This paper argues that Italy possesses the right to unilaterally extend maturities on its outstanding local law bonds under an explicitly established provision of Italian law, putting it in a strong negotiating position with its creditors for a potential restructuring. It also examines the unique ways in which Italy is insulated from legal risk in the event creditors take action, particularly due to a lack of acceleration clauses in some (and possibly all) debt instruments. Unilateral maturity extension would provide several benefits to Italy: first, maturity extensions, as opposed to principal haircuts, would mitigate the harm endured by Italy’s banking sector, which was a primary concern of the Edelen proposal and has grown even more important as Italy’s banking sector has only increased its exposure to Italian debt in recent years; second, Italy’s short-term debt obligations would be reduced, allowing the Italian government greater maneuverability in attempting to restart growth and adopt more reasonable fiscal policies; third, this proposal accomplishes the main objectives of a recovery while reducing legal risk, as it works within explicitly contemplated frameworks, without any ex post alterations or overly coercive and discriminatory measures. Part I of this proposal discusses the background Italian situation with an eye on the law permitting a unilateral extension of maturities on some (if not all) of the local law issued debt instruments. Part II outlines how this maturity extension would affect both Pre-2013 and Post-2013 issued debt instruments based on the presence or absence of the ESM instituted Euro CACs. Part III discusses the synergy between maturity extension, and the remedies available to a potential litigious creditor as a result, particularly with respect to acceleration.