Abstract This article focuses on the impact of land investments in Mozambique. It examines the effects these land investments are having on local people’ access to food and sustenance, culture, land and water, and political engagement in some Mozambican provinces and areas. The next section critically evaluates whether human rights related to the aspects are being violated, as well as Mozambique’s legal obligations under both local and international law. The main goals are to alert the academic community to the negative impacts that land grab and investments have on local populations in Mozambique and to explain how these activities can be effectively stopped by using the normative framework now in place on human rights. It argues that foreign companies and investors in Mozambique are causing significant negative impacts on local communities, including livelihood, food, culture, land, and political participation. These issues are already protected by human rights law, and effective protection by the state could help combat land grabbing. Mozambique’s judiciary, civil society, and human rights institutions should work together to prevent local communities from being harmed.

Abstract This article explores when constitutional damages can and should be awarded in South African law. The history of the divergence between common-law damages and constitutional damages (and the uncertainty that might arise about which type of damages a victim of an injury ought to pursue) is explored. Thereafter, a critical and constructive interpretation of the case law on constitutional damages is provided, which sets the scene for a precedent-inspired three-step approach to constitutional damages adjudication. This approach is then defended as a transformative constitutional one which squares easily against the notion of constitutional adjudicative subsidiarity.

Abstract Unlike article 34 of the UNCITRAL Model Law which prescribes three months limitation period for recourse against arbitral award, section 48 of the Nigerian Arbitration Act (ACA) does not specifically contain any limitation period. However, section 29(1) of the ACA which has general application provides for three months limitation period from the date of award within which a party can apply to set aside an award on the ground that the arbitral tribunal exceeded its scope of submission. The aim of this paper is to ascertain the scope, application and effect of the relevant provisions of the ACA by evaluating relevant judicial decisions. This paper adopts the doctrinal methodology by relying on relevant statutes, judicial decisions and literature. The paper points out the issues arising from computation of time as to whether limitation time starts to run from the date of award or when the award is received by the parties or their legal representatives and calls for judicial rethinking. The paper finds that the virtual repetition of the grounds for recourse against international arbitral award in the grounds for refusal of recognition and enforcement may give an unsuccessful party a bite of another cherry. In order not to defeat the essence of the limitation period, the paper recommends necessary the legislative reforms.

Abstract While the literature on the Nkonya-Alavanyo conflict references litigation and its apparent ineffectiveness in resolving the conflict, there is a paucity of detail about this litigation. This paper contributes to a more holistic comprehension of the discourses structuring resolution attempts in this conflict, with lessons for the resolution of communal conflicts generally. Drawing on archival data, media reports, and field interviews, we examine the trajectory of the Nkonya-Alavanyo conflict in the Ghanaian judicial system as an example of an intractable communal conflict that has defied legal attempts at resolution. We argue that judicial attempts at resolving the conflict have been ineffective because the resultant juridical discourse is polysemic and – to the extent that the non-negotiable value of justice is a factor in the conflict – is subject to divergent articulations. Second, we submit that the juridical discourse competes with State, civil society, and partisan articulations that do not privilege judicial decisions, with State discourse increasingly being one of militarisation.

Abstract The period 2005 to 2011 has a special significance for the people of Sudan. It not only saw the emergence of South Sudan as an independent country, but it also marked the beginning of formal constitution-making in South Sudan’s tumultuous political history. Two important documents – the Interim Constitution 2005 and the Transitional Constitution 2011 – were enacted during this period. I discuss both documents in this paper. I find that the Transitional Constitution unnecessarily concentrates power in the president. I argue that in failing to constrain the president, the Transitional Constitution has failed the task of a modern constitution.