ABSTRACT This paper argues that China intruded at multiple points along the LAC in May 2020 to showcase strength amidst the COVID-19 pandemic which is believed to have originated in Wuhan. COVID-19 led to large scale deaths and a global economic meltdown with Beijing severely criticized for the emergence of COVID-19 pandemic, poor regulation of the animal markets, suppressing information and failure to prevent the spread of COVID-19 beyond China’s borders. This caused immense damage to China’s international reputation and status, its economy, and relations with other countries. Border incursions by China in May 2020 were a guise to highlight China’s strength lest India consider China in a weakened state and gain leverage over Beijing in the bilateral relationship. Through border incursions, Beijing wanted to mask its vulnerability created by COVID-19 and showcase its willingness to not compromise over its security interests. China is both powerful and insecure about its status. This combination makes it undertake a particularly pessimistic security-centric outlook and more likely to engage in risky behavior. Like in the previous instances, the use of military force against India in the year 2020 stemmed from a sense of vulnerability caused by loss of status due to Covid19.

ABSTRACT This article argues that China intruded at multiple points along the LAC in May 2020 due to the construction of border infrastructure especially the Darbuk-Shyokh (DS)-Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) road in conjunction with India’s Minister of Home Affairs Amit Shah’s statement regarding restoration of Aksai Chin and Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) into India after the abrogation of Article 370 in August 2019. China perceives that the rapid pace of border infrastructure development by India especially the construction of the DS-DBO road mitigates its military/tactical advantage along the LAC. However, the road has been under construction for more than a decade. Similarly, India’s claims on Aksai Chin and PoK have remained unchanged even after Narendra Modi became the Prime Minister. What raised anxieties and insecurities in China was abrogation of Article 370 and Amit Shah’s statements because Beijing believes India has become more assertive, aggressive and risk prone under Hindu nationalist Bhartiya Janata Party governments led by Modi. Beijing considered that the border infrastructure build-up by India especially the DS-DBO road would allow India to threaten Aksai Chin as per Shah’s statement. This prompted China to intrude along the LAC to mitigate India’s threat and Beijing’s anxieties/insecurities pertaining to Aksai Chin.

ABSTRACT Several Indian commentators claim that Mao Zedong enunciated a “Five Fingers of Tibet” Strategy to pursue a “revanchist” agenda of “reattaching” Nepal, Sikkim (a kingdom before merging with India in 1975) and Bhutan, and the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA, presently Arunachal Pradesh) and Ladakh of India with Tibet (thus, with China) based on Tibet’s “historical claims” over them. They maintain that Xi Jinping is pursuing the same strategy toward the Himalayan region. They impute that this so-called strategy informed the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) attempts in May 2020 to change the status quo in border areas. Therefore, this article reviews the relevant literature published since the 1950s and seeks corroboration from contemporary experts on India-China relations, Tibet, PLA affairs and Chinese foreign policy to ascertain whether Mao propounded such a strategy and whether China ever pursued it. It concludes that there is little evidence to substantiate these contentions. Hence, the Five Fingers of Tibet is a faulty prism to analyze the India-China border dispute and understand China’s approach toward Nepal and Bhutan. Thus, this prism is liable to produce alarmist analyses, shaping public opinion, that may negatively impact India’s policy choices regarding China and its Himalayan neighbors, Nepal and Bhutan.

ABSTRACT After decades of relative stability, recent years have seen a spike in the number of militarized crises between the troops of China and India along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) on their disputed border. What explains this sudden upsurge in violence on the Sino–Indian border, and how specifically can we make sense of China’s increasingly assertive posture leading to intrusions at multiple points along the LAC in May 2020? This paper argues that China’s growing assertiveness can be best understood to be a function of the country’s growing power. Its growing material capabilities – economic and military – in recent decades, and particularly relative to India, by both increasing China’s military options on its borders, as well as reducing the kind of external and internal vulnerabilities that may have encouraged more conciliatory stances in the past, have created the conditions for Beijing to adopt more aggressive postures in its territorial disputes, including with India.

ABSTRACT In China’s pursuit of aggrandizing power and regional hegemony, it has employed various tactics and strategies – “salami slicing” is one of them. “Salami slicing” is defined as policies used incrementally by Beijing to improve its foreign policy position. China has employed “salami slicing” in the South China Sea and along its borders with India, Nepal, Bhutan and other countries. The tactic has caused concern in India, as China has gradually occupied the disputed territory along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), raising the questions: How does Beijing employ this tactic to gain disputed territory from India and what is its rationale? Besides, has India prepared itself to retaliate? This article examines these questions, arguing that China intruded along the LAC in May 2020 at multiple points to grab territory on the Indian side under the aegis of its salami slicing tactic. Beijing knew from previous attempts that India would provide a strong response if it tried to grab territory at one point along the border, thus, incursions took place at multiple points backed by significant military reserves to force India to accept China’s land grab. However, India demonstrated both military preparedness and political resolve to tackle Beijing’s salami slicing tactic.

ABSTRACT In the years leading up to 2020, India–China relations were often described as being in a state of uneasy uncertainty. Despite robust bilateral trade, China frequently made attempts to challenge the status quo along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) through below-threshold tactical incursions. However, the situation took a significant turn in May 2020 when China’s expansionist agenda became apparent, resulting in provocative incursions that ultimately led to the tragic Galwan clash. While the precise motivations behind China’s actions are multifaceted, certain trends in India’s foreign policy choices stand out as contributing factors that may have pushed China to a tipping point. This article contends that India’s burgeoning defense and security partnership with the US, which has increasingly impacted the security, stability, and balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region, could have been a leading reason for the incursion. China views India’s strengthening relations with the US as a strategic move, viewing India as a tool or part of the US containment strategy against China. This paper specifically examines the political, security, military, and other developments in India–US relations and beyond which caused concern in Beijing and, in turn, contributed to China’s aggressive actions along the LAC in May 2020.

ABSTRACT This article examines the complex dynamics between India and China, particularly their positional and spatial rivalries in the Indo-Pacific region. Since the late 1940s, the two nations have engaged in territorial conflicts along the disputed border, culminating in the 1962 war. China’s quest for preeminence in the Indo-Pacific prompted India to strengthen ties with the US, join the Quad, and enhance regional partnerships. This paper argues that China’s intrusions along the Line of Actual Control in May 2020 aimed to teach India a lesson reminiscent of the 1962 war, diminish its influence, and force acceptance of China as the preeminent power. Analyzing China’s ambitions, and India’s strategic responses, the article assesses India’s inclination to recognize China’s dominance in the Indo-Pacific. As the two nations grapple with historical baggage and contemporary geopolitical shifts, the article explores the implications of their strategic choices on regional stability and global power dynamics.

ABSTRACT India–China standoff has lasted for more than three years since China intruded at multiple points along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh in May 2020. Although both states continue to assert that they do not want war/conflict, the risk of vertical and horizontal escalation has grown significantly, both along the LAC and in the maritime domain. Several rounds of talks at the diplomatic and military levels have failed to amicably resolve the standoff, further compounded by Modi’s and Xi’s unwillingness to seriously address the issue in leader-level talks. Moreover, the Modi government’s refusal to publicly admit that China now forcibly occupies territory previously held by India before 2020 only suggests to Beijing that further Chinese incursions will be similarly publicly denied by India. Beijing and New Delhi’s LAC actions are indicative of an intensifying security dilemma, as evidenced by their competitive military buildups and prioritization of gaining and holding territory over meaningful political talks. Their deployment of new technologies, such as precision-guided missiles and combat UAVs, is not being complemented by dialogue to understand how their use may generate a significant escalatory response leading to a broader war or conflict.

ABSTRACT India’s state of deterrence vis-a-vis China has significantly weakened over the last two decades. This has occurred in the backdrop of asymmetries that are both natural (geographic) as well as institutional – economic growth rates, defense production and preparedness. India’s attempts to restore deterrence starting since 2009 has failed to serve its objectives owing to imperfect strategic assessments, over-reliance on non-deterrence measures to ensure stability, and under-investment in military power. Such conditions had led to a deterrence posture that was high on assertiveness but low on credibility. India continues to under-invest in military capabilities and neglect deterrence, even while undertaking significant steps toward creating a military-industrial complex primed for the future. Hence, India needs to restore deterrence – of a kind that is generalized, credible, and based on the buildup of war fighting capabilities. In order to escape the decadal land dilemma, India needs to emphasize its strengths in terms of air power (instead of sea power); and in terms of external options, India could adopt a more flexible version of strategic autonomy. The paper further argues that such a deterrence posture needs to be complemented by a high-level political approach toward a final resolution of the border dispute.