ABSTRACT This article analyses how Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has weaponized global wheat interdependence and explores the applicability of the weaponized interdependence (WI) framework to substitutable agricultural commodities. It traces Russia’s attacks on Ukrainian Black Sea and Danube ports, the Black Sea Grain Initiative, and subsequent rerouting of Ukrainian exports through EU overland corridors, showing how these moves reshaped trade flows, sparked farmer protests in Central and Eastern Europe, and enabled Russia’s “grain diplomacy” in parts of the Global South. The article argues that wheat’s substitutability and the reconfigurability of export infrastructures make chokepoints and hubs more transitory, generating shifting dependencies rather than stable hierarchies. Building on process-tracing of trade disruptions, policy responses, and fieldwork with Ukrainian and EU-border farmers, the article suggests a typology of weaponization outcomes based on the substitutability of goods and infrastructures.

ABSTRACT This article examines the institutionalisation of participation at the World Bank at the turn of the twenty-first century. Moving beyond accounts centered on transnational advocacy or organisational learning, it argues that bureaucratic politics shape norm change within international organisations (IOs). More specifically, it shows that reform-minded staff, acting as institutional entrepreneurs under hierarchical constraints, advanced normative change from within. Drawing on archival research and interviews, the article traces the process by which social scientists first introduced participatory ideas into the Bank’s policy debates and a second group of senior reformers later reframed them in ways compatible with the institution’s dominant economic rationalities. It also highlights the boundary-spanning alliances these insiders forged with NGOs and academics to secure legitimacy, mobilise expertise, and embed social development concerns within the Bank’s policy apparatus. The case demonstrates that norm institutionalisation in IOs depends not simply on external pressure or learning, but on knowledge struggles, coalition-building, and epistemic conversion through which contested ideas become institutionally acceptable.

ABSTRACT States in international relations emerge through diplomatic state recognition, yet when there are rival statehood claims over the same territory, recognition becomes contested and a security concern. International organisations and their parliaments express recognition positions that matter because of their collective nature, but this remains underexplored in predominantly state-centric scholarship. This study addresses that gap by analysing how International Parliamentary Institutions (IPIs) facilitate recognition in statehood conflicts. We propose an analytical framework to capture how IPIs exercise agency through using their own instruments (e.g. resolutions) to express recognition positions, particularly when these diverge from their executive counterparts. Applying this framework, we conduct a historical analysis of the European Parliament’s approach to Kosovo as a case study of IPIs’ significance for recognition, drawing on extensive original and secondary data. Findings show that the activism of parliamentarians and majority decision-making rules enabled a stance in favour of Kosovo’s recognition; that EP support has strengthened over time; and that plenary debates fostered reflection on recognition of Kosovo and beyond. The study highlights the importance of both institutional rules and individual agency, contributing to a deeper understanding of collective recognition by diverse international actors in some of the world’s most complex security environments.

ABSTRACT In this paper, we contribute to the debate on the end of neoliberalism and on possible alternatives to the latter. We start by clarifying the relationship between neoliberalism, globalisation and the state as well as between neoliberalism, “populism”, and far-right conservatism. We argue that, despite important political-economic changes, we are still in an “interregnum”, whereby neoliberalism is increasingly challenged and dysfunctional but still dominant. Moreover, neoliberalism is mutating, as it is becoming mixed with stronger doses of nationalism and populist authoritarianism. However, the hegemonic crisis also opens the way to counterhegemonic projects. Building on Polanyi, we elaborate an analytical framework centred on the principle of expansive democratisation for distinguishing between political initiatives that aim to reinforce neoliberal hegemony and between reactionary and progressive counterhegemonic projects. We argue that building emancipatory alternatives to neoliberalism requires revitalising the critique of capitalism, fighting for global social-ecological justice.

ABSTRACT This article offers a practice-oriented perspective on the near-simultaneous rise of anti-genderism in the post-2010 context. Using the Turkish case, it argues that normative isomorphism across different locales is not always the result of recent norm diffusion; their simultaneous and isomorphic emergence can be attributed to the diffusion of practices that enact pre-existing normative frameworks. Empirically speaking, this would mean re-reading the rise of anti-genderism as also a process of practice diffusion, no doubt, within the broader context of the growing influence of right-wing populism and illiberalism. The research suggests focusing on the diffusion of practices rather than norms per se, allowing for a more nuanced understanding of global normative similarities and claims of globality.

ABSTRACT This paper contributes to the scholarly debate on secondary states’ agency in the context of US–China technological competition by examining how members of the Five Eyes (FVEY) intelligence alliance, excluding the United States, responded to perceived security risks posed by Huawei’s 5G infrastructure. While all FVEY states ultimately excluded Huawei from national networks, the pathways to this outcome diverged markedly, reflecting differences in threat perception, institutional processes, political priorities, and strategic cultures. Australia acted decisively, leveraging established mechanisms to implement a hardline stance; Canada and New Zealand proceeded cautiously, balancing domestic politics and trade concerns; and the United Kingdom initially resisted US pressure before reversing course amid domestic scrutiny. These variations show that alliance cohesion cannot be assumed, even among long-standing intelligence partners, and that convergence in policy outcomes does not imply convergence in underlying rationale, though all members ultimately reached a de facto similar outcome. The study underscores the limits of US influence over allied interpretations of asymmetric technological threats and highlights the critical role of secondary states in shaping technological geopolitics. By illuminating how liberal democracies navigate security, economic, and political imperatives in asymmetric competition, it provides insights into the challenges of multilateral coordination over emerging technologies.

ABSTRACT The relationship between far-right and science has gained increasing scholarly attention, yet existing analyses often rely on broad labels such as “anti-scientific” or “anti-intellectual” without sufficient conceptual precision. This lack of precision, in turn, commonly leads to an inadequate analysis of the discourse of figures such as Argentine President Javier Milei. This article attempts to overcome this limitation by applying to Milei’s case a novel theoretical framework that distinguishes between two complementary dimensions of anti-science attitudes: an epistemological axis and an ethical–political axis. Empirically, the study draws on roughly 109 h of public statements produced by Milei between December 2023 and July 2025, analysed through a qualitative discourse approach inspired by grounded theory. The findings show that Milei selectively targets publicly funded intellectuals and institutions, framing them as corrupt, useless, or indoctrinating, while simultaneously praising market-oriented knowledge producers. Epistemologically, however, he does not reject science per se; instead, he frequently celebrates scientific progress and expert authority, except in specific cases such as climate change where his market fundamentalism overrides scientific consensus. We show that Milei’s discourse is better understood as a “war over science” – an attempt to appropriate science under neoliberal logics – rather than as wholesale anti-scientific rejection.

ABSTRACT How does parenthood affect individuals’ attitudes toward war? Existing literature on public support for war offers some explanations as to when the public is more likely to support the use of military force. Yet, it has largely overlooked an essential factor: parenthood. Building on rational choice and social identity theories, we argue that individuals who are parents are less likely to support war. Individuals with children face greater uncertainty and are more vulnerable to the damages that war could bring. In addition, the shift in identity as parents affects how individuals perceive security threats. We test our hypothesis using the World Value Survey Wave 6 (2010-2014). The results show that parenthood decreases the likelihood of expressing support for war, for both females and males, even after controlling for other demographic traits and country-level covariates such as exposure to militarised violence and gender inequality. Our findings contribute to the literature on security studies and public opinion and suggest a need to consider the impact of parenthood.

ABSTRACT This paper explores the multifaceted relationship between artificial intelligence (AI), programming languages, and ethical-political structures, emphasising how AI development both reflects and reshapes global power dynamics. When prompted about its participation in political discourse or its potential to function as a public intellectual (a hybrid human–nonhuman actor that redefines the link between technology, politics, and public reason), generative AI often expresses a willingness to engage with complex ideas, while simultaneously acknowledging its limitations in terms of original thought and its inability to advocate for social change. It tends to prioritise neutrality over taking definitive stances, which raises critical concerns. This neutrality may inadvertently contribute to inequality, particularly in the context of the divide between the Global North and the Global South. Moreover, the geopolitical rivalry between the United States and China, combined with AI’s growing role in decision-making processes, underscores its potential to privilege certain agendas – often those aimed at power maximisation and wealth accumulation. This paper argues that the promise of AI must be weighed against its risks, especially in high-stakes domains, and that meaningful accountability demands more than ethics-as-branding. By framing AI as a sociotechnical artifact embedded in ideology and power, the study highlights the need for global, pluralistic, and enforceable ethical frameworks in the face of accelerating digital transformation.

ABSTRACT As China’s diplomatic and economic outreach towards the Global South has expanded in recent decades, so too have its efforts to align with important Global South countries and create movement away from US hegemony. Brazil’s relationship with China is emblematic, as it is a big player in Latin America and in multilateral bodies, and due to its historical relationship with the United States. While theories about China’s rise lead us to expect that relations between China and Global South countries such as Brazil should be positive and straightforward due to economic interests, normative identity, and successful diplomatic outreach, empirical studies yield mixed results, with challenges arising from host state domestic politics. We explore how Brazil’s domestic policy preferences, public opinion, and polarisation shape China’s ability to achieve its diplomatic goals in multilateral (focusing on BRICS) and bilateral (especially agribusiness trade) settings. We find that despite an overall strong relationship, Brazil diverges from China’s policies and preferences in important ways, exposing limits on China’s efforts. In addition to tracing major diplomatic statements, we draw on newly collected survey data reflecting Brazilian public opinion on salient issues.