In this paper, I argue for the necessity of including what I call “categorical norms” in Thomas Aquinas’s account of the ground of obligation (normativity theory) by drawing on the value phenomenology of Dietrich von Hildebrand. A categorical norm is one conceptually irreducible to any non-normative concept and which obligates us irrespective of pre-existing aims, goals, or desires. I show that Thomistic normativity theory on any plausible reading of Aquinas lacks categorical norms and then raise two serious objections which constitute master arguments against it. The upshot is that this theory requires reform. I end by proposing work remaining for such reform, namely, an expansion of the Thomistic metaphysic and anthropology.

The paper discusses three talks, which were given at the meetings of the Philosophical Society of Berlin (Philosophische Gesellschaft zu Berlin) in the mid-1870s. In these talks, the principles of some main movements in contemporary philosophy (realism, absolute idealism, critical idealism) were elaborated and contrasted to each other. The paper focuses on the concepts of real-idealism and ideal-realism. All the discussants, Friedrich Frederichs, C. L. Michelet and J. H. von Kirchmann, introduce these concepts. Frederichs, an adherent of critical idealism, argues only for the standpoint of real-idealism. Michelet, G. W. F. Hegel’s personal student and an adherent of absolute idealism, takes real-idealism and ideal-realism to be the two sides of the one coin. Kirchmann, an advocate of realism, regards real-idealism as an objective, and he is skeptical about the possibility to achieve it

On its twenty-fifth anniversary, Fides et ratio remains relevant for its bold defense of reason and the complementarity of faith and reason. It describes a philosophy that is not the preserve of academics but the duty of every person. It asserts that philosophy is never contained in one system but is always open to new questions and further insights. St. John Paul defends a philosophy that welcomes pluralism based on the richness of being but rejects a pluralism based on the impossibility of knowing the truth. Reflecting on Fides et ratio, this article describes six ways that theology uses philosophy and offers five lessons for philosophers, i.e., the universal character of philosophy, the complementarity of faith and reason, the necessity and limits of pluralism, the requirements for a philosophy to be consonant with theology, and the current reinvigoration of philosophy in seminaries.

In his work Bruno, Schelling elaborates for the first time a concept of freedom and independence of the finite that extends through his reformulation in Philosophy and Religion of 1804, to the Freedom Essay of 1809 and beyond to the works of 1810 and 1811—Stuttgart Private Lectures and The Ages of the World. The question we will address in this article—taking a necessary detour through Bruno themes—concerns the status of the finite as such and how it is at all possible to admit both the existence of a world of finite beings as it appears to consciousness and the positing of an Absolute and infinite principle of philosophy. We will show how Schelling’s interest shifts, almost unintentionally, from the infinite principle to the finite as such, as a principle of freedom and self-initiation independent of the real. The split opened by the duality of the two principles will continue in Philosophy and Religion of 1804 and will become more evident in the other works of the 1800s that are the subject of our broader philosophical interest. In analyzing Bruno, we fill for the first time a major existing gap in Schelling’s now-renowned middle metaphysics culminating in his Freedom Essay of 1809 as well as proving its inception in the unresolved problems of the system prior to 1809.

Hebrews 4:15 says that Jesus was tempted like other human beings yet never sinned. Sinlessness is not the same as impeccability. Chalcedonian Christology or some variant of it seems necessary to show that Jesus was metaphysically unable to sin. Metaphysical impossibility to sin, though, appears to rule out temptation as experienced by ordinary human beings. This paper argues that Oliver D. Crisp, T. A. Hart, Brian Leftow, and Gerald O’Collins all fall short in trying to show how Jesus was both impeccable and tempted as we are.

This paper examines the use of the painting metaphor in the Republic, showing that earlier mentions of painting suggest an understanding of mimesis at odds with the critique of book X, and argues that this disagreement can only be understood in the dialogical context of the work as a whole. Early on, painters are said to be able to produce images truer and more beautiful than any existing object, and both the depiction of the city in speech itself and its realization in practice are compared to the act of painting. Read in this context, the critique of mimesis in book X can be seen as a challenge to one of the central arguments of the Republic. But in critiquing images as representation of reality it leaves untouched the metaphorical use of images, and so allows the city in speech to fulfill its original purpose as an analogy for the soul.

Many contemporary philosophers of mind disagree with substance dualism, saying that despite the failure of physical theories of mind, substance dualism cannot be advocated, because it faces more serious problems than physical theories, lacking compatibility with philosophical arguments and scientific evidence. Regardless of the validity of the arguments in support of substance dualism, it is demonstrated in this article that this theory is coherent, with no philosophical or scientific problems. The main arguments of opponents of substance dualism are explained and criticized in this respect. Based on this, it becomes clear that the interaction of soul and body has a reasonable philosophical explanation, the problem of the pairing of soul and body, although it may not have a scientific explanation, it has a philosophical and theological solution, the principle of the physical causal closure lacks conclusive reasons and cannot reject the existence of the soul, the existence of the soul does not contradict the theory of evolution, the dependence of the soul on the brain is compatible with its independence, and finally, the principle of simplicity does not make any problem for accepting the substance dualism.

Smith asks whether patriotism and cosmopolitanism spring from the same source. If they do, we face two anomalies. First, we should expect a British subject to love France more than Great Britain because France has a larger population than Great Britain. Second, we should expect a British subject to love France more than a far-away country such as China given that the British subject is more familiar with the French than with the Chinese people. Both expectations are factually untrue. This led Smith to reject the patriotism-cosmopolitanism continuum thesis. The love of country must spring from a source that is unrelated to the love of humankind. Nonetheless, neither kind of love can be reduced to substantive utility that informs the economist’s utility function and the social welfare function. Substantive utility appears as self-interest and other-interest (altruism). The altruist preference varies in intensity, depending on familiarity: people are ready to help more familiar people than less familiar ones. What complicates the discussion is that Smith uses the same term “familiarity” to discuss varying degrees of love: people tend to love more familiar people than less familiar ones. This paper sheds light on Smith’s confusing concept “universal benevolence”—which is best understood as the love of humankind.

In addition to its main theme of freedom, Hegel’s political philosophy addresses the problem of poverty. This article proposes a theoretical foundation for a Hegelian welfare state by demonstrating how its rationale and concepts are derived from Hegel’s political philosophy. Poverty constitutes a fundamental deficiency in the modern liberal state focused on the self-actualization of its citizens. This poverty is not an accidental but a structural factor of modern market society, resulting from economic contingencies. The poor rabble is deprived of the opportunities for self-actualization that market society provides. Therefore, the main task of a Hegelian welfare state is to secure the right of subsistence as a condition of the possibility of self-actualization. Without subsistence citizens are unable to develop and actualize their free will through property formation in market society. Derived from Hegel’s right of necessity and the guiding principle of freedom, the right of subsistence is paramount to the legitimacy of the state. Therefore, it cannot be left to the contingent morality of private charity. The right of subsistence does not only guarantee mere survival, but also includes a minimum of property needed to participate in market society.

In this article after identifying four major trends in the discourse on Ethiopian philosophy, it will be argued that there is a need to introduce a mature conception of Ethiopian philosophy that can both diagnose existential predicaments and also has the ability of introducing an emancipatory dimension. At the heart of this article is the claim that there are four major trends in Ethiopian philosophy which is a discourse that is still looking for an identity and that these trends are characterized by hermeneutics, intercultural philosophy, critical theory and indigenous Ethiopian philosophy. After identifying the limitations of the four trends in Ethiopian philosophy, the article will point towards the development of a new discourse in Ethiopian philosophy that has the power of pointing towards the emergence of a new discourse that is able to diagnose existing realties and also can engage in a dialogue with other philosophical traditions.