Abstract This article discusses the potential influence of the existence of an underlying armed conflict in Gaza on the applicability and application of jus ad bellum . It rejects the Israeli ‘displacement’ approach whereby jus ad bellum does not play a role during an ongoing armed conflict as it finds no support in the sources of international law, in particular state practice. The article then provides possible explanations for the Israeli reliance on ‘displacement’ regardless of its shaky foundations: namely, the preference to provide overall justification for the operation, to avoid difficult political topics, and to allow Israel freedom of action in other arenas (such as Lebanon and Syria). Regardless of such findings, the article acknowledges that jus ad bellum faces challenges to its application during hostilities. It analyses the right of self-defence, as Israel has relied on such right to justify its use of force in Gaza, addressing relatively briefly jus ad bellum necessity while focusing on the various approaches to jus ad bellum proportionality, and the differences between such approaches when it comes to the legality of the use of force in self-defence in Gaza. Ultimately, the article argues that states must provide clear pronouncements on this issue to prevent the adoption of an overly permissive approach to the regulation of jus ad bellum during hostilities.

Abstract The purpose of this study is to discuss possible solutions to stated problems and to reflect on the prospects for the resumption of military justice in Ukraine. The research formulates solutions for overcoming the negative consequences for the judiciary of the armed aggression by Russia against Ukraine. With regard to the limited institutional and human resources of international tribunals such as the International Criminal Court, the main burden of the investigation and trial of cases arising from military legal relations will be placed on the Ukrainian judicial system. International tribunals play a more global role, which is imposing responsibility on the organisers of armed aggression against Ukraine and placing sanctions on the military and political leaders of the aggressor country. For the judiciary of Ukraine, the best way to resolve this significant problem is to restore the system of military courts, which were voluntarily liquidated in 2010. The restoration of military courts will make it possible to unload pressure from the system of courts of general jurisdiction, to ensure prompt resolution of hundreds of thousands of cases of compensation for damage caused to citizens and businesses as a result of the hostilities, as well as the just trial of criminal proceedings for military and war crimes.

Abstract This article analyses the October 7th 2023 Hamas attack on Israel through the lens of the Genocide Convention, arguing that these actions constitute genocide under international law. Drawing on international case law, the analysis demonstrates how Hamas’ actions meet both the physical element and specific intent requirements for genocide, evidenced by its ideology, systematic policies and leadership statements. The article also examines how reverse accusations of genocide against Israel have functioned as a rhetorical shield to deflect recognition of Hamas’ own genocidal actions. It analyses the legal implications for state parties and the international community.

Abstract The article demonstrates that the orders of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip are highly problematic from a legal perspective. There are strong indications that the ICJ acted outside the scope of its authority by adopting a very vague but progressive interpretation of the Genocide Convention combined with a novel application of Article 41 of the ICJ Statute, which allowed the ICJ to adopt specific interim measures in the first, second and third orders. Finally, an overall analysis indicates that the ICJ has begun to act as the ultimate genocide prevention body in attempting to enforce a general duty to minimise human suffering in Gaza. While this might be seen as a laudable exercise to protect civilians, it seems to be beyond the scope of the Genocide Convention and the judicial authority of the ICJ.

Abstract This article considers two arguments raised by the Government of Israel to explain why it does not regard the West Bank as occupied territory and may therefore establish Israeli settlements there. The first is that this territory was not the sovereign territory of another state when occupied by Israel in June 1967; the second is that the trust created by the League of Nations Mandate over Palestine still applies in those parts of Mandatory Palestine that did not become the sovereign territory of another state in 1948. After a short introduction, the article argues that in the modern area, in which peoples have the right to self-determination, the law of belligerent occupation may apply in territory that was not the territory of a state before it was occupied. Relying on a large body of historical research, the article then shows that the mandate system was a compromise between the colonial aspirations of Britain and France and the principle of self-determination propagated by US President Woodrow Wilson. The Mandate did not give rights to Jews or the Jewish people. It merely obligated Britain to facilitate its commitment under the Balfour Declaration to create the conditions that ‘will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home’ in Palestine. This obligation, and its parallel right, ended with the termination of the Mandate and the establishment of the State of Israel, which was the ultimate realisation of a national home for the Jewish people in the land of Israel. Even if one were to accept the argument that the trust established by the Mandate continues to apply in the West Bank, in an era in which colonial ideas have been rejected, the conclusion is not that Jewish citizens of Israel have a right to settle there, but that the right of the Palestinian inhabitants of that area to self-determination should be respected.

Abstract Children’s weekly magazines in Israel’s first decade offer a unique arena for legal research, since they provide a broad field for learning about the nature of the effort made by their curators to instil legal consciousness in children. These publications, as prominent educational materials and popular leading leisure resources, mediated to their young readers the current events, and they are a barometer of values, including the rule of law. Accordingly, the article presents some of the values that the weeklies stressed for coping with the challenges of the time from a legal perspective. The article also describes how cultural heroes in Israel were presented in the magazines and defined the concept of the rule of law of the period. It shows that along with the weeklies’ general commitment to the rule of law and the appreciation of law-abiding figures who strived for good, the magazines, including their editorials and op-eds, featured in their literature, illustrations and other elements, a deeper layer of acceptance and even encouragement of some types of behaviour that were inconsistent with the principle of upholding public law and human rights in a broad sense. This is especially apparent concerning the conduct surrounding border security.

Abstract This article critically evaluates three attempts to overcome the problem of fit between international human rights law (IHRL) and the digital ecosystem, through an expansion of the existing IHRL framework to big tech companies. The attempted expansions considered here include standard-setting initiatives involving the imposition on states and companies – large technology companies and other business enterprises – of certain duties to apply IHRL in connection with potentially rights-infringing business practices. As I discuss below, most of the duties identified and/or developed in this regard within the context of the United Nations Human Rights Council’s Business and Human Rights (BHR) agenda constitute soft law for the time being. Negotiations for a Legally Binding Instrument (LBI) designed to strengthen the applicable legal framework are ongoing, but their prospects of success remain unclear. Another attempted expansion involves self-regulation by big tech companies through corporate policies aimed at incorporating certain IHRL norms into their business practices. The efforts of Meta to incorporate IHRL into its corporate policies and to offer an IHRL grievance mechanism through the operation of the Meta Oversight Body (focusing mainly on protecting freedom of expression, as articulated in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) represent a key case study in this regard. A third attempt to address the aforementioned problem of fit that I consider below involves efforts by special procedures of the Human Rights Council to exercise its standard-setting and monitoring functions in connection with the practices of large technology companies. The work of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Opinion and Expression in this area is particularly noteworthy. These three examples of expansion attempts provide useful insights into the potential of IHRL to serve as a legal framework to govern the operations of large technology companies, as well as about the limits of its potential.The article starts by discussing recent developments in the BHR agenda, including efforts to conclude an LBI. The extent to which this agenda represents a promising avenue for holding large technology companies accountable to IHRL norms is then considered in the second and third parts of the article, which discuss two normative initiatives that derive largely from the BHR agenda: this section specifically examines Meta’s espousal of IHRL as part of its corporate BHR policy, and considers attempts by Human Rights Council special procedures to apply IHRL to technology companies.

Abstract This article discusses the East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), a regional energy organisation formed in 2020. It highlights the organisation’s significance in promoting cooperation in the East Mediterranean energy sector but notes the absence of a robust legal framework, governance structure and binding rules. The lack of mechanisms for enforcing decisions among members is also a concern. To address these shortcomings, the article proposes the adoption of a regional energy treaty. The suggested treaty holds the potential of transforming the EMGF into a potent and legally binding energy organisation. By establishing a comprehensive legal foundation, the treaty could foster energy cooperation, promote sustainable energy initiatives, and create a secure investment environment, thereby stimulating economic growth across the Mediterranean region. Moreover, implementation of the treaty could play a crucial role in ensuring energy security within the East Mediterranean. It has the capacity to help in mediating and resolving disputes concerning maritime boundaries, transit and political issues that pose threats to the stability and effectiveness of the EMGF. For a regional energy treaty to be effective, it should encompass provisions concerning transit, trade, investment and environmental protection. The inclusion of decision-making bodies and robust dispute settlement mechanisms is essential to encourage investment, facilitate unhindered transit and consolidate the stature of the EMGF as a pre-eminent energy organisation.