The War on Terror and the Transformation of Political Islam

AbstractThe war on terror intensified widespread misconceptions about the nature and complexity of Islamism. The paper analyses the trajectory towards the acceptance of democracy and human rights on the part of mainstream Islamist groups and argues that such development ran the risk of being derailed by an ill‐conceived war on terror that in the short term benefited those sectors of Islamism that always had violence at the centre of their political project.

E-government website evaluation with hybrid MCDM method in fuzzy environment

E-government websites play an important role in the knowledge society not only by accelerating bureaucratic procedures but also enhancing citizen commitment to democracy. The acceptance of democracy (in its fullest sense) means considering the citizen as customer, making citizen satisfaction the ultimate target. Therefore, in addition to web design characteristics, e-service and e-democracy are taken into account in e-government website evaluation. Fuzzy logic is employed due to the properties of the evaluation process. Experts evaluated the criteria weights using fuzzy AHP, and the e-government websites from a group of selected EU countries using fuzzy VIKOR as a multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) technique, and a ranking was obtained. The unique properties of the paper can be listed as the formation of criteria using two kinds of fuzzy numbers, combining two MCDM methods, and applying this methodology to the problem of website evaluation for the first time.

Creating an American Mythology: A Comparison of Branding Strategies in Three Fashion Firms

Fashion firms must formulate and promote an identity that will be meaningful and memorable. Ralph Lauren, Tommy Hilfiger, and American Apparel are brands that overtly define themselves as American. Each brand seeks out what they define as essential elements from the American cultural landscape. These elements are used to construct a unique and coherent narrative—or more precisely mythology—underscoring the values of the brand, and framing a lifestyle identity to be embodied within products and extended to the wearer. By formulating a culturally rich brand identity and presentation, the firm attempts to visually and textually seduce the target consumer. These three brands are linked through their acceptance of democracy as a common denominator defining an American identity; however, each brand links itself to radically different manifestations of American democracy.

Acceptance of democracy and democratic orientation in Serbia in the context of social changes

The subject of the paper is the support for democratic government and its basic values expressed by the citizens of Serbia. Direct, general evaluation of democracy, operationalized through valuing democracy as a good or bad system of government was analyzed. Unidimensional syndrome of democratic orientation which comprises social tolerance, postmaterialist values, valuing of autonomy, support for gender equality and market orientation was observed as an indicator of the acceptance of the democratic values. The data collected in the three waves of the World Values Survey (N=3700), conducted on representative samples of Serbian citizens in 1996, 2001 and 2006, were analyzed. The results of the analysis indicate that general support for democratic government, as well as the acceptance of the democratic orientation among Serbian citizens, shows a 'zigzag' profile of change - a sharp increase after the democratic changes in 2000, followed by a significant decrease. The congruence between support for democratic government and democratic values is relatively rare. The concluding chapter discusses the importance and implications of the obtained results in the context of social change effects on the changes of value orientations in one society, as well as in the light of the two competing models of the relationship between political culture and political structure, culturalist and institutionalist. .

Changes in the Political Culture of Young East and West Germans Between 1992 and 2003. Results of the DJI Youth Survey1

This article focuses on the question whether young people's attitudes to politics in both parts of Germany have become more similar or are still different in relevant aspects. The concept of political culture is used as the theoretical framework. Reference is made to gender, age and level of education. Data from the three waves (1992, 1997 and 2003) of the ‘DJI Youth Survey’ carried out by the German Youth Institute (DJI) are analysed. Each wave was based on personal interviews with approximately 7000 16- to 29-year olds. The text first describes the political involvement of young people, secondly the acceptance of democracy and, thirdly, satisfaction with the reality of democracy and trust in political or state institutions, as well as in politicians. The results show clear differences in some aspects of the political culture of young people in the Western and Eastern ‘Länder’ of Germany, particularly less satisfaction with the reality of democracy in the East. In other aspects the political attitudes have become more similar, especially trust in institutions. However, the political involvement of young people is largely the same in the East and West, i.e. in this respect no change has occurred.

Perspectives on democratic consolidation in Southern Africa: The five general elections of 2004

Abstract Huntingdon's ‘third wave’ of democracy came late to Africa, but five countries held general elections in 2004, providing an opportunity to reflect on degrees of democratic consolidation in the region. African political dynamics are considered in relation to the political and economic environment together with national, ethnic and regional identities and the way in which these may influence democratic consolidation. The electoral systems of the five countries are considered in relation to the dominant party effect. The course and outcomes of the five elections are examined in relation to indicators of participation and competition suggested by Lindberg. The latter's indicators of legitimacy are considered in relation to more detailed analysis of each election in its national context, paying attention to the influence of ethnic, regional and other divisions on outcomes, which are mapped. Major procedural flaws prevented democratic consolidation in Mozambique and hindered it in Malawi, where the party system also proved unstable. South Africa, Namibia and Botswana satisfied most of the criteria apart from turnover and provide convincing evidence of the institutionalisation and acceptance of democracy, albeit qualified by the continuing dominance of their governing parties. In all five countries the equation of democracy with socio-economic benefits threatens disillusionment in the face of poverty and inequality.

Social Change in Central and Eastern Europe: General Trends and National Patterns

The paper addresses five issue areas. First it describes the plurality of trajectories in central and eastern European transformations, offering a broad typology. Then it addresses the drift between acceptance of democracy and the market, owing to growing inequalities. Third, problems of poverty and exclusion are addressed. Fourth, it is addressed if any known model of redistribution emerged in the post-transition economies. Fifth, consequences of the populist turn in European policies are being analyzed. Influences of the EU practices will be dealt with and some preliminary conclusions drawn. These suggest a strong intertwining between social and economic performance that limit theoretically conceivable – neoliberal, social democratic, postmodern or conservative - policy choices.

Post-communist structural and values inequalities: Occupational-class basis for democratic consolidation

The data analysis from "Democratic Values" Project leads to the conclusion that there is a distinct subjective hierarchy among post-communist countries, between respondents from lagging and outpacing countries. Comparative analysis of the numerous data shows clearly how the commitment of respondents in these countries to democratic changes and democratic values is distinctly differentiated according to the degree of economic and political development of their societies and the degree of success achieved in their transition. On the other hand, there is a significant differentiation of opinions of respondents according to the status group or occupational class to which each person belongs. The reduction of social class groups to five basic occupational classes, a reduction based on classical and contemporary studies of social stratification, and the comparative analysis realized on this basis, convincingly support the conclusion that there is a sustained correlation: a clearly shaped status hierarchy with regard to acceptance of democratic values. This status hierarchy is valid within the frameworks of each separate post-communist country, regardless of their different degrees of success in the transition. A number of interesting illustrations are adduced, repeating and reconfirming on various occasions the stable link between status and attitudes with regard to individualism and collectivism, liberalism and statism, egalitarianism, the acceptance of the market economy principles, the acceptance of democracy or of socialism as concepts and practice, the attitude towards totalitarian and dictatorial regimes, the degree of consolidation around European values, etc. To sum it up, the outpacing and lagging countries in the post-communist transition look alike in their high-status groups and differ in their low-status strata.

The Developing International Law of Democracy

Global events in the early 1990s brought considerations and discussions of democracy to the fore of international law and relations. In international law there appears to be an unquestionable acceptance of democracy and a failure to fully considering the what the idea of democracy contains. The piece reviews the edited collection of Greg Fox and Brad Roth, Democratic Governance and International Law, demonstrating that democracy in international law is less about a particular right or entitlement but rather there exists the formation of an international law of democracy that is a more widespread development whereby democracy has become a leading concern in the pursuit of other legal objectives.

Paradoxy instrumentálního přijetí demokracie

Paradoxy instrumentálního přijetí demokracie