With the return of great power competition, the Arctic is set to become increasingly relevant for global geopolitics and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) security. The potential for higher tensions in the region demands that the alliance’s member states strengthen their deterrence vis-à-vis Moscow, a task for which naval forces and the maritime domain as a whole will be pivotal. This article argues that the alliance should consider the establishment of an additional standing NATO maritime group (SNMG) for the Arctic region to undertake missions and operations similar to those that the SNMG 1 has performed during the last few years. Its establishment would enhance maritime domain awareness, naval power, and deterrence in the northern flank, albeit facing significant challenges in terms of force generation and adaptation to cold weather conditions. These challenges, however, should not automatically disqualify the proposal as entirely unattainable, but rather be seen as a longer-term goal.

While China’s Arctic inroads have attracted growing attention from the United States, this article views Arctic competition as a periphery of global great power competition, or as a sideshow to the main theater of U.S.-China competition—the Indo-Pacific. Examining China’s Arctic activity from a peripheral perspective, it ultimately argues that the United States should sustain its current posture of not letting a nonpriority theater become a main event in its competition with China.

Russia’s February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine caused immediate disruption to the Arctic’s strategic environment. This shift has caused Russia to partner more closely with China, giving Beijing new opportunities to advance its goals in the region. This article explores the impacts that this shift could have on China’s activity in the Arctic. First, it describes the history of China in the Arctic to define its strategic objectives in the region. Then, it argues that the geopolitical changes following the war in Ukraine have given Beijing new opportunities to advance these Arctic goals. Finally, it assesses this shift’s strategic impact to the United States and its allies. This work provides a critical insight into changing power dynamics in the Arctic in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The Soviet bastion defense concept was likely among the most influential approximations of Soviet wartime strategy during the Cold War, and it has continued to shape Western perceptions of Russian naval strategy in the post–Cold War era. However, recent shifts in Russian military geography and technological advancements challenge the rationale for Moscow to pursue a bastion defense strategy during wartime. Climate change is altering the conditions for Russian military posturing in the Arctic, while new technologies are reshaping the Russian Navy’s role in nuclear deterrence and the function of its naval general-purpose forces. This article contends that Western military planners must adapt their assessments of Russia’s wartime strategies to reflect these evolving dynamics, ensuring sound and strategic responses in the high north.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) faces strategic vulnerabilities in the European high north due to growing Russian and Chinese collaboration. Leveraging scenario planning and enhanced integration of Nordic capabilities into Joint Force Command Norfolk is recommended to bolster Arctic deterrence. Clarified command structures, specialized polar-warfare units, targeted infrastructure investments, and expanded Joint exercises are essential. This would strengthen NATO’s Arctic posture, ensuring regional stability and enabling the U.S. strategic pivot toward countering China’s growing global influence in the Indo-Pacific.

This article investigates to what degree and through which fields and mechanisms strategic competition today plays out in the Arctic as well as how these questions align with international relations (IR) theory. Using rationalist approaches to the study of IR and the DIME model (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) to structure the empirical investigation, this article finds that the strategic competition matches perspectives found in realism as well as liberalism. The article points out how states develop strategies to maximize security, wealth, power, and prosperity at the cost of others, while at the same time also identifies empirical evidence supporting liberal perspectives that stresses how unintended consequences of competition can be harnessed through institutions and international law. The competitive environment experienced in today’s Arctic increasingly reflects an international society characterized by zero-sum thinking and a dynamic where the constraining role of institutions has diminished.

This article focuses on scientific description and discursive analysis of the key parameters of the Ukrainian media as strategic agents of Ukrainian discursive transit during the Russo-Ukrainian War and the proposition of the new field for cooperation of the European Union (EU) and Ukraine conflict studies in media. This study analyzes changes in EU media policies with Ukrainian democratic media development during wartime. The author focuses on the positive outcomes and future perspectives of the EU-Ukraine media organizations’ cooperation in media security and Russian propaganda countering. The article revises the current EU-Ukraine efforts in countering Russian propaganda and proposes the application of conflict studies in the sphere of journalist’s security. By security in this case, the author understands a set of measures to reduce the lethality of journalists’ work in war zones.

This article examines the strategic implications of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) dominance over the global lithium value chain and the resulting vulnerabilities for the U.S. Department of Defense. During several decades, through sustained strategic investments, the PRC has achieved a controlling position in the lithium market, encompassing mining, refining, and battery manufacturing. This control allows the PRC to influence lithium pricing and availability globally, posing significant economic and strategic risks to nations reliant on these supply chains, particularly the United States.

The 1950 Defense Production Act (DPA) is one of the most significant tools the U.S. government uses to mobilize the civilian economy for national defense. As the United States approaches the DPA’s statutory termination and likely reauthorization in 2025, this article surveys its recent employment during the COVID-19 pandemic and potential for policy iteration, assessing its evolution from postwar and early Cold War origins to a broader industrial policy tool. By analyzing DPA usage, legislative actions, and public interest trends, this study aims to extract key lessons from its recent implementation. The article argues that while the DPA has become increasingly central to the government’s industrial policy initiatives, its application has been broadly inconsistent, unevenly coordinated, and insufficiently integrated into broader strategic frameworks. Reauthorization of the DPA could include creating a more permanent and coordinated executive branch infrastructure, clarifying its use as an emergency versus routine policy tool, and identifying gaps in future deployment.