There are numerous issues of the constitutional system of Bosnia and Herzegovina which are controversial. They are often conditioned by the author's ideological and political views, but also by different theoretical approaches to the analyzed problems. These are fundamental questions of every constitutional system, on the solution of which more important things than academic discussions depend like the functioning of the state and the realization of fundamental constitutional principles. The author of this paper has used the opportunity to present his views on a number of fundamental issues in one place, to explain them once again, to compare his views with the views of other authors and to point out the structural flaws in the Constitution itself, which allow opposing views. The author deals with issues such as: minimal and fundamental consensus necessary for the functioning of the constitutional system; the nature of the mandate of the members of the Presidency; the relationship between consociation and liberal democracy in the constitutional system; the problem of legal (dis)continuity of entities.

After the introduction, the first part of the paper is devoted to defining the concepts of artificial intelligence and totalitarianism, where the importance of distinguishing between the current (machine learning) and the projected (superintelligence) phase in the development of artificial intelligence, i.e. between the embryonic (totalitarian movement out of power) and the established (totalitarian movement in power) stage in the development of totalitarianism is underlined. The second part of the paper examines the connection between the current level of artificial intelligence and the embryonic phase of totalitarianism, while the third part of the paper analyzes the potential relationship between the superintelligence and the established totalitarianism. It seems, considering the similarities and differences between the effects of contemporary and future artificial intelligence and the effects of earlier totalitarianism, that today (and in the future) we do not have a mere replica of totalitarian phases from the 20th century, but special totalitarian phenomena in the form of "capillary totalitarianism", i.e. "hypertotalitarianism". Last century's totalitarianism, as well as today's "capillary" variant of it, were not necessarily irreversible, but "hypertotalitarianism" will be. In conclusion, protective measures against the risk of artificial intelligence are proposed, in the form of the principle of exemption (modeled after the concept of conscientious objection).

In this article, the author discusses the relatively new Lobbying Act that was enacted in the Republic of Serbia in 2019. According to the author's point of view, this Act is not in alignment with the Criminal Code, and the necessary amendments to the Criminal Code have not been made following the adoption of the Lobbying Act. Lobbying essentially involves attempting to influence government authorities to pass laws and perform other actions within their jurisdiction in exchange for appropriate compensation. On the other hand, the basic form of committing the criminal act of trading in influence is realized by making requests or receiving gifts or other benefits with the intent to mediate in performing an official act, utilizing one's official or social position or influence, which can be real or presumed. It is evident that lobbying and trading in influence overlap, which raises the question of whether a lobbyist, during the act of lobbying, is effectively involved in trading in influence or if the Lobbying Act decriminalizes trading in influence. According to the author, trading in influence is a broader concept than lobbying. This is because lobbying includes only influencing government authorities to pass laws, while trading in influence can be related to any authority, such as the police, administrative authorities, etc. This is why the Lobbying Act did not decriminalize trading in influence in general. However, the fact is that the lobbyist, according to positive legislation, is in danger of committing a criminal offense, so a change in the Criminal Code is necessary. The legislative body needs to amend the Criminal Code accordingly. It should be stipulated that a lobbyist who acts in accordance with the Lobbying Act does not commit a criminal offense. Additionally, the Lobbying Act needs to be revised. The question is - is it necessary to have registered lobbyists and non-registered lobbyists? The Lobbying Act should only prescribe registered lobbyists.

The main purpose of this paper is to examine the crime of forced pregnancy within the framework of the International Criminal Law (ICL). The author notes that acts of sexual violence, including forced pregnancy, have long been neglected in the system of international criminal justice. The crime of forced pregnancy has particularly been one of the most controversial issues during the negotiations regarding the text of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Delegations from several states that prohibit abortion were concerned that the adoption of the crime will expose their nationals to the criminal prosecution for forced pregnancy. A solution was a compromise which moved the crime of forced pregnancy away from the original concept of its proponents - an emphasis of the crime, as it stands in the Rome Statute, is not on the denial of the abortion for women which have been forcibly made pregnant, but rather on the (physical) confinement of such women. Also, the result is a definition that is too complex to be of significant practical value, a demonstration of which is the fact that the ICC has just recently made its first judgement regarding the crime of forced pregnancy, even though this crime has been in the Rome Statute for more than twenty years. Having that in mind, the author argues that the crime of forced pregnancy is a classic example of the "overextension" of the ICL. Namely, the ICC should be responsible for prosecuting only the most serious international crimes which are of concern for the international community. Clearly, as it has been demonstrated in the Rome Conference, various states have very different opinions on this issue. Besides these topics, the author has also pointed out that the crime of forced pregnancy, within a framework of crimes against humanity and war crimes, is a distinct crime in relation to the crime of genocide. The main difference between those two crimes is in their material element.

The possibility of introducing employees into ownership of the employer in the Republic of Serbia was significantly limited by 2020. Amendments to the Company Act introduced the possibility of including employees into the ownership of a limited liability company. The subject of this paper is the analysis of the newly introduced legal institutes: reserved own share and financial instrument - share purchase right. These are institutes introduced with the idea of involving employees in the ownership of the employer. By analyzing the aforementioned institutes, authors seek to notice the positive and negative sides of the relatively new regulations, and suggest de lege ferenda corrections, in order to enable unhindered functioning of the ESOP arrangement.

In 2011, the Republic of Serbia passed the Law on Restitution. The subject of research in this paper is a historical-legal, comparative-legal, normative and analysis of the application in Serbian judicial practice of Article 5, paragraph 3, point 3 of this Law, which stipulates that "the right to return property or compensation does not exist to a person who was a member of the occupation forces that operated on the territory of the Republic of Serbia during the Second World War, as well as his successors". In this sense, the rights to the return of confiscated property and compensation for members of the German, and to a lesser extent, the Hungarian nationality, are emphasised. The aim of the analysis is to try to determine whether such a restriction is justified and whether it contributes to the intention of the legislator when enacting the Serbian Law on Restitution, which implies the correction of historical injustices and the fair compensation of persons who, after the Second World War, were deprived of their property without their wishes and without (fair) compensation. In this sense, in the first part of the paper, historical and legal circumstances are investigated, i.e. the demographic structure of the German minority in Yugoslavia, estimates of the amount of property they owned and which was taken from them is made, as well as their attitude towards the Serbian population before and during the Second World War and the fate of the Germans in these areas after the end of the hostilities. In addition, the author stresses to a number of the most important post-war Yugoslav regulations, thanks to which the Volksdeutsche people were deprived of their property and according to which they were deprived of Yugoslav citizenship. In the second part of the paper, the provision of Art. 5 par. 3 point 3 of the Law on Restitution is analyzed, so a legal argumentation is presented about its inconsistency with basic legal-civilizational achievements and comparative-legal solutions. It is apostrophized that the legislator failed to make a distinction between members of the occupation forces against two relevant criteria: the moment when they acquired property and the way in which they acquired property that would be the subject of restitution. In the third part of the paper, the judicial practice of the Constitutional Court of Serbia and the Administrative Court, as well as practice of the Restitution Agency is investigated and the Law on Rehabilitation is analyzed. Based on this, it is indicated who is considered to be a member of the occupation forces and it is concluded that in this sense, contrary to the point of view of the Restitution Agency, it is necessary to rely on the Law on Rehabilitation and judicial practice. The author concludes that the prohibition of restitution to members of the occupation forces and their descendants is of an ideological and not a legal nature and that there is no legal argument for reflecting historical and criminal responsibility for the enjoyment of legally acquired property rights. Unfortunately, even the Restitution Agency does not contribute with its practice to alleviating this problem, because it selectively acts on the decisions of the Administrative Court, as it selectively applies the Law on Rehabilitation.

In its 2022 Dobbs, State Health Officer of the Mississippi Department of Health decision, the United States Supreme Court overturned the historic Roe v. Wade, adopted in 1973. This was achieved by referring to the fact that the right to abortion is neither expressly guaranteed by the Constitution or its amendments, nor by the American national tradition, and by referring to the member states of the United States as the only entities entitled to regulate the right to abortion. By reintroducing the possibility of limiting or abolishing the right to abortion through the laws of member states into the U.S. legal system, the Court laid new foundations for the debate that has for decades divided constitutional lawyers and American society into two mutually very distant poles.

The unity of the legal order is the foundation of the rule of law. It also implies the internal harmony of decision-making, ie. the absence of contradictory court decisions in the unified legal system. In order to realize this ideal, it is necessary for the legal system to foresee that legally binding and final individual legal acts mutually bind state bodies. The unity of the legal system can be only achieved when the system provides that conviction judgment rendered by a criminal court bind civil court in the subsequent civil proceedings. Civil courts should be also bound by a decision rendered by a criminal court if the defendant is acquitted of the charge, in case criminal court has solved some preliminary question that is important for deciding in civil proceedings. Such a system exists in Austria and Serbia. In principle, a verdict rendered by a criminal court should produce effects erga omnes. On the other hand, in Germany and Anglo-Saxon legal systems, the principle of independence of criminal and civil justice applies. However, the difference between the previous and the latter system is not as significant as it seems at first glance, because the judgment of the criminal court in civil proceedings has a significant probative value. From the point of view of the Constitution of Serbia, as well as the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the principles of independence of the courts in making decisions, the requirement that a court must only be bound by the Constitution and the law are not an obstacle for the legislator to determine that the final judgment of the criminal court binds the civil court. The principle of res judicata, which forms one of the foundations of the rule of law, is much broader in Anglo-Saxon than in Euro-continental law. This particularly applies to the application of the institute issue or collateral estoppel which derives from the Roman principle of venire contra factum proprium. The principle serves to prevent substantial injustice. The principle of the rule of law requires legal certainty and predictability which implies the absence of contradictory court decisions in a unified legal system. In order to avoid the possibility of making contradictory court decisions, it is necessary to reexamine the ambit of the res judicata principle and to extend the application of the principle of venire contra factum proprium and preclusion in order to achieve procedural fairness.

Given that AIDS is an incurable, deadly disease that can be prevented by simple preventive measures, the intention of the Serbian legislature to make the transmission of HIV infection a criminal offense is justified. However, infection with HIV represents a specific disease, which makes the criminal act of transmitting infection with HIV specific too. For the crime to be prescribed adequately, it is first necessary to understand the nature of the disease, the ways of its transmission, and also the psychology of the infected person, that is, the potential perpetrator. The current legal text shows that the legislator has not fully coped with this challenge. In the current legal text that prescribes the criminal offense of transmitting infection with HIV, there are certain shortcomings that we must point out. First of all, the legislator failed to foresee the possibility of punishing persons who knowingly transmit HIV infection to others, even though they are not infected themselves, but this form of offense was foreseen only for HIV-positive persons. Then, the legislator foresees the occurrence of the qualifying circumstance only for the act from paragraph 3 of Art. 250, and not for the offense from paragraph 2 of the same article, although death occurs in all cases when HIV infection reaches the terminal stage. Also, the position that prescribes the negligent form of the act is vaguely formulated and leads to confusion in which situations the act can have a negligent form. The way in which the criminal offense is currently prescribed makes it almost impossible to prove the connection between the action and the consequence, and therefore difficult to prove the guilt of the perpetrator, as evidenced by the fact that in 15 years there have been only two convictions for this crime. The (un) achieved results speak in favour of the fact that it is not enough to just prescribe a criminal offense, but that the problem of criminalizing HIV transmission must be approached in a different and systematic way.

The constitutional history never had the status of an independent discipline on faculties of law in Serbia. On the other hand, there are a few synthesis in Serbian and in English with monographic characteristics regarding the constitutional history of Serbia. Occasionally there are some concerning the entire constitutional history, but most of them are about 19th century. Some of those monographs are analyzed in this paper: the works of Slobodan Jovanović regarding 19th century constitutional history of Serbia 'Constitutional Development and Constitutional Fights in Serbia' by Jaša Prodanović, 'The Development of Parliamentary Government in Serbia' by Alex Dragnich and 'Constitutional history of Serbia' by Dragoljub Popović. In consideration are taken a few Serbian Constitutional law textbooks which traditionally contain general as well as national constitutional history. Those works are taken as examples for analyzing the possibility of constitutional history being an independent discipline. It was done through an indirect approach, by analyzing the monographic works, that is, the synthesis of constitutional history of Serbia in 19th century. This paper doesn't give a review of the content of the abovementioned works but a review of the methodological approach used by its authors. Although the constitutional history was never considered as an independent discipline on faculties of law in Serbia, the assumption is that it has its own subject and specific methodological approach. All the works that have been the subject of analysis show a certain methodological specifics. However, the authors do not explicitly state their methodological approach. For example, Slobodan Jovanović distinctly says that he writes about the constitutional history and states some notions in regards to a potential subject of that discipline which he understands it to be quite broadly. The analysis of Jaša Prodanović and Alex Dragnich are predominantly based on chronological approach, whereas the analysis of Dragoljub Popović are based on chronological and thematic approach. The conclusion is that the constitutional history lays between the use of the historical method and the method of the constitutional law. And, as there can't be an understanding of constitutional legal phenomenon without its overall comprehension which includes not only the analyze of the constitutional norms but also the 'life' of those norms, their practical shaping, neither can constitutional history be limited to merely give a description of the constitutional norms which existed in the past. Constitutional history must leap into the past and understand which conditions lead to certain ideas or were of great significance in shaping the political institutions. Hence, the subject of constitutional history, at first glance, can be seen as unspecified. However the subject is clear, and a successful result requires a perception of the subject of constitutional history from various perspectives.