In the ideal vs. non-ideal theory debate contemporary political philosophers discuss the method of theorizing social justice. Some argue that theories of social justice should be ideal and justify exclusively in ideal theory a just society as goal for social reform. Others hold that theories of social justice should be nonideal and justify exclusively in non-ideal theory how to address social injustices in the status quo. This article shares the view of those who, like John Rawls, maintain that theories of justice must consist of an ideal and a non-ideal theory part. Yet it criticizes Rawls for prioritizing ideal over non-ideal theory and defends the mutual dependence or co-originality of ideal and non-theory. For not only does non-ideal theorizing depend on a goal of social reform justified in ideal theory. Ideal theorizing also depends on a non-ideal theory to determine whether and how the goal for social reform is feasible.

In philosophy classes, students are regularly confronted with positions and arguments from the philosophical tradition. At the same time, there seems to be a certain tension between this common pedagogical practice and relevant theoretical principles that are widely accepted in the didactical literature: According to these principles, philosophy classes should aim at the development of philosophical skills, and not at the transmission of knowledge about the history of philosophy. So how can the prominent role of historical classics in philosophy classes be justified? The standard solution in this context is to consider the philosophical tradition as a ‘dialogue partner’ that can effectively support students in their independent attempts at solving philosophical problems. In this article, we would like to critically question this solution. We will present a number of concerns about the standard view that the philosophical tradition can fulfil this ‘dialogue partner’‐role within a problem-based approach to teaching philosophy. In our view, these concerns necessitate a more fundamental discussion of the significance of the philosophical tradition for the teaching of philosophy.

In this paper, I propose a new solution to the puzzle of how the original contract can be obligatory. Thomas Hobbes suggests that covenants become obligatory only with the establishment of the Leviathan. But this would imply that the obligation of the original contract depends on the existence of the very institution it brings into being ‐ a case of circular reasoning. How can the original contract be obligatory if obligation arises only from the institution it establishes? If Hobbes is interpreted as holding that consent ‐ rather than the Leviathan ‐ is the true source of obligation, this circularity can be avoided and the puzzle resolved: the original contract can be obligatory even in the state of nature, since it is possible to bind oneself to future performance through mutual consent and thereby establish an obligation whose content is conditional. This solution to the puzzle aligns with a recent strand of Leviathan interpretation that understands the original contract as conditional. That does not eliminate the need for a Leviathan, but shifts the focus: what changes is not the source of obligation, but its strength.