The Scandinavian Journal of EconomicsVolume 113, Issue 2 p. 235-236 The Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, 2010 First published: 23 May 2011 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9442.2011.01667.xRead the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Volume113, Issue2June 2011Pages 235-236 RelatedInformation

In this paper, the impact of Lazear contracts with defined-benefit pensions on aggregate technology composition and the aggregate risk premium is examined. In the presence of capital market constraints affecting workers, defined-benefit pensions bias the economy towards risk-free production. Leveraging the risky technology relaxes the constraints and results in more risky production and a fall in the aggregate risk premium. This effect holds with risky debt and low pension shortfall risk but breaks down with high pension shortfall risk. A key prediction is that as Lazear contracts become less common, risky production will increase and the aggregate risk premium will fall.

Publicly-provided private goods are conventionally considered consumer goods. Departing from this perspective, we analyze the public provision of inputs that improve household productivity (e.g., education and childcare). In a two-class economy with distorting taxation, public provision is always welfare improving with respect to pure taxation, given that the public input directly affects household productivity. Moreover, the case for public provision strengthens as households' heterogeneity in input demand fades out, contrary to consolidated results in the literature. The features of optimal provision schemes depend on the nature of publicly provided input, namely, if it substitutes household productive capacity or just helps households to exploit it.

The Scandinavian Journal of EconomicsVolume 113, Issue 1 p. 228-234 Editors' Report First published: 17 February 2011 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9442.2011.01643.xRead the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Volume113, Issue1March 2011Pages 228-234 RelatedInformation

The Scandinavian Journal of EconomicsVolume 112, Issue 3 p. 640-641 Corrigendum: Monetary Policy, Expectations and Commitment George W. Evans, George W. Evans University of Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403-1285, USA[email protected]Search for more papers by this authorSeppo Honkapohja, Seppo Honkapohja Bank of Finland, FI-00101 Helsinki, Finland[email protected]Search for more papers by this author George W. Evans, George W. Evans University of Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403-1285, USA[email protected]Search for more papers by this authorSeppo Honkapohja, Seppo Honkapohja Bank of Finland, FI-00101 Helsinki, Finland[email protected]Search for more papers by this author First published: 04 August 2010 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9442.2010.01622.xCitations: 6Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL No abstract is available for this article.Citing Literature Volume112, Issue3September 2010Pages 640-641 RelatedInformation

We adopt the view that greater party discipline induces legislators to commit to promised policies after being elected. We then develop the hypothesis that the effect of party discipline on the stringency of environmental policy is conditional on the degree of government corruption. Our empirical work suggests that greater party discipline results in more stringent environmental policies when the level of corruption is relatively low, but in weaker policies when the level of corruption is comparatively high.

This paper evaluates the employment effects of active labour market programmes for Danish welfare benefit recipients, focusing on private sector employment (PSE) programmes. Using a latent variable model that allows for heterogeneous treatment effects among observationally identical persons, we estimate commonly defined mean treatment effects and the distribution of treatment effects. We find no significant mean treatment effect of PSE programme participation as compared to participation in other programmes for PSE programme participants. However, we find substantial heterogeneity in the treatment effects, and those most likely to participate in PSE programmes are those who benefit the least from such programmes.