Abstract In Peri Archōn 4.4.1, Origen argues against a form of ‘Arianism’ ante litteram. Previous scholarship has suggested that the view targeted by Origen could be a form of Basilidean system. In this paper, I make a fresh attempt to identify the polemical context of this passage. I first identify a more reliable control for delimiting the possible targets using Origen’s classification of heresies reported in Pamphilus’ Apology and Book 32 of the Commentary on John. Synthesis of the two reports suggests that Origen is unlikely to have targeted Basilides’ teachings in Peri Archōn 4.4.1. I then analyse two further pieces of evidence to substantiate an alternative identification: psilanthropism or monarchianism. Where Origen explicitly rejects ἦν ποτε ὅτε οὐκ ἦν (or variants), one finds these two positions as the immediate polemical context. Further, analysis of Peri Archōn 1.2.1–4 reveals that, as in Peri Archōn 4.4.1, these positions are placed alongside Valentinian emanationism as the twin polemical targets of Origen’s Christology. This fresh identification opens up a new perspective for reassessing the development of the fourth-century ‘Arian’ controversy prospectively, that is, through the lens of the third-century polemical landscape.

It is commonly thought that evolution is a chance process, an idea found in popular writings on evolution, but also in academic writing in a broad range of scientific disciplines: scientific, philosophical and theological. One problem is that words such as ‘chance’ and ‘random’ are used with a range of different meanings according to context, and in evolutionary biology the word ‘chance’ is sometimes used in a way that is different from its use in mathematics and philosophy. The present article aims to clarify the range of meanings and to argue the case that the evolutionary process is far from being a ‘theory of chance’ from biological, mathematical, or indeed philosophical and theological perspectives.

To assess the claim that Parkinson's disease (PD) specifically reduces religiosity religious faith and spirituality. A longitudinal case-control study over 12 months of spirituality in 42 patients with idiopathic PD and 39 disease controls matched for age, gender, educational attainment and disability. There was no selection on grounds of religious affiliation. Participants were assessed on the Beck Depression Inventory, Medical Outcomes Score (MOS), cognitive tests including Paired Associate Learning [PAL], One Touch Stocking [OTS]) and Stroop test. Tests of spirituality were the Brief Multidimensional Measure of Religiousness and Spirituality questionnaire (BMMRS), a Mystical Experiences Questionnaire (MEQ), and the Rivermead Life Goals Score, supplemented by qualitative interview methods. Over one year, as expected, mobility and cognition declined in the PD group. However, there was no significant change in scores of religiosity and spirituality scores in this group. Likewise, there were no subjective reports of a decrease of interest in religious faith or spirituality, although anecdotal accounts of decreasing mobility, loss of driving ability, increasing emotional lability and tiredness meant reduced participation in some religious and spiritual practices. However, over one year there was a significant fall in controls' religiosity score due mainly to a fall in 'religious practices' with no clear underlying reason. Compared to non-neurological patients with similar disability, Parkinson's disease is not associated with a decline in religious faith or spirituality. Declining mobility and cognition in Parkinson's disease does not lead to diminished religiosity.

ABSTRACT One of the principle theological themes that emerged from my narrative data, gathered from interviewing survivors of the 2010 Haiti earthquake, was that of divine providence. Although the terms ‘fatalism’ and ‘providence’ were never explicitly used by the researchers or the participants, the language interviewees used and the meaning they expressed would be categorised in traditional theological terms under divine providence. Yet, when social scientists commentate upon the same beliefs, they tend to use the term ‘religious fatalism’. What could appear to be a distinction without a difference, however, can actually represent a misunderstanding with possible egregious consequences. With reference to a discussion between a social geographer colleague and myself as a practical theologian, I seek to explore the dilemma that can arise over use of different terms when referring to the same incident by social scientists and theologians.

As a practical theologian and researcher in the field of ‘natural’ disasters, as well as being a disaster responder chaplain, I am often confronted by, and have to confront, the nexus between theology/philosophy and “real life” in extremely traumatic contexts. The extreme suffering that is often the consequence of catastrophic natural disasters warrants solutions that can help vulnerable populations recover and adapt to live safely with natural hazards. For many practice-based responders, speculative theological/philosophical reflections around situations that are often human-caused seem predominantly vacuous exercises, potentially diverting attention away from the empiricism of causal human agency. In this article, I explore a middle ground involving a nuanced methodological approach to theodicy that is practical but no less intellectually demanding, that is theological more than philosophical, practical more than theoretical; a middle ground that also takes seriously the human culpability as causal for the human, and some would say the divine, suffering from disasters. I will include in this exploration my ethnographic fieldwork following the catastrophic earthquake to hit the Caribbean nation of Haiti in 2010.

As current research indicates, many young children are exposed to influences which inspire misleading impressions of science, religion, and their interactions, to the extent that by the time they reach their teenage years, the great majority already see science and religion as belonging to two quite distinct, even opposing, domains of thought. This chapter introduces three intervention-based projects: the Faraday Institute for Science and Religion’s schools outreach programme; the Wonders of the Living World project; and God and the Big Bang, which aim to challenge these misconceptions by engaging young people in positive exploration of science and religious faith. Initial quantitative impact assessment data and qualitative findings indicate that these interventions have been, or are likely to be, very effective in encouraging young people to develop an enriching, intellectually satisfying and interdisciplinary approach to considering the respective roles and interactions of science and religious faith. Common characteristics of these three effective intervention strategies revolve around enabling young people to connect with seemingly complex ideas at an accessible level; creating opportunities for interactivity (through activities, quizzes, question and answer sessions, etc.); and engaging with the young people on a personal level. The combination of these strategies not only allows the illustration of abstract concepts but also creates a welcoming and safe environment for young people to explore and share their own thoughts and questions. Areas for development include provision of more opportunities for interdisciplinary learning in primary and secondary schools by better equipping teachers to explore related topics with their students. Such measures will help to ensure that the opinion formers of tomorrow will be open-minded, confident thinkers well-placed for considering the important questions of ultimate reality and their place and purpose in the universe.

This introduction to the special issue of the Journal of Implicit Religion on Artificial Intelligence (AI) and religion will explore the some initial but important reasons why the interplay between these two fields should be of interest to the religious studies scholar. After introducing AI as well as elements of its cultural history and narratives, this article will lay out three arguments for researching AI and religion. First, that the potential disruption wrought by AI will effect society, and as religion and society are intrinsically intertwined these changes will have implications for religion. Second, that AI is potentially reinvigorating for contemporary religion, and may also incite the creation of new religious movements. And third, that AI’s uncertain status as a potential new intelligent being raises questions about personhood that religions have traditionally attempted to resolve based upon their theological understandings of the person, and that the continuing debate in this area will be of interest to scholars of religion.

In 2010 a thought experiment speculating on the motivations and aims of a potential superintelligent Artificial Intelligence, sometimes known as the ‘Singularity’, caused uproar and anxiety on the forum board where it was initially posted. This paper considers that thought experiment’s debt to older forms of religious argument, the reactions from among the community, and how expectations about the Singularity as a being with agency can be considered to be an example of implicit religion. This is significant as the thought experiment appeared in a field of research, AI, considered by many to be secular due to its technological focus. The communities under discussion also explicitly express their aim of ‘perfecting’ human rationality, and place that ability in opposition to ‘religion’ as a derided object and the aims of ‘Goddists’ in general. This tension between overt atheism and secular communities’ return to religious tropes and narratives is relevant for the wider study of religion in the contemporary era.

We propose a SAGE model for social psychological research. Encapsulated in our acronym is a proposal to have a synthetic approach to social psychological research, in which qualitative methods are augmentative to quantitative ones, qualitative methods can be generative of new experimental hypotheses, and qualitative methods can capture experiences that evade experimental reductionism. We remind social psychological researchers that psychology was founded in multiple methods of investigation at multiple levels of analysis. We discuss historical examples and our own research as contemporary examples of how a SAGE model can operate in part or as an integrated whole. The implications of our model are discussed.

ABSTRACTSince the failed coup of 15 July 2016, for which it is held responsible, the Gülen Movement (GM) has been in crisis. With no foreseeable future in its homeland, the GM is now tasked with regrouping abroad. This article investigates the GM in London, a city that, for various reasons, is likely to become a significant centre for Gülenist activity in the post-coup era. Taking the Dialogue Society (DS) as its focus, it investigates the prospects of the GM’s survival by analyzing its activities, both before and after the coup, in light of Mamdani’s discussion of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Muslims in the post-9/11 world. The article shows how the GM has established itself as a voice of ‘good’ Islam in the context of British debates on Islam and radicalization. It suggests that the public presence the GM has established for itself through its public engagement activities in the UK could constitute a central part of its fight back against President Erdoğan, and be catalytic to its creation of a dynamic future in exile.