This study aims to explore the potential of artificial intelligence (AI)-supported drone operations as a proactive response to increasing maritime threats, particularly in the southern Baltic Sea, and to analyse the applicability of autonomous systems in protecting ports, offshore platforms, subsea cables, and pipelines under conditions of spatial congestion and geopolitical risk. This study adopts a qualitative analytical approach, grounded in the review of relevant literature, official reports, and statistical data from a variety of international and academic sources. The research process involves the analysis of existing materials to identify key patterns and trends related to maritime infrastructure and security in the southern Baltic Sea. Through inference, the study aims to draw reasoned conclusions from available data, particularly where direct evidence was limited due to the emerging nature of the subject matter. AI-enhanced naval drones can significantly improve the monitoring and protection of maritime infrastructure through continuous, real-time, and autonomous operations. The deployment of such systems enables faster threat detection and decision-making, thereby enhancing the resilience of critical assets, such as wind farms, subsea cables, and ports. Overall, this information should contribute to national defence and stability. In the face of rapid transformation in the southern Baltic Sea, driven by increasing maritime traffic, energy demands, and offshore development, the integration of AI and autonomous systems into maritime operations is essential in order to ensure effective spatial and security management. Unmanned vehicles, supported by AI, will become a cornerstone of maritime defence, enabling constant surveillance and rapid response to evolving hybrid threats.

The presence of cybersecurity in educational institutions, including vocational education and training (VET), plays a vital role in ensuring the overall societal security in an increasing digital world. This study explores how staff of VET institutions respond to suspected cybersecurity incidents, focusing on reporting channels and methods used. The objective is to better understand incident response practices in the under-researched VET context, with special attention given to the human and organisational aspects of cybersecurity. VET institutions operate digital systems that mirror real workplace environments and often handle authentic customer data, exposing them to risks that differ from those of general education settings. A qualitative methodology was employed, consisting of thematic interviews with twenty-seven staff members across three Finnish vocational schools. The analysis was guided by the Situation Awareness in Cybersecurity Incident Response model and the Zone of Proximal Development framework, allowing for a deeper exploration of how staff perceive and act upon potential threats. Although formal reporting procedures exist, staff frequently rely on informal networks and direct contact with IT support. Urgent cases are often communicated via phone, a method perceived as efficient but lacking in documentation and structure, which can hinder post-incident analysis and learning. Improving cybersecurity incident response in VET institutions requires the integration of formal digital tools with flexible, human-centred communication methods. Strengthening these systems is essential, not only for protecting sensitive data, ensuring continuity, and creating safer learning environments, but also for reinforcing the digital resilience of society as a whole.

This paper conducts an in-depth study on how Ukraine changed the balance of military power in the Black Sea. It conceptualises the idea that the development of modern military technology has reached a level of maturity, providing a new perspective for the Jeune École concept. The paper uses the process tracing method to establish a timeline from Russian full blockade to Ukrainian sea denial. The battlefield application of anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) in the early stages of the war created the necessary conditions for establishing sea denial, followed by the continued use of ASCM, aerial drones, and maritime drones to consolidate the initial successes. The international community observed Ukraine’s deployment of unmanned systems with great interest, heralding it as the dawn of a new era in naval warfare. However, when analysed in depth, it becomes clear that traditional weaponry played the decisive role in achieving sea denial initially. Only after the Russian Federation’s fleet had been forced from the coastal waters did naval drones begin to extend and solidify the denied area. The research further indicates that even a smaller state can produce significant strategic effects using anti-ship cruise missiles and swarming maritime drones—principles rooted in the historic Jeune École doctrine. Findings reveal that technological advances have significantly mitigated the traditional limitations of small platforms, especially in adverse conditions. As such, the combination of Jeune École’s asymmetric maritime strategy and modern unmanned systems offers a viable blueprint for smaller nations to challenge superior naval forces, dispute blockades, and achieve effective sea denial.

This study aims to clarify the countermeasures required to protect Japanese nuclear power plants (NPPs) from grey-zone military threats—coercive actions that fall short of open armed conflict. It further examines whether replacing land-based NPPs with offshore floating nuclear power plants (OFNPs) could enhance deterrence and improve crisis response capabilities under Japan’s existing legal and institutional frameworks. A scenario planning approach was employed to explore high-impact, uncertain future scenarios involving grey-zone military threats to NPPs. Four representative scenarios were developed and analysed in relation to both Japanese government and plant operators, focusing on common failure points and feasible countermeasures. The analysis identified legal and institutional constraints that hinder the timely deployment of Self-Defence Forces, including requirements for prior Diet (Japan’s National Legislature) approval and rigid operational authorisations. Recommended countermeasures include shifting from a positive-list to a negative-list legal model; deploying drone countermeasures, such as high-power microwave systems; and reinforcing spent fuel pool buildings. OFNPs were found to offer both design-based and strategic advantages, including broad-area maritime surveillance and the ability to implement maritime security operations without Diet approval. This study clarified that mitigating grey-zone military threats to NPPs by 2035 will require integrated legal reform, technical enhancement, and strengthened operational preparedness. It also demonstrated that OFNPs offer advantages of deterrence and flexible crisis response, making them a promising alternative to conventional land-based NPPs in Japan’s evolving security environment.

This study investigates NATO’s preparedness to cope with a protracted conflict and war in Europe, the additional challenges that allies would face in a worst-case scenario, and the strategies that can enhance their readiness. Guided by the NATO 2025 Hague Summit Declaration and the EU’s White Paper on European Defence Readiness 2030, the study analyses selected capabilities of forces at the tactical and critical enablers at the operational level. To evaluate the preparedness of NATO to cope with a protracted conflict and war, are leveraged historical and contemporaneous defence data on Europe in a statistical analysis. Both the examined defence industrial capacity and the cross-border military mobility contribute to vulnerabilities in the overall European defence readiness. To stress-test the NATO defence readiness in Europe in a hypothetical worst-case scenario non-kinetic geopolitical conflict with CRINK– the study leverages an empirically validated global model. Scenario analysis results suggest that today’s existing problems will only be amplified in a protracted conflict with CRINK. By quantifying the potential cost of unpreparedness, this study provides a measurable rationale for European allies to embark on a rapid de-risking trajectory, rather than waiting for a much more costly, abrupt shock trigger dictated by the increasingly unpredictable CRINK.

The recent and rapid growth of low-cost, sophisticated drones, along with the associated technological challenges, is a notable feature of warfare tactics. As the Russians and Ukrainians become more dependent on these cost-effective yet crude drones, they establish a new battlefield characterised by high efficacy and low cost. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces launch drones to target each other. Drones locate their targets, perhaps with low efficacy, but they can cause significant destruction. Drones can destroy and carbonise tanks, which cost about $4 million each. However, the unit price of drones does not exceed $1,000. The limitations and ineffectiveness of most anti-drone devices currently on the market, including lasers, high-power microwaves, and radio frequency jammers, are evident in the increasing ubiquity of drones. This case study suggests that current counter-drone technologies are unable to neutralise kamikaze and weaponised drones on both sides. As a result of these failures, Russian and Ukrainian forces employ new technologies, such as metal grids and nylon net barriers, which are effective in destroying and stopping drones to some extent. This article presents a case study involving the reliance on drones by both warring sides, who have also been utilising anti-drone tactics since February 2022. The work investigates the solutions currently available to both adversaries for reducing the impact of weaponised drones on the battlefield. This study evaluates them and demonstrates how their inherent drawbacks could motivate the development of new strategies and countermeasures against armed drones.

This paper aims to analyse the role of public intelligence as a strategic tool in modern conflicts, focusing on its use during the Russo- Ukrainian war. It employs a qualitative research design, combining comparative case analysis and document analysis to examine the role of public intelligence as a strategic tool in the Ukraine War. The primary data sources include declassified intelligence reports, official government statements, media coverage, and academic literature on intelligence disclosure and strategic communication. The findings of this study indicate that public intelligence disclosure in the Ukraine War has been highly effective in countering Russian disinformation and strengthening diplomatic cohesion among Western allies. Unlike previous conflicts, intelligence transparency played a crucial role in shaping global narratives and mobilising international support. However, its deterrence value remains uncertain, as intelligence disclosures did not prevent Russia’s full-scale invasion. The findings of this paper highlight how intelligence dissemination has shifted from classified circles to a public tool of strategic statecraft. The Ukraine War marked a departure from traditional intelligence practices, as the United States and the United Kingdom used real-time declassification to counter Russian disinformation, unify allies, and shape global opinion. This shift underscores both opportunities and limitations, as intelligence transparency did not deter Russia’s invasion. Public intelligence disclosures proved effective in neutralising misinformation and influencing diplomatic responses. Intelligence disclosure also had diplomatic ramifications. While it helped rally allies, initial scepticism from Germany and France revealed lingering distrust due to past intelligence failures.