10-Q Filings Research Articles

The Impact of Cryptocurrency Exposure on Corporate Tax Avoidance Among US Listed Companies

This study examined the association between corporate cryptocurrency activities and tax avoidance outcomes, utilizing data from US public firms covering the period from 2015 to 2023. Financial data were sourced from Compustat, while details regarding cryptocurrency activities were manually extracted from 10-K and 10-Q filings. Our analysis employed a fixed-effects regression model to examine the impact of these activities on cash effective tax rates (ETR). The findings indicate that firms engaged in cryptocurrency activities tend to have a lower ETR compared with those without such involvement. Notably, this effect was predominantly observed in companies directly engaged in cryptocurrency activities, such as accepting cryptocurrency as a payment method or actively trading cryptocurrency on an exchange platform. In contrast, firms involved in crypto mining or initial coin offerings did not exhibit a similar association. Our findings offer significant regulatory insights for governance bodies concerned with the implications of corporate cryptocurrency activities on tax strategies.

Manager sentiment, deal characteristics, and takeover performance

Various studies analyze the driving forces behind takeover activities, including investor sentiment, liquidity, and fundamental shocks. In this study, we examine how manager sentiment influences takeover characteristics and long-term performance using textual analysis of data in 10-K and 10-Q filings. Our findings identify that manager sentiment has strong positive predictive power for takeover activities, and high (positive) manager sentiment decreases the long-term performance of takeover deals. Moreover, we show that high-sentiment managers tend to undertake large deals, decrease all-stock transactions, acquire hard-to-value targets, and provide high target valuations, suggesting over-investment for underperforming high-sentiment deals.

Do Shareholders Care about “Surprise” Internal Control Weakness Disclosures?

SUMMARY Prior research shows that many of the companies that disclose material weaknesses in internal control (MWs) do not disclose such weaknesses in earlier quarterly 10-Q filings for the same year—i.e., the year-end MW disclosures are “surprise” disclosures. We find that shareholders at accelerated filers with surprise MW disclosures are more likely to vote against auditor ratification (by a factor of about 1.4 times) than at companies with “no-surprise” MW disclosures. These findings suggest that shareholders may at least partly blame auditors and hold them responsible for the surprise MW disclosures. Internal control disclosures necessarily involve professional judgment, but the results indicate that for shareholders, earlier disclosure of such problems is preferable to waiting until the year-end (and perhaps hoping that the problems will be resolved).

Delivering the precision oncology paradigm: reduced R&D costs and greater return on investment through a companion diagnostic informed precision oncology medicines approach

BackgroundPrecision oncology medicines represent a paradigm shift compared to non-precision oncology medicines in cancer therapy, in some situations delivering more clinical benefit, and potentially lowering healthcare costs. We determined whether employing a companion diagnostic (CDx) approach during oncology medicines development delivers effective therapies that are within the cost constraints of current health systems. R&D costs of developing a medicine are subject to debate, with average estimates ranging from $765 million (m) to $4.6 billion (b). Our aim was to determine whether precision oncology medicines are cheaper to bring from R&D to market; a secondary goal was to determine whether precision oncology medicines have a greater return on investment (ROI).MethodData on oncology medicines approved between 1997 and 2020 by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) were analysed from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings. Data were compiled from 10-K, 10-Q, and 20-F financial performance filings on medicines’ development costs through their R&D lifetime. Clinical trial data were split into clinical trial phases 1–3 and probability of success (POS) of trials was calculated, along with preclinical costs. Cost-of-capital (CoC) approach was applied and, if appropriate, a tax rebate was subtracted from the total.ResultsData on 42 precision and 29 non-precision oncology medicines from 56 companies listed by the National Cancer Institute which had complete data available were analysed. Estimated mean cost to deliver a new oncology medicine was $4.4b (95% CI, $3.6–5.2b). Costs to bring a precision oncology medicine to market were $1.1b less ($3.5b; 95% CI, $2.7–4.5b) compared to non-precision oncology medicines ($4.6b; 95% CI, $3.5–6.1b). The key driver of costs was POS of clinical trials, accounting for a difference of $591.3 m. Additional data analysis illustrated that there was a 27% increase in return on investment (ROI) of precision oncology medicines over non-precision oncology medicines.ConclusionOur results provide an accurate estimate of the R&D spend required to bring an oncology medicine to market. Deployment of a CDx at the earliest stage substantially lowers the cost associated with oncology medicines development, potentially making them available to more patients, while staying within the cost constraints of cancer health systems.

“Surprise” material weakness disclosures: Effects on audit fees and audit report lags

Prior research shows that many of the companies that disclose material weaknesses in internal control (MWs) do not disclose such weaknesses in earlier quarterly 10-Q filings for the same year—i.e., the year-end MW disclosures are “surprise” disclosures. I first show, using data from 2009 to 2019, that such surprise MWs continue to be the majority of MW disclosures as late as 2019. I find that accelerated filer companies with surprise MWs pay lower fees compared to companies with no-surprise MWs; however, this finding does not hold for non-accelerated filers. I also find that there are no significant differences in the audit report lag of surprise and no-surprise MW disclosers. Thus, the lower audit fee paid by surprise MW disclosure companies may offer a possible explanation for the widespread prevalence of surprise MW disclosures. The results also highlight the importance of the external auditor in public disclosures of MWs. The findings have public policy relevance given the ongoing efforts to expand the set of companies that would be exempt from the auditor attestation of internal controls.

COVID-19 Disclosures and Market Uncertainty: Evidence from 10-Q Filings

COVID-19 Disclosures and Market Uncertainty: Evidence from 10-Q Filings

Loan fair values and the financial crisis

PurposeIn 2009, effective the second-quarter, the financial accounting standards board mandated that all banks need to disclose the fair value of loans in their 10-Q filings in addition to their 10-K filings. This paper aims to investigate whether these disclosures reduced the level of information asymmetry about the riskiness of bank loan portfolios during the financial crisis.Design/methodology/approachThe paper examines the impact of these disclosures on the bid-ask spread of a panel of 246 publicly traded bank holding companies. The spread serves as a proxy for information asymmetry and the ratio of the fair value of a bank’s loan portfolio to its book value is a proxy for the credit and liquidity risk associated with the same. The reaction to the first-quarter filing serves as a control to assess the reaction at the time of the second-quarter filing.FindingsThere is a significant negative association between bid-ask spread and the ratio indicating that the fair value information was useful in reducing information asymmetry during the financial crisis. A pattern was observed in the information dissemination related to the fair value of loans that is consistent with the literature that documents a delayed investor reaction to complex financial information.Originality/valueInvestors may use the fair value information to better assess the risk profile of a BHC’s loan portfolio. Also, loan fair values provide managers with data to better implement stress test models and determine optimal capital buffers.

Manager Sentiment, Deal Characteristics, and Takeover Performance

Extensive literature has discussed the driving forces of takeover activities, including investor sentiment, liquidity, and fundamental shocks. We examine how manager sentiment affects takeover characteristics and long-term performance using data from textual analysis based on 10-K and 10-Q filings. We find that manager sentiment has a strong positive predictive power for takeover activities. Firms with high manager sentiment tend to acquire large and private targets and complete deals with large sizes. Moreover, high manager sentiment is associated with less stock payment, fewer days of completion, and higher bidding premiums. Finally, our findings demonstrate that high manager sentiment decreases the long-term performance of takeover deals.

Opportunity knocks but once: delayed disclosure of financial items in earnings announcements and neglect of earnings news

We define a delayed disclosure ratio (DD) as the fraction of 10-Q financial statement items that are withheld at the earlier quarterly earnings announcement. We find that higher DD firms have a greater delay in investor and analyst response to earnings surprises: (i) the fraction of total market reaction to quarterly earnings news realized around the earnings announcement (after the 10-Q filing) is smaller (greater), and (ii) analysts are more likely to defer issuing forecasts from immediately after the earnings announcement to after the 10-Q filing. Consistent with our limited attention model predictions, the response catch-up associated with DD is incomplete, even after the delayed items are fully disclosed at the 10-Q filing date, and persists until the next earnings announcement date. The return reaction to earnings news over the entire quarter does not vary with DD, so differences in earnings informativeness do not explain the DD effect. Our findings suggest that, for limited attention effects to be mitigated, the timing of disclosures must be coincident with the focal periods—at earnings announcement dates—when investors and analysts are paying the most attention.

Analysts’ forecasts timeliness and accuracy post-XBRL

PurposeTo the authors’ knowledge, this paper is the first to use Detail I/B/E/S to study directly the timeliness of security analysts’ next-year earnings-per-share (EPS) estimates relative to the SEC filings of annual (10-K) and quarterly (10-Q) financial statements. Although the authors do not prove a causal relationship, they provide evidence that the average time from firms’ filings of 10-Ks and 10-Qs to the release of analysts’ annual EPS forecasts during short timeframes (for example, 15-day timeframe from a 10-K’s SEC file date) subsequent to the 10-K and 10-Q filing dates significantly shortened with XBRL implementation and then remained relatively constant following implementation.Design/methodology/approachUsing filing dates hand-collected from the SEC website for 10-Ks during 2009-2011 and filing dates for 10-Ks and 10-Qs during 2003-2014 input from Compustat along with analysts’ estimated values for next year EPS, actual estimated next year EPS realized and estimate announcement dates in Detail I/B/E/S, the authors study the days from 10-K and 10-Q file dates to announcement dates and the per cent errors for individual estimates during per- and post-XBRL eras.FindingsThe authors find that analysts are announcing next-year EPS forecasts significantly more frequently and in significantly shorter time in zero to 15 days immediately following 10-K and 10-Q file dates post-XBRL as compared to pre-XBRL. However, the authors do not find a significant change in forecast accuracy post-XBRL as compared to pre-XBRL.Research limitations/implicationsBecause this study uses short timeframes immediately following the events (filings of 10-Ks and 10-Qs), the relationship between 10-Ks and 10-Qs with and without XBRL and improved forecast timeliness is strengthened. However, even this strengthened difference-in-difference methodology does not establish causality. Future research may determine whether XBRL or other factors cause the improved forecast timeliness the authors’ evidence.Practical implicationsThis improved efficiency may become critical if financial statement reporting expands as a result of new innovations such as Big Data and continuous reporting. In the future, users may be able to electronically connect to financial statement data that firms are maintaining on a perpetual basis on the SEC website and continuously monitor and analyze the financial statement data dynamically in real time. If so, then unquestionably, XBRL will have played a critical role in bringing about this future innovation.Originality/valueWhereas previous studies have utilized Summary IBES data to assess the impact of XBRL on analyst forecasts, the authors use Detail IBES to study the effects of XBRL adoption directly by measuring days from 10-K and 10-Q file dates in Compustat to each estimate’s announcement date recorded in IBES and by computing the per cent error using each estimate’s VALUE and ACTUAL recorded in Detail IBES. The authors are the first to evidence a significant shortening in average days and an increase in per cent of 30-day counts in the zero- to 15-day timeframe immediately following the fillings of 10-K s and 10-Qs.

Earnings Uncertainty and Attention

I document a positive relationship between earnings uncertainty and attention to subsequent earnings releases. I use the percentage of uncertain words in 10-K or 10-Q filings as the measure of ex ante earnings uncertainty. Earnings releases of high uncertainty firms are accompanied by higher Google search volume, higher Bloomberg readership, higher abnormal trading volume, and faster analyst response. Low uncertainty stocks underreact more to earnings surprises suggesting that the lower attention received by them is insufficient to fully incorporate new information immediately following earnings. The findings are consistent with attention constrained investors allocating less attention to low uncertainty firms.

Do Retail Investors Use SEC Filings? Evidence from EDGAR Search

We address whether retail investors use SEC filings when making trading decisions. We find that retail investor trading, both buying and selling, is significantly related to EDGAR search for 10-K and 10-Q filings, more so than to Google search. This is true for firms with high or low visibility, firm-days with and without press coverage, and during or excluding earnings-announcement and filing windows. The results of lead-lag and two-stage-least square analyses are consistent with search leading to trade. In addition, the direction of retail investors’ trading is consistent with the direction of earnings changes reported in the downloaded filings, suggesting that retail investor trading direction is influenced by the accounting information they read in the filings. We also find that the significantly positive relation between retail trading and EDGAR search is strongest for the most easily readable 10-K and 10-Q filings. Finally, we find that retail investor trading-predicted returns are higher on days with heavier EDGAR search, consistent with retail investors making more profitable, or at least less loss making, trades when doing more research on EDGAR. Overall, our results provide strong evidence that retail investors use EDGAR filings data in making their trading decisions.

The impact of non-timely 10-Q filings and audit firm size on audit fees

PurposePrior studies suggest that non-timely 10-Q filings indicate higher potential risks than non-timely 10-K filings. Furthermore, larger audit firms tend to be more risk-averse and conservative about reporting. Inspired by these research streams, this paper aims to investigate the influence of non-timely 10-Q filings on audit fees and the impact of audit firm size on this association.Design/methodology/approachThe cross-sectional audit fee regression model used in this study is similar to that used in prior audit fee research (Simunic, 1980; Francis et al., 2005; Hay et al., 2006; Wang et al., 2013). The model includes the following five major characteristics that would influence auditors’ fee decisions: auditee size (LNAT), complexity (REIVAT, FOREIGN, SEG), financial condition (LOSS, ROA, GROWTH, ZSCORE), special events (ICW, RESTATE, INITIAL, GC) and auditor type (BIG4). To examine the effect of non-timely 10-Q filings on audit fees, the variable NT10Q is included in the audit fee model.FindingsThe results indicate that when both non-timely 10-K and non-timely 10-Q filings are included in the regression model, only non-timely 10-Q filings are significantly associated with higher audit fees, suggesting that the presence of non-timely 10-Q filings signals more serious underlying problem than non-timely 10-K filings in the audit fees decision processes. In addition, we find that audit fees for firms audited by Big 4 auditors are 26.4 per cent higher when those firms file non-timely 10-Q reports, whereas there is no significant association between non-timely 10-Q filings and audit fees for firms audited by non-Big 4 auditors.Practical implicationsAs no attention has been paid to the investigation of the impact of non-timely 10-Q filings on audit fees, with the aim of filling the gap of this specific research area, this study examines the association between non-timely 10-Q filings and audit fees and the influence of audit firm size on this association.Originality/valueThe contribution of this paper is threefold: first, it is the first study to examine the association between non-timely 10-Q filings and audit fees. The results show that non-timely 10-Q filings are a better and earlier indicator of audit risk than non-timely 10-K filings. Second, the results reveal that the relationship between non-timely 10-Q filings and audit fees is affected by audit firm size. Specifically, Big 4 auditors tend to charge higher audit fees in the presence of non-timely 10-Q filings, reflecting that they are more sensitive to audit risk than smaller audit firms are. Third, an examination of the quarterly effect of non-timely 10-Q filings on audit fees indicates a stronger effect from the first quarter’s non-timely 10-Q filings, compared to the second or third quarter.

How Important are Earnings Announcements as an Information Source?*

In a competitive information market, a single information source can only dominate other sources individually, not collectively. We explore whether earnings announcements constitute such a dominant source using Ball and Shivakumar's (2008) [How much new information is there in earnings?, Journal of Accounting Research, 2008, 46(5), pp. 975–1016] R 2 metric: the proportion of the variation in annual returns explained by the four quarterly earnings announcement returns. We find that the earnings announcement days' R 2 is 11% – higher than the corresponding R 2 of days with dividend announcements, management forecasts, preannouncements, and 10-K and 10-Q filings and their amendments, and comparable to that of the four days with the largest realised absolute returns in a year. Additional analysis reveals that earnings announcements convey extreme bad news as often as management forecasts and preannouncements; for any other type of news, earnings announcements are much more frequent. We conclude that earnings ...

Share Repurchases: Market Timing and Abnormal Returns

Prior research shows positive abnormal returns follow the announcement of a new share repurchase program, but do firms earn abnormal returns on their actual repurchases? An obstacle to answering this question has been poor data on the timing of corporate share repurchases. I build a near complete dataset of monthly share repurchases using software I wrote to extract the data from 10-Q and 10-K filings. Constructing portfolios based upon the share repurchase signal, I find small to medium firms earn abnormal returns while large firms do not. Furthermore, I find evidence consistent with a market reaction to the disclosure of share repurchases. Firms experience positive abnormal returns around their 10-Q and 10-K filing date relative to non repurchasers with public programs, and using machine learning techniques to forecast share repurchases, I find the share repurchase surprise, actual minus forecast repurchases, is associated with positive abnormal returns around a firm’s earning announcement and 10-Q, 10-K filing dates. My main contributions are thus threefold: I provide systematic, machine extracted data on repurchases, show that small to mid-size firms have positive abnormal returns while large firms do not, and use machine learning techniques to forecast repurchases and show abnormal returns around earning announcement days and 10-Q and 10-K filing dates are positively associated with the unexpected component of repurchases, the share repurchase surprise.

Financial Concept Element Mapper (FinCEM) for XBRL interoperability: Utilizing the M3 Plus method

The use of eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) to represent financial reports (particularly 10-K and 10-Q filings) is a requirement of all public companies in the United States. The intention of the XBRL mandate is to streamline the financial reporting pipeline by providing full automaticity with respect to the collection, collation and analysis of financial information on the Web. However, the current lack of acceptable XBRL interoperability prevents the realization of the mandate's potential. This paper reports on a comprehensive solution to this problematic situation. The proposed design artifact, called FinCEM, is undergirded by channel theory and seeks to capture and leverage the semantics of XBRL calculation linkbases towards improved XBRL interoperability. The design artifact is instantiated and evaluated against XBRL filings from companies included in the S&P 100. The artifact, which operates automatically and without human intervention, is shown to provide significant improvements over alternative approaches as it attains high accuracy with respect to its core information retrieval task.

Opportunity Knocks But Once: Delayed Disclosure of Financial Items in Earnings Announcements and Neglect of Earnings News

We define a delayed disclosure ratio (DD) as the fraction of 10-Q financial statement items that are withheld at the earlier quarterly earnings announcement. We find that higher DD firms have a greater delay in investor and analyst response to earnings surprises: (i) the fraction of total market reaction to quarterly earnings news realized around the earnings announcement (after the 10-Q filing) is smaller (greater), and (ii) analysts are more likely to defer issuing forecasts from immediately after the earnings announcement to after the 10-Q filing. Consistent with our limited attention model predictions, the response catch-up associated with DD is incomplete even after the delayed items are fully disclosed at the 10-Q filing date, and persists until the next earnings announcement date. The return reaction to earnings news over the entire quarter does not vary with DD, so differences in earnings informativeness do not explain the DD effect. Our findings suggest that, for limited attention effects to be mitigated, the timing of disclosures must be coincident with the focal periods—at earnings announcement dates—when investors and analysts are paying the most attention.

Investor Demand for Sell-Side Research

ABSTRACTWe use daily page views of analyst estimates, ratings, and target prices on Yahoo Finance to understand when users seek sell-side analyst research. Demand for this information is most pronounced on days with earnings announcements, management guidance, and All-Star analyst reports. Surprisingly, demand does not increase at Form 10-K and Form 10-Q filings. While the overall demand for analyst estimates is 19.9 percent less than for analyst ratings and target prices, on earnings announcement and management guidance days, this preference is reversed. Moreover, the demand for analyst information substantially trumps that of SEC filings and financial statement information.JEL Classifications: M41; G14; G24.

Investors’ Demand for Sell-Side Research: SEC Filings, Media Coverage, and Market Factors

We use daily page views of analyst estimates, ratings, and target prices on Yahoo Finance to understand when such users seek sell-side analyst research. Demand for this information is most pronounced on days with earnings announcements, management guidance, and All-Star analyst reports. Surprisingly, demand does not increase at Form 10-K and Form 10-Q filings. While the overall demand for analyst estimates is 19.9 percent less than for analyst ratings and target prices, on earnings announcement and management guidance days this preference is reversed. Moreover, the demand for analyst information substantially trumps that of SEC filings and financial statement information.

An Analysis and Taxonomy of Disclosure Controls and Procedures Effectiveness

SUMMARY With the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, there has been much discussion and analysis of Section 404 dealing with management's and the external auditor's evaluation of internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR). However, Section 302 of the Act requires management to evaluate their disclosure controls and procedures (DC&P) and report on the effectiveness of such controls in their 10-Q and 10-K filings. This paper explains the SEC's differentiation of ICFR and DC&P and attempts to report on the effectiveness of DC&P utilizing the Audit Analytics database. The data show that DC&P have been ineffective, as reported by management in their 10-K filings, ranging from a low of 13.75 percent to a high of 33.91 percent of observations over the 11-year period from 2004 through 2014. The paper concludes with potential research issues related to DC&P.