Abstract A judge springs out of his car on the way to court in downtown Chicago and takes photographs of an inflatable rat. A while later he inserts these photographs into a decision involving another insufflated rodent used in a union protest. The increasing use of images in case law and precedent in the common law world provides a visual atlas of how lawyers see. Using a constantly augmenting corpus of over 400 images drawn from decisions in different common law influenced jurisdictions across the globe, Judicial Uses of Images catalogues, analyses, and reviews the normative significance and affective force of this new medium of legal expression and judgement. An increasingly imaginal transmission of law is critically dissected in the terms of remediation and the emergent criteria and protocols of retinal justice. The affective and aesthetic tensors of viewing are elaborated to provide a guide to the novel visual sensibilities of legality.

At the dawn of the federal deportation system, the nation’s top immigration official proclaimed the power to authorize deportation arrests “an extraordinary one” to vest in administrative officers. He reassured the nation that this immense power—then wielded by a cabinet secretary, the only executive officer empowered to authorize these arrests—was exercised with “great care and deliberation.” A century later, this extraordinary power is legally trivial and systemically exercised by low-level enforcement officers alone. Consequently, thousands of these officers—the police and jailors of the immigration system— now have the power to solely determine whether deportation arrests are justified and, therefore, whether to subject over a hundred thousand people annually to the extended detention and bare process of our modern deportation system. This deportation arrest regime—still anomalous in our law enforcement system— has been justified by the notion that immigration enforcement has always been different when it comes to arrest constraints and that the validity of the modern deportation arrest system is evidenced through its history. This Article investigates and ultimately challenges those justifications. It focuses on the advent of administrative arrest authority in the federal immigration scheme and explores how the once “extraordinary” and confined power to authorize deportation arrests became legally trivial and diffuse. It not only provides the first account of the invention and development of federal deportation arrest authority from its inception to the modern day, but also one that differs from and complicates the conventional account in critical ways. Specifically, it reveals an early system of deportation arrest procedures that, even at a time of virulent hostility toward immigrants and overtly racist immigration regulation, was designed to impose significantly greater checks on enforcement officers’ arrest authority and more robust independent review than does the modern immigration scheme. This Article also describes why that eventually changed, providing important insight on why we are where we are today. Ultimately, this Article contests the conventional narrative that the modern deportation arrest regime is justified by its past and casts doubt on the near-unanimous case law that has relied on it. In so doing, it gives courts a reason to reconsider the constitutional validity of this scheme and provides historical support for calls to fundamentally transform the deportation arrest system.

Tax law distinguishes between holding an asset and disposing of it. Dispositions are "realization" events, occasions for taxing accrued appreciation, while holding is not. An owner of an asset who would like to dispose of it may instead hold the asset and hedge. Hedging, like disposing, changes a taxpayer's exposure to risk, but is, in many cases, not a realization event. A taxpayer may hedge an asset by obtaining a derivative financial instrument whose value varies inversely with the value of the asset. Derivative financial instruments thus enable taxpayers to simulate a disposition without current tax. Because hedging is often a close economic substitute for disposing, hedging should arguably be taxed like a disposition. If taxpayers are indifferent between two methods of accomplishing the same result, tax law can create social costs by taxing the two methods differently. Indeed, on January 12, 1996, the Treasury released a proposal that would treat an owner of an appreciated asset as having sold the asset if the person enters into a transaction that offsets exposure to risk in the appreciated asset. Several authors also favor treating hedging as a realization event, while others believe that this would not be a helpful reform.This article explores the conceptual and practical foundations and limits of the economic substitute argument for taxing hedging like a disposition. Within the context of an income tax, reformations of the realization requirement to apply to hedges might well accomplish little improvement in the efficiency and equity of the tax system because the realization requirement itself is a departure from an ideal income tax. Although treating hedging as a realization event might reduce transaction costs associated with hedges, it would encourage taxpayers to engage in more complicated and expensive transactions to avoid the new realization rule and would increase the extent to which taxpayers are locked into investments that they would prefer to sell. As to equity, the current ability to hedge without tax undermines the tax on capital. But, so too does the ability to hold without tax, and this undermines the equity argument for taxing hedging. By exposing the inevitable formality of the realization requirement, this article supports examination of a broader reform that would apply accrual taxation to marketable securities.

It is basic to income taxation that each taxpayer should be taxed on his or her economic income and that only taxpayers who suffer economic losses should derive tax benefits therefrom. While these tenets are easily stated, they are difficult to enforce, particularly in the partnership setting where lines between the economic interests of partners are often blurred. The substantial economic effect rules of section 704(b) strive mightily to constrain partners' ability to shift income and losses in a manner inconsistent with the partners' economic arrangement. Nevertheless, when a partner contributes property to a partnership, the possibility exists that some of the gain or loss inherent in that property may be shifted from the contributor to the other partners. No gain or loss is recognized at the time of the contribution, and the partnership, as new owner of the property, takes the contributor's basis. Thus, upon any subsequent sale of the property, the gain or loss, including gain or loss inherent in the property when contributed, is generally treated as that of the partnership entity and, absent a special rule, would be divided amongst the partners.This shifting of gain or loss was tolerated before 1984. Under section 704(c), partners were permitted to agree that the subsequent gain or loss would be reported by the contributing partner, but this treatment was never mandatory. Moreover, the regulations under section 704(c) contained rules constraining that agreement, the most significant of which came to be known as the "ceiling rule," providing that the gain or loss allocated to the contributing partner could not exceed the partnership's entire gain or loss on the sale. When the ceiling rule applied, precontribution gain or loss was effectively shifted to the noncontributing partners in spite of the partners' agreement to the contrary.

A Review of The Feminist War on Crime: The Unexpected Role of Women’s Liberation in Mass Incarceration. By Aya Gruber.

The rise of globalization has become a double-edged sword for countries seeking to implement a beneficial tax policy. On one hand, there are increased opportunities for attracting foreign capital and the benefits that increased jobs and tax revenue brings to a society. However, there is also much more tax competition among countries to attract foreign capital and investment. As tax competition has grown, effective corporate tax rates have continued to be cut, creating a “race-to-the-bottom” issue. In 2021, 137 countries forming the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS passed a major milestone in reforming international tax by successfully introducing the framework of a global minimum corporate tax, known as Pillar Two. It aims to set a floor for corporate tax rates with various corrective measures so that multinational enterprises’ income will be taxed once in either source country or residence country at a substantive tax rate. Hence, Pillar Two is the first implementation of the “single tax principle” at the global level. Because Pillar Two requires an unprecedented amount of coordination among countries, it is important to understand Pillar Two thoroughly so that countries can maneuver the challenges of implementation, while still enjoying the ultimate benefit that would come from this global tax harmony. This Article analyzes the issues of tax competition and why most countries in the world have come to the conclusion that a global minimum tax is needed. This Article explains the single tax principle as the theoretical underpinning of Pillar Two, breaks down the principles and policies that comprise Pillar Two, and anticipates what promise and pitfalls passage of the global minimum tax will bring. Because the basis of Pillar Two is a direct extension of the Global Intangible Low Tax Income (GILTI) and Base Erosion and Anti-Abuse Tax (BEAT) provisions of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, it is reasonable to anticipate that the global minimum tax will be considered a success if it is implemented by all the G20 countries.