In 2018, following a significant increase in violence against NHS staff and others serving the public, the UK Parliament passed a piece of legislation which included the creation of a new offence category, ‘Assault against an Emergency Worker’. The intention was to codify the aggravating nature of assaults against emergency workers as a reflection of the moral outrage such behaviour should attract. However, the actual implementation of this law has been criticised as adding very little to the lofty promises of promoting a “zero tolerance” culture. In this paper we review the new legal framework and attempt to highlight potential effects arising from its implementation.

On 27 April 2022, Singapore executed Nagaenthran K. Dharmalingam, a 33-year-old Malaysian who was convicted of trafficking 42.72 grams of heroin. His execution was carried out despite calls from United Nations (UN) human rights experts, including the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, for the government to commute his death sentence inter alia on the basis that Nagaenthran did not have access to procedural accommodations for his disability during his interrogation and death sentences should not be carried out on persons with serious psychosocial and intellectual disabilities. Nagaenthran’s execution has put Singapore’s criminal legal system, particularly in respect of its treatment of offenders with intellectual and psychosocial disabilities, under international scrutiny.

The Mental Capacity Act 2005 (‘the Act’) (UK) and associated rules and guidance aim to support the person with impaired decision-making to participate in decisions about their life. More than a decade after the Act came into force, there is uncertainty about what it means for the person (‘P’) who is the subject of proceedings in the Court of Protection (‘CoP’) to participate in court hearings. This paper reviews the law and guidance on participation of P as well as the limited published research on P’s participation. The authors identify gaps in the current legal framework and conclude that research which captures the views of judges, practitioners, and not least, P and their families and carers, is a necessary step towards improved CoP guidance and practice promoting the participation of P.

The Mental Capacity Act (Northern Ireland) 2016 was enacted by the Northern Ireland Assembly in May 2016. The first phase of the Act came into operation during 2019 and includes provisions for Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (DoLS). When fully implemented this legislation will integrate mental capacity and mental health legislation into a single piece of legislation, for people aged 16 years and over. Given the recent introduction of Trust Panels as a new mechanism for DoLS, this study is the first of its kind. This small-scale exploratory study is a survey of 33 social workers who have made DoLS applications to Trust Panels. The findings illustrate social workers’ experiences of applying for Trust Panel authorisation for interventions amounting to deprivation for liberty with adults who lack the capacity to make the relevant decisions.
 The findings report on the social workers’ level of experience in undertaking applications, their views about training for Mental Capacity Act work, and their perceived confidence levels for this work. The factors that have helped or hindered practitioners are also highlighted. The data collection was undertaken during the COVID-19 pandemic, and the impact of changes to work practices during this time are acknowledged. The study makes recommendations for further developing training, practice, and research.

In every Australian jurisdiction, legislation permits mental health service providers and/or mental health tribunals to force people with mental illness to engage in treatment, under Community Treatment Orders (CTOs). Despite considerable efforts made by every Australian state and territory to meet human rights obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) (2008; Maylea & Hirsch, 2017), Australia has rates of CTO usage that are very high by world standards (Light, 2019). Even within Australia, rates of CTO usage vary considerably between and within jurisdictions in spite of the legislation being very similar (Light, 2019; Adult mental health quarterly KPI report, 2019). This occurs in the context of mixed evidence about the efficacy of CTOs and a lack of clear understanding of their purpose (Segal et al., 2017; Kisely et al., 2017). The use of CTOs remains one of the most contentious issues in mental health service delivery. Not only is their efficacy unresolved, they also raise serious ethical and human rights concerns. The current debates, and attempts at reform, must be informed by valid and reliable data. This brief commentary will make the case for a research agenda that addresses the minimal research that has been undertaken to address the variations of CTO use across Australian jurisdictions.

Using Hong Kong’s mental health legislation as a case study, this article asks whether provisions in domestic mental health legal frameworks which seek to restrict the institution of legal proceedings against those working under such legislation may be justified, given the implications they have on the fundamental right to access to justice. Under section 69 of the Hong Kong Mental Health Ordinance, legal proceedings cannot be brought against anyone acting in pursuance of the Ordinance unless leave has been given by a court, and such leave shall not be given unless the court is satisfied there is a ‘reasonably arguable’ case of bad faith or negligence. Limited case law on section 69 and Hong Kong mental health jurisprudence in general indicate that this test is likely to be applied by judges stringently, with the result that mental health patients face a virtually insurmountable hurdle should they wish to bring actions against professionals for wrongful or negligent treatment under the Ordinance. The author argues that provisions such as section 69 are rooted in discriminatory stereotypes of persons with mental illness as particularly ‘vexatious’ litigants and constitute unjustified barriers to their right to equal access to the courts. In Hong Kong’s case, in particular, section 69 operates within and reinforces a broader legislative framework that is systemically discriminatory against those who fall under the compulsory mental health regime. As such, such provisions must be seriously reconsidered and reformed.