The rapid transformation of the international economic order from a liberal arrangement of economic interdependencies to a geoeconomic competition between states changed attitudes regarding foreign investment. This arguably protectionist turn toward national security is an attempt to safeguard against multidimensional consequences of crises. To protect the EU’s strategic autonomy, Regulation 2019/452 came into force in 2019, laying the foundations for the European Foreign Investment Screening framework. Soon afterwards, FDI screening served as an instrument in the EU’s policy for addressing and mitigating risks rapidly arising from an international crisis: the COVID-19 pandemic. This experience influenced another recent measure – the European Economic Security Strategy (EESS) – together with the proposal for the New FDI Screening Regulation. This article argues that the experience of the COVID-19 crisis inspired dualistic changes in FDI screening, transforming it into a protector of European economic security. The EESS and the proposal for the New FDI Screening Regulation are juxtaposed against the United States’s experience in controlling FDI for the aim of assessing FDI screening as a tool for safeguarding European economic security in light of the EU’s inexperience in the matter.

There are few certainties in the field of migration. From the factors that drive migrants to flee their countries and the conditions they expect to find in the destination country to migrants’ flows, routes and methods, migration policy is constantly functioning within a field of uncertainty. Yet, the importance of better managing migration processes is becoming increasingly relevant due to the multiple factors that stimulate the international movement of people, such as conflict, political or economic instability or climate change. The uncertainty surrounding the European Union’s (EU) ability to manage migration has spurred a twofold approach: the criminalisation of migrant smuggling (in an all-encompassing way) and the externalisation of migration policy through agreements with third countries. However, are these approaches effective, or should the EU consider alternative strategies to address the challenges posed by irregular migration? The purpose of this article is to evaluate the effectiveness of the EU’s policies on irregular migration, by exploring firstly the effectiveness of criminal law in deterring migrant smuggling and secondly the EU’s recent emphasis on externalisation. The consequences of both are examined in an effort to determine their effectiveness towards the objective. The article concludes with some suggestions for the way forward.

The article focusses on a specific aspect of the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) 2024 Advisory Opinion on the legal consequences arising from the policies and practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, namely the statement that the right to self-determination constitutes a peremptory norm of international law. The article submits that the finding of the ICJ can be at variance with the basic criteria set forth by the International Law Commission in the 2022 Conclusions on identification and legal consequences of peremptory norms of general international law (jus cogens). In particular, limiting the peremptory effect of self-determination to cases of foreign occupation that lead to annexation risks undermining the unitary, universal character of peremptory rules. Overall, the case confirms the divisive potential of the concept of jus cogens in the international legal community.