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Determinants of Tax Morale in Croatia: an Ordered Logit Model

Abstract Background: A lower tax morality leads to an increased readiness to become active in the unofficial economy and causes the lack of public revenues. Objectives: The aim of this paper is to investigate determinants that shape tax morale of Croatian citizens. Methods/Approach: An ordered logit model is employed to evaluate which determinants shape tax morale of Croatian citizens. Data for the research were collected from 2,000 face-to-face interviews conducted in Croatia in late 2015. Results: The descriptive analysis illustrates that 52 percent of respondents reported a high level of tax morale, 26 percent of respondents have a low tax morale, while 8 and 14 percent have a mid-low and a mid-high tax morale, respectively. The ordered logit analysis revealed that gender, age, financial situation, region, and participation in the unofficial economy have an impact on the tax morale. Conclusions: Besides socio-demographic, socio-economic, and spatial determinants, a great number of sanctions for participation in informal activities also shapes tax morale of the Croatian citizens. More precisely, marginal effects show that those perceiving the expected sanctions as “normal tax or social security contributions due, plus a fine or a prison sentence” have by 6.3 percentage points higher probability of reporting the highest tax morale than others.

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Tax Culture: Perspectives from an African State

Universally, Tax Culture is not a very common topic but it is critical to administrative governance and economic development. This article argues that the Tax Culture of any milieu is an assemblage of various indices and criteria. These include the history of taxation; tax laws; tax information; tax education; tax revenue mobilization; tax system transparency; tax delinquency; tax dispute resolution; and taxpayer satisfaction. The article sheds light on these instrumental wheels of the Tax Culture of Ghana by providing the research results of field surveys conducted a decade and a half ago. Though dated, any observer of the Tax Culture of Ghana, and indeed of much of Africa and the Global South, will realize that little has since changed. In some instances, the article provides more up-to-date evidence beyond the 2005 data. The article goes beyond an assessment of the Tax Culture of Ghana and articulates recommendations for improving the same. Additionally, it attempts to interconnect issues of Taxation, Good Governance, and Legal Pluralism. Although popular themes in public discourse in Africa today, these concepts are often spoken of in different thematic spheres other than taxation. The article links these themes in practical and concrete ways to taxation, cast in the light of historical institutionalism – an examination of the institutions of taxation, governance, and traditional authority as they interacted through time.

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Determinants of Segment-Level Tax Expense Disclosure

This study examines the determinants of the disclosure of segment-level tax expense. Segment reporting rules require firms to report segment-level profit using a definition of earnings that is consistent with profit measures used for internal reporting. Thus, we expect firms using after-tax performance measures for internal reporting to define segment-level profit on an after-tax basis. However, given the ambiguous nature of segment reporting rules, firms with higher proprietary costs of disclosure may choose to report segment-level profit on a pre-tax basis, thus avoiding segment-level tax reporting. We find that only 13.8% of all multi-segment firms report after-tax profits at the segment-level. Using the presence of after-tax CEO incentives as a proxy for the internal use of after-tax segment performance (Phillips 2003), we find a positive association between after-tax incentive use and segment-level tax reporting in our full sample. We also find a negative association between effective tax rates and segment-tax reporting; suggesting firms engaging in tax avoidance are less likely to disclose segment-level taxes. We then split our sample of firms into those defining segments along geographic rather than non-geographic lines and find that the use of after-tax incentives increases the likelihood of reporting only for non-geographic-based operating segments, while proprietary costs of disclosure (i.e., ETRs) only decrease the likelihood of reporting for geographic-based operating segments. Overall, our results suggest discretion in ASC 280 is used to reduce disclosure quality of segment-level taxes for firms with geographic-based segments.

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