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The Case Law Of The Court Of Justice Of The EU On Art. 17 Of The 1999 Montreal Convention: An Evaluation From A Comparative Perspective

This paper analyzes the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on Article 17(1) of the 1999 Montreal Convention (MC99) regarding the liability of international air carriers for death or bodily injury to passengers. The interpretational principles and methods applied by the CJEU are examined, accounting also for the particularities of the EU legal order. Furthermore, the results reached by the CJEU are compared with the case law of other jurisdictions, mainly the US, and doctrinal writings. Nonetheless, this paper does not explore the pertinent issues from a de lege ferenda perspective. The paper concludes that the judgments of the CJEU on Art. 17(1) MC99 have interpreted the notions of “passenger,” “accident,” and “bodily injury” broadly, in a passenger-friendly way. Although the interpretation of ‘passenger’ does not differ from the established case law in other jurisdictions, some aspects of the interpretation of “accident” and the interpretation of “bodily injury” significantly depart from the view currently prevailing among courts internationally. The CJEU has yet to rule on the scope of the exclusivity of the MC99, under Art. 29 thereof, regarding personal injury of passengers. However, the expansive interpretations of “accident” and “bodily injury” by the CJEU limit the practical effect of Article 29 compared to other jurisdictions. Given the regulatory influence that the EU exercises world- wide, the CJEU judgments might guide courts also outside the EU. Although this would bolster passenger protection, it would exacerbate the already fragmented application of the MC99 internationally.

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Treaties Establishing ICAO And IMO – A Comparative Study

The comparison between air law and maritime law reveals both similarities and distinctions rooted in the unique frameworks of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and The International Maritime Organization (IMO). While both entities were established through separate treaties, the Chicago Convention birthed ICAO, emphasizing the organization’s Assembly, Council, and auxiliary bodies. In contrast, the IMO Convention, also known as the Convention on the International Maritime Organization, forms the basis for IMO’s structure and functions as outlined in its preamble. The core objectives of IMO revolve around fostering collaboration among governments to enhance regulatory frameworks for international maritime trade. This encompasses advocating for elevated standards in maritime safety, navigation efficiency, and marine pollution prevention. Similarly, ICAO aims to establish principles and techniques for air navigation, promoting safe, regular, economical, and efficient air transport. The Chicago Convention primarily focuses on regulating international civil aviation, ensuring its orderly development and safety through defined principles and procedures, including standards for airspace sovereignty, aircraft registration, airworthiness, and aviation security. Conversely, the IMO Convention tackles various aspects of international maritime transportation, spanning safety, security, environmental protection, and shipping efficiency. Despite being specialized agencies of the United Nations, both ICAO and IMO face the challenge of accommodating diverse interests and viewpoints of their member states without the autonomy enjoyed by the private sector. Nonetheless, both organizations have consistently served the international community in facilitating world trade and commerce within their respective domains. This article discusses details of comparison and contrasts between ICAO, IMO, and air law and maritime law in their treaty settings.

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Still Far From Home – How Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine Undercuts The Montreal Convention’s “Fifth Jurisdiction” For “Wandering Americans”

The rapid growth of global air travel in the mid-20th century gave rise to the problem of the “wandering American”—American residents whose air travel injury claims could not be heard in United States courts under the Warsaw Convention’s Article 28. Prominent cases prompted adoption of a “fifth jurisdiction” in the Montreal Convention’s Article 33, allowing injury suits in the Contracting State where an injured passenger had her “principal and permanent residence” so long as the international carrier served the forum. U.S. officials toasted their success in providing Americans with a domestic forum, but the adoption of the fifth jurisdiction did not finish the job. Even if an American plaintiff meets Article 33’s requirements, personal jurisdiction problems can bar the courthouse door. This article re-examines the problem of the “wandering American” and the fierce debates over the fifth jurisdiction at the 1999 International Conference on Air Law in Montreal through the lens of personal jurisdiction. It argues that the Montreal Convention would likely not have changed the results of prominent “wandering American” cases such as the shoot-down of Korean Air 007 or the hijacking of Air France 139. It comments on how the law is rapidly evolving as federal courts wrestle with whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) can better address the lack of “minimum contacts” carriers have with most U.S. states and the lack of causal connections between forum and claims. Finally, it considers how Congress or American aviation authorities can better align Montreal’s promise of a “fifth jurisdiction” with American jurisdictional law.

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Tort Claims Arising From Military Aircraft Crashes Are Not Preempted By The Federal Aviation Act

The Second Circuit's landmark ruling in Jones v. Goodrich Pump & Engine Control Sys., Inc. establishes crucial precedent by asserting that tort claims stemming from military aircraft crashes are not field or conflict preempted by the Federal Aviation Act (the Act). This decision, the first of its kind at the appellate level, carries far-reaching implications. The court’s rationale, grounded in the Act’s plain language, emphasizes that “public aircraft,” including military ones, are exempt from Federal Aviation Administration regulation. Title 49, section 44701(a)(1), explicitly excludes public aircraft from the Act’s purview. While the court’s analysis relies on the Act’s text, it is fortified by a comprehensive examination of legislative history dating back to the early days of aviation. This Article contends that the Second Circuit’s reasoning, supported by both statutory language and over a century of legislative evolution, should serve as a universally adopted guideline. The separation of civil and military aircraft regulation, initiated in the Paris Convention of 1919 and continued through subsequent legislative acts, underscores the distinct standards governing military aviation. The inherent divergence in purpose and design between civil and military aircraft, coupled with Congress’s consistent exclusion of military aircraft from FAA regulation, solidifies the argument against preemption. As the sole appellate authority on this matter, the Jones decision provides a robust foundation for future courts facing Federal Aviation Act preemption challenges in “public aircraft” tort cases.

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