ABSTRACT The Covid-19 pandemic has disrupted relationships between religious communities and the state. Churches, religious authorities, and believers have been obligated to modify key activities (prayer, ceremonies) and weigh their religious identity against state prohibitions. Accordingly, we ask how members of a reclusive religious community negotiated and performed their identity under a prolonged emergency. We analyse intra-communal discourse concerning the state’s social distancing regulations during Covid-19 outbreaks and lockdowns that occurred in closed groups in messaging apps. Specifically, this research case-studies Jewish ultra-Orthodox communities in Israel (Haredim). Extensive analysis of over 2,000 WhatsApp and Telegram posts in 35 ultra-Orthodox groups over a two-year period indicates that participants constantly sought to affirm their primary, dominant, communal identity. While efforts to integrate adherence to state prohibitions into this primary identity were evident, these efforts were well accepted only when justifying them via affirmation of the communal identity – superseding medical, political, and practical concerns. The findings advance understanding of minority groups’ attitudes towards state directives and illuminate contemporary pathways of identity dynamics in online social networks. The findings may also be applicable in a broader sense to the study of discourse dynamics in echo chambers and filter bubbles.

ABSTRACT Abortion is a highly contested issue and one where the fault lines are often drawn along religious lines. In the United States, the most famous and timely example, anti-abortion attitudes and activism are strongly identified with conservative Christian values. But what is the role of religion in abortion debates in a more secularised context? Does religion ‘work’ as a justification for opposing abortion rights in such contexts? We analyse debates in the Finnish parliament regarding two Citizen’s Initiatives concerning abortion. Using discourse analysis and descriptive statistics of speech patterns and voting behaviour, we draw three conclusions from the parliamentary material: (1) religious discourse is rarely used; (2) it is not effective, and its use is considered inappropriate; and (3) voting patterns in abortion cases are better explained by instrumental than religious concerns. Although the Finnish political system is not particularly secularist, the secularisation of political culture means that religion is marginalised as a source for justifying politics. In other words, religion is a troublesome resource for political legitimation in the Finnish context.

ABSTRACT While Shiʿi clerics are among the most influential political actors in the Middle East today, there remains insufficient understanding of the network of relationships that links them together and shapes their politics. This article argues that understanding the influence of Shiʿi clerical elites in the region requires a more systematic exploration of their internal dynamics, including how individuals within the clerical elite ascend through the hierarchy and the legacy they carry. Without this knowledge, comprehending where, when, and how new leaders (maraji’) will emerge, as well as the impact they are likely to have on the politics of their societies and beyond, remains challenging. To illuminate these dynamics and better understand the influence of this important group of actors, this article proposes an approach that aims to map the interconnected world of the Shiʿi clergy using quantitative network analysis. It argues that network analysis can complement existing qualitative studies by illuminating latent connections among the Shiʿi clergy; and, ultimately, can offer a more authoritative foundation for forecasting the identity and politics of future Shiʿi marjaʿiyya.

ABSTRACT With the pun intended, this article asks whether, in overwhelmingly secular societies, the four Nordic religious-niche parties created by revivalist Christians before and after the Second World War, and whose strength has been in their countries’ Bible Belt regions, have a future as broad-based, religious-mainstream parties or are destined to ‘wither on the vine’? If, as the parties’ literature suggests, niche-party ‘nicheness’ is variable, can the ‘pure type’ of religious-niche party modify its nicheness and, if so, how, and with what result? The argument made is that i) the Nordic Christian parties have sought to expand beyond their revivalist core by ‘importing’ continental Christian Democracy as an ‘unsecular politics’ strategy and ii) that whilst, outside Denmark, support for the Nordic Christians is no longer a proxy for religiosity, and charismatic leadership has enabled the Christian parties intermittently to attract a wider body of ‘unsecular voters’, they have struggled to retain them in face of competition from a populist radical right playing the ‘Christian heritage’ card.

ABSTRACT Religion has long played an important role in the European integration process. Here we review competing confessional visions of ‘Europe’ and summarise empirical findings on their influence on public support for the European Union (EU). In the EU’s early years Catholics – especially if observant – consistently favoured integration more than Protestants, a deep-seated difference that survived statistical controls for other factors. In recent years, however, religion’s impact has changed: (1) religiosity has replaced confessional identity as the most influential religious factor, as the devout in all traditions favour the EU; (2) religious traditionalism, previously tied to religiosity, now plays an independent role, with those defending the authority of the Bible and other traditional forms of religious guidance more sceptical of the EU; and (3) continuing secularisation has eroded support for the EU, both by reducing the ranks of the religious and by ‘decoupling’ religious influences from integration attitudes, especially among the young. We examine these changes in an analysis of the 2019 European Election Study.

ABSTRACT The intimate relationship between religion and parties of the right in European politics has been well documented in political science, encompassing both the long-standing partnership between the church and Christian Democrats as well as the more recent adoption of Christian identity and symbolism by radical ‘right-wing’ parties. Yet in this contribution, it will be argued that in the 2019–2024 session of the European Parliament (EP), it is a third right-of-centre group that has now emerged as the clearest proponents of the role of Christianity in the modern-day European Union (EU). The European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), led by Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from Poland’s Law and Justice Party (PiS), regularly and consistently advance the case for ‘freedom of religion’ and the positive role of churches as institutions in public affairs. While Christian Democrats have become secular, ‘catch-all’ peoples’ parties and ‘far-right’ politicians are criticised for exploiting tensions over multiculturalism, it is the European conservatives, with their ‘Euro-realist’ agenda, who now represent the most novel and intriguing aspect to the interface between religion and the right in EU party politics.

ABSTRACT Drawing on data from an original survey and the qualitative content analysis of parliamentary written questions, the contribution studies how religion shapes the political activity of Italian MEPs. It claims that Italian MEPs show some resilient attachment to the Catholic identity of Europe, although they do not take religious values much into consideration for policy decisions. To highlight the role of religion in European politics, this contribution also compares its impact on some policy issues in the EU and Italian political arenas. In both spheres, religious tropes and values, considered as a cultural reference, are more politicised on security issues than on other questions. Such politicisation is undertaken by populist radical right MEPs, who adopt a securitisation framework to emphasise the threat posed by Muslim communities. In the Italian polity, religious values as Christian cultural norms are also politicised on identity issues and morality questions to sustain value-driven restrictive policies.

ABSTRACT This contribution introduces a collection that presents selected findings of the second wave of the project ‘Religion in the European Parliament and in European multilevel governance’ (RelEP2) pursued during the term 2019–2024, after a first wave in 2009–2014 (RelEP1). This new research was necessary for at least two reasons leading to an apparent paradox: first, the ongoing secularisation of European societies which has increasingly questioned the relevance of religion as a political factor; and, second, the politicisation of religion as a discursive resource in a polycrisis Europe, both at national and supranational levels. The contribution first frames the objectives and modalities of the project survey, which investigates what members of the European Parliament (MEPs) believe and what they do with these beliefs. It then compares the contexts and outcomes of the two waves of the survey. The next sections relate together the two dimensions of the collective research: religion within the European Parliament (EP) on the one hand; and religion at the juncture of nation and Europe on the other hand. They summarise how this collection contributes to our understanding of religion in European politics, and the future research avenues it identifies.

ABSTRACT The literature has long acknowledged the role of religion in the linkages between national identity, politics, and Europe. However, little is known about how religion permeates the activity of Portuguese members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and whether this includes a politicisation of religion. This contribution sheds light on the use of religion by Portuguese MEPs during the European term 2019–2024. Drawing on a questionnaire and other quantitative and qualitative data, the contribution shows that religion itself has lost salience in terms of the activity of Portuguese MEPs. Instead, ‘religiously loaded’ themes are used as empty signifiers to reinforce collective and personal identity belongings. We conclude that the use of religion by Portuguese MEPs mirrors a secular transition found in Portugal since 1974 that has led to the privatisation of faith and a clear separation between the Catholic Church and the state. In sum, although Portuguese MEPs remain predominantly Catholic, the place of religion in European politics is a case of ‘dual identity’: they are Christians at heart but secular at work.