This article offers an analysis of the specific challenges that direct financial markets, such as money markets, markets for derivatives, currencies and bonds, pose to competition policy. These markets often fall outside the scope of tools developed in the context of traditional competition analysis, particularly those derived from theories based on the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm. Drawing on a comprehensive review of the theoretical and empirical literature, we examine several fundamental issues related to competition policy in direct financial markets. First, we explore the question of market power and concentration in this sector from the theory point of view. Second, we discuss specific types of anticompetitive behaviour, such as collusion on benchmark prices, the potentially anti-competitive effects of information-sharing mechanisms and the growing role of algorithms and artificial intelligence (AI). We highlight the need to adapt the analytical frameworks and tools of competition policy in order to ensure effective competition, as well as legal certainty for financial market participants, both of which are essential to the proper functioning of these markets in a rapidly evolving environment.

This paper presents a systematic review of the literature on optimal fining methods for cartel infringements. Building on the PRISMA 2020 methodology, we analysed forty-seven articles to address three core themes: how optimal fines are defined, the ways different variables are incorporated in quantitative models, and comparative insights. We identified five prevailing approaches: revenuebased, overcharge-based, damages-based, profit-based, and a (recent) sophisticated revenue-based framework blending revenue- and overcharge-based elements. While each method has distinct advantages and challenges, the sophisticated revenue-based approach appears particularly promising in balancing deterrence against proportionality concerns, offering a potential remedy to the shortcomings or implementation issues, found in strictly revenue-based or damages/overcharge-based regimes. This review underlines the importance of aligning fine structures with the overarching policy objective of mitigating wealth transfers from consumers to producers. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first systematic review to map how different strands in extant literature conceive an optimal fine.

Ireland is an increasingly interesting and prominent jurisdiction in merger control, both from a European and international perspective. Due to the level of multinational corporate investment into the country (particularly in digital and pharmaceutical industries), Ireland has a somewhat disproportionate level of importance when compared to other jurisdictions of a similar size in the EU. In addition, the Irish competition authority, the Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (‘CCPC’), has recently been granted several additional powers when reviewing mergers. Further, it appears to be adopting a more aggressive and interventionist stance, for example, by taking the previously unusual step of prohibiting a number of transactions and requiring extensive remedies across several cases. Alongside the changes in Irish merger control, the EU Commission is faced with the resurrected challenge of below-threshold mergers as a result of the Court of Justice of the EU’s (‘CJEU’) judgment in Illumina v. Commission. This decision has scuppered its ability to rely on Article 22 of the EU Merger Regulation (‘EUMR’) to access problematic acquisitions in digital and pharmaceutical markets. As a result, there is a strong possibility that national competition authorities (‘NCAs’) with the ability to ‘call-in’ transactions that fall outside the EU’s notification thresholds may be required to do so to plug this gap that has re-emerged in European merger control. In this context, with Ireland positioned as an extremely important corporate hub and the CCPC likely to be faced with an expanding mandate over the coming years, this article offers a timely review of the Irish authority’s activities over the past five years as a means of synthesizing trends that can be observed (as well as potential future developments). It does so by tracing through the assessments of mergers systematically over this period (2020–24) from their initiation by way of notification to the CCPC, all the way through to determinations, remedies, and prohibitions. By taking this approach, the article extracts information and points of interest from the various stages as a means of shaping merger parties’ expectations of the process, as well as providing key advice for other NCAs in the EU.

Online search has long been dominated by Google Search. In several competition and regulatory proceedings across the globe, various remedies to increase competition are being discussed, including data sharing obligations or a ban on the exclusive default settings of Google Search. A key factor for the success of any remedy package will be the ability of competitors to add value by differentiating their services from Google Search. Up to now, almost all search engine competitors depend on Google’s or Microsoft’s search results by means of syndication agreements, as they cannot feasibly set up their own search engine infrastructure from scratch. To allow market entry and growth across all sections of the search value chain, the remedy package must enable competitors to build up their own infrastructure step by step, in accordance with the success of their market entry. The article outlines how the Ladder of Investment approach, successfully implemented in the telecommunications sector, can be applied to this end. The paper aims to provide guidance on how such a regulatory approach could be implemented either by means of new statutory regulations, such as in the United Kingdom, or through remedies imposed in competition cases on the monopolization of search services.

The balancing test under the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR) has emerged as one of its most debated features, reflecting tensions between competition enforcement and broader EU policy goals. Initially conceived as the ‘EU interest test’ in the White Paper, its contours remained rather vague until the recent publication of the Draft Guidelines, in July 2025. These Draft Guidelines finally allow a glimpse into better understanding of the balancing test. This paper explores more broadly how the balancing test works and the policy objectives it may pursue. After mapping the legal sources and the FSR’s relationship with broader EU law, a theoretical framework of the balancing test is developed, rooted in FSR broader assessment and in the general principles of EU law. The test’s process and assessment, in particular the order of positive effects it can balanced, are examined. Some procedural points, i.e., the burden of proof and variations across FSR procedures, are discussed as well. Ultimately, the paper assesses how the Commission will use its discretion in conducting the balancing test and its policy implications.

This article examines how public interest considerations shape the design and enforcement of competition law, using Vietnam’s National Competition Commission (NCC) as a case study. Public interest – balancing consumer welfare with state-driven economic goals – informs national competition policies. It enables competition authorities to pursue their objectives, yet it creates tensions in practice. The NCC’s effectiveness in Vietnam is undermined by its subordination to the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MoIT), which oversees dominant state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This legal status fosters conflicts with sectoral regulators, influence from interest groups, and inconsistent enforcement, compromising the NCC’s ability to address anti-competitive practices impartially. Drawing on global examples (e.g., Australia, South Africa) and Vietnam’s Law on Competition (LoC) 2018, the study reveals a dilemma: the NCC struggles to reconcile public interest goals like SOE support with competition aims like market fairness. The article argues that the NCC’s lack of independence – rooted in its MoIT ties – drives inefficiency and bias, necessitating reform. It proposes statutory changes to grant the NCC autonomy, ensuring its power and objectivity in enforcing competition law. These findings offer lessons for transitional economies navigating similar public interest-competition trade-offs.