This article presents a historiographical survey of scholarship on Islamic law and legal authority in Central/Inner Asia under Russian Imperial rule. It analyzes the debates, paradigms and assumptions that have dominated the field up to the present. The binaries that have dominated the field—between cooperation and insulation, rupture and continuity—disguise the complex legal history of the region. The historiography has shifted to emphasize a more pluralistic legal landscape, shaped by imperial intervention, local custom, practical considerations, and agency of ordinary Muslims. I suggest that by integrating a variety of sources, both archival and Islamic, scholars can take a bolder anthropological turn to develop new directions in historiography that will involve studying the lived experiences of legal actors and ordinary Muslims, gendered dimensions of legal practice, the meanings of socio-legal institutions, and the daily interaction between religious scholars and their communities.

This article offers a comparative study of two closely linked constellations of early Ṣūfī thought: the ascetic–mystical program of al-Fuḍayl ibn ʿIyāḍ (d. 187/803) and that of his renowned disciple Bishr al-Ḥāfī (d. 227/841). Moving beyond hagiographic anecdote, the study advances the thesis that the pair articulate two complementary modalities of tawba (repentance) that generate distinct ascetic habitus and pedagogical lineages: al-Fudayl’s “ethic of awe” (fear, juridical redress, and renunciation of patronage) and Bishr’s “aesthetics of reverence” (beauty-induced modesty, evident humility, and fame avoidance). Drawing on primary sources (Ḥilyat al-Awliyāʾ, al-Sulamī’s Ṭabaqāt al-Ṣūfiyya, al-Qushayrī’s Risāla, al-Sarrāj’s Lumaʿ), the article reconstructs each thinker’s core concepts, practices (e.g., returning wrongs, ḥafāʾ/barefoot humility), and teaching styles and maps how the teacher–disciple nexus transmits, adapts, and ritualizes these ethics into durable Ṣūfī dispositions. Methodologically, the article combines close textual analysis with practice theory to show how emotions—such as fear and modesty (ḥayāʾ)—are choreographed into public, socially legible acts, thus reframing repentance as embodied discipline rather than interior feeling alone. A prosopographic appendix traces transmission from al-Fudayl to Bishr to Sarī al-Saqaṭī and al-Junayd, clarifying how each modality survives in later Baghdad sobriety and Malāmatī self-effacement. The contribution is twofold: first, it supplies a granular typology of early Ṣūfī repentance that explains divergent stances toward money, publicity, and power; second, it models how to read early Ṣūfī biography as anthropology of practice, recovering the lived grammar by which “conversion stories” become social programs. In doing so, the article nuances standard narratives of early Ṣūfism, showing that Bishr is not merely al-Fuḍayl’s echo but a creative reframer whose “reverential” path complements—rather than imitates—the awe-driven ethic associated with al-Fuḍayl.

The Fozu tongji 佛祖統紀 (Comprehensive Records of the Buddha and Patriarchs), compiled by the Tiantai monk Zhipan 志磐 during the Song dynasty, is a seminal work in the history of historiography. This article focuses on its inclusion process during the Ming dynasty, revealing the interplay between textual transmission and political power. Through primary source analysis and textual criticism, this article examines how the Fozu tongji became included in Ming court editions of the Buddhist Canon. Two main conclusions emerge: First, the Fozu tongji—a text documenting the history of the Tiantai school—was formally included through advocacy by Puqia 溥洽 of the seng lu si 僧錄司 (Buddhist Registry Office), signifying the imperial rulers’ recognition of the Tiantai school. Second, to align with state ideology, all prophecy-related content was systematically eliminated from the original text. This case study provides a window into practices of religious governance in the early Ming Dynasty. Furthermore, it enriches the scholarly understanding of the dissemination history of the Fozu tongji and also provides broader insights on the inclusion of Buddhist texts. While inclusion in the canon elevated the Fozu tongji’s influence, the text was altered under the ideological “purification” imposed by the state.

The aim of this article is to determine the extent to which (directly or indirectly) the papal teachings apply to cooperatives as tools for solving social, economic and environmental problems, which were defined by Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), in accordance with CST by implementing the principles of solidarity, cooperation, justice and respect for human dignity. The analysis of various papal documents covers the period from the pontificate of Pope Leo XIII up to Francis. The popes appreciate the work of cooperatives. They serve their members by implementing Christian values, including in the cooperative movement known as Christian solidarity. Cooperatives had been developing since the 19th century, often thanks to the priests involved in their founding and management. Popes are interested in socio-economic issues, economic activity and its form as cooperatives. Their reflections encompass various issues related to cooperatives, ranging from the right of people to associate, the principles of cooperative activity, the tasks of cooperative members, the role of production, agricultural, banking, consumer, social, labour, and energy cooperatives, to the necessity of state support for this form of management. They also emphasize the achievement of universal personal, spiritual, and community values, as well as the need to promote the common good.

James Sterba recently presented arguments against theories which ground morality in God and attempted “to provide an account of the norms on which an ethics without God can be appropriately grounded ….” In particular, Sterba noted that “Robert Adams is best known for his attempt to ground morality in God’s nature” and “[r]ecently, Adam Johnson significantly developed Adams’s view ….” In 2024, Sterba and I had a public debate concerning this issue at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln in which I argued that the trinitarian God of Christianity provides the best explanation for objective morality whereas Sterba argued that morality can be objective without God and proposed a nontheistic account. In this paper, I argue that my theistic theory, which I call Divine Love Theory, is a better explanation of objective morality than Sterba’s nontheistic theory. First, I provide a summary of both my theory and Sterba’s. Second, I respond to Sterba’s arguments against theories which ground morality in God. Third, I provide reasons to conclude my Divine Love Theory is a better explanation for objective morality than Sterba’s theory.

This article examines the configuration of carceral Islam in Algeria as an instrument of moral governance and civic re-education. Drawing on a multi-year qualitative investigation conducted within several research projects and framed by a comparative Maghrebi perspective, the study analyses how imam and Murshidat contribute to the construction of an “administered religion,” in which spiritual authority is translated into institutional competence and a tool of moral regulation. Through the examination of institutional sources, interviews, and field observations, the research shows how faith becomes a language of discipline, how Tawba (moral and spiritual repentance) is converted into a form of moral capital, and how spirituality functions as a technology of civic conformity. The Algerian prison thus emerges as a laboratory of religious governmentality, where the spiritual dimension is incorporated into logics of security and social control. The comparison with Tunisia—and, to a lesser extent, Morocco—highlights both convergences and divergences among Maghrebi models of religious management, opening new avenues for research on the public function of religion and on the contemporary forms through which states moralize the sacred in Muslim societies.

In Indian religious traditions, the attainment of death with full conscious awareness has long been idealized, reflecting the deep ontological connection posited between death and liberation (mokṣa). Within this framework, Jainism—grounded in a rigorous soul–matter dualism—developed highly systematized practices that aim to separate consciousness from both the body and karma not only at the moment of death but throughout daily practice, as exemplified by kāyotsarga. Although sallekhaṇā (fasting unto death) has received considerable attention beyond Jain communities in the context of “death with dignity,” its deeper meditative dimensions have remained largely understudied. This article elucidates the meditative techniques of samādhimaraṇa underlying sallekhaṇā by examining classical Jain sources on deathbed meditation, particularly the kevalin’s procedures at the third and fourth stages of pure meditation (śukladhyāna). The analysis also addresses kevali-samudghāta—the uniquely Jain technique of “omniscient soul projection” incorporated into the third stage of śukladhyāna in Hemacandra’s twelfth-century Yogaśāstra—thereby clarifying the broader meditative context of sallekhaṇā. By situating samādhimaraṇa within its doctrinal, meditative, and soteriological contexts—rather than reducing it to suicide or to a religious variant of “death with dignity”—this article contributes to a more precise and contextualized understanding of Jain deathbed meditation. In doing so, it also contributes to the expanding field of death-yoga studies that has so far focused primarily on Hindu and Buddhist traditions, highlighting the distinctive role of Jainism in the landscape of Indian contemplative practice.

In this article, I argue that the command of Jesus in Luke 12:22–34 not to be anxious and afraid are supported by exegetical clues from the text and findings in anxiety recovery research. I will argue that the imperatives of Luke 12:22–34 are not intended to be alienating but instructive with regard to where we put our attention and how we handle fear. Moreover, I will demonstrate that these words are not the fruit of a detached theologian or an abstract, impractical encouragement but instead the wisdom of someone familiar with the struggles of life, particularly that of first-century Jewish Palestine. Such is a wisdom that can be drawn upon today, especially for those who struggle with anxiety. The research methodology in this article is interdisciplinary, employing theology, exegesis, and psychology.

In the governance of intangible cultural heritage (ICH), traditional rituals often fall into a paradox of institutional exhibition. The Korean shamanic rites Ssitgim-gut and Byeolsin-gut, respectively, represent the two poles of ritual institutionalization, displaying semiotic logics of original iconicity and institutional textualization. This study, based on audiovisual materials, archival records, and performative documentation, constructs event-level coding of the signifier–subsystem–power relation and, through hierarchical regression and Mann–Whitney nonparametric tests, proposes the Dual-Axis Symbolic Regime Model (DSRR)—comprising the Symbolic Purification–Differentiation Axis (S) and the Textual–Institutional Axis (I). Results indicate that along the S-axis, the purification segments of Ssitgim-gut, dominated by iconic signifiers of soul pacification, manifest a shaman-centered unipolar power structure, whereas its performance segments, involving community participation, reveal a collaborative and co-performative power distribution. Moreover, institutionalization significantly affects the distribution of symbolic power. Along the I-axis, after Byeolsin-gut was incorporated into ICH stage performances, its ritual signifiers became scripted and codified, acquiring administrative value; consequently, the power gap between shamans and families narrowed, and interpretive authority shifted toward institutional agencies. These results remain robust after controlling for media-related variables.In conclusion, the DSRR model elucidates the correlation between symbols and power, offering empirical insights for ICH governance—specifically, how to preserve ritual integrity while avoiding the semantic attenuation of symbols caused by over-textualization.

Feminist biblical criticism of Proverbs 1–9 has decried the figure of “Dame Folly” as reinforcing pejorative stereotypes of women that blame women for “the world’s sin and corruption.” To be sure, in the history of Christian biblical interpretation, Proverbs has been read in precisely this way—and with tragic consequences. In fact, Proverbs was used as fuel for the witch-hunting craze that infected the Christian West in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, with its particular focus on women as being especially “addicted” to heresy and “evil superstitions.” Nonetheless, as this essay demonstrates, a reading which denigrates all women universally as blameworthy is not really native to post-exilic Judaism or biblical literature in general before the Hellenistic period. Instead, it emerges with the influence of Hellenism and the misogynist stereotypes endemic to Greek literature, mythology, and even philosophy that distort and blur the lens through which Hellenistic Jews (and later Greco-Roman Christians) read their Scriptures. Through a reading of Proverbs in its own language, its own post-exilic Jewish world, and its own literary context, this essay both recovers the wise women of Israel, so esteemed and valued in post-exilic Judaism, and uncovers the identity of the real fool of Proverbs 9.