ABSTRACT In this article, we consider a recent philosophical attempt to narrate transgender experiences in response to what Miranda Fricker has termed ‘epistemic injustice’, against the background of highly polarized debates concerning trans identities in both academic philosophy and popular culture. We bring out some of the difficulties and challenges involved in doing epistemic justice to trans testimonies via an analysis and critique of Daniele Moyal-Sharrock and Constantine Sandis’ philosophical paper ‘Bedrock Gender’. We consider how the paper raises distinct issues related to testimonial and hermeneutical injustice in its emphasis on trans testimonies of gender certainty. In response, we consider what is at stake in understanding and using the testimony of gendered experiences for furthering a philosophical account of gender. In scrutinizing the epistemology of trans in the paper, we argue that combatting epistemic injustices related to gender requires self-reflexivity and an understanding of the complexity of gendered realities as well as the moral-existential aspects of testimonies of gender. We suggest that rather than speaking of gender in terms of ‘bedrock’ and ‘certainty’, thinking philosophically about gender must involve a critical investigation and ongoing conversation of how gender identification can both confirm and contest our sense of who we are.