The paper is a discussion of the book by Witold Wachowski entitled Poznanie rozproszone: Od heurystyk do mechanizmów (Distributed Cognition: From Heuristics to Mechanisms). At the beginning, I introduce the theoretical context of the reviewed publication. Then, I discuss the content of the publication and the research thesis. In the further part, I draw attention to certain difficulties related to the application of ecological heuristics and the possibility of its connection with the research tradition developed on the basis of the so-called free energy principle. In the last part, I indicate the importance of the discussed publication for the contemporary debate conducted on the basis of the philosophy of cognitive science.

Truthmaking non-maximalism usually assumes that some truths do not have truthmakers. I suggest, however, that non-maximalism can be understood more specifically, and that different types of non-maximalism can be distinguished. To do so, I refer to two positions. The first is deflationary truthmaking, some of whose proponents assume that no truths have truthmakers. The second distinguishes between truths that do not have truthmakers but depend on being, and truths that do not have truthmakers and moreover do not depend on being. Given the combinations of these positions, I propose a new classification indicating the positions available to a non-maximalist. I argue that one of these positions is particularly worth adopting because of its advantages over the other options.

Haskell Curry's philosophy of mathematics is really a form of "structuralism" rather than "formalism" despite Curry's own description of it as formalist (Seldin 2011). This paper explains Curry's actual view by a formal analysis of a simple example. This analysis is extended to solve Keränen's ( 2001) identity problem for structuralism, confirming Leitgeb's (2020a, b) solution, and further clarifies structural ontology. Curry's methods answer philosophical questions by employing a standard mathematical method, which is a virtue of the "methodological autonomy" emphasized by Curry (1951 Curry ( , 1963 ) and more recently with greater clarity by Maddy (1997 Maddy ( , 2007)) .

AI-developers face a challenge when seeking to use models that aim to be culturally sensitive. While we agree that culture is an emergent reality, there is always the risk of creating algorithms that treat culture as objective to account for various facets of the social realm. As a result, culture becomes prepackaged and autonomous. Nonetheless, culture is not only emergent but dialogically and socially invented. In this article, the point is to advance the discussion about culture by addressing a crucial philosophical issue and proposing some practical themes on how to avoid culturalism in AI development.

Truth about matters of fact is objective. This is not just because truth is objective. It is also because facts are objective. An objective fact makes an assertion of that fact true. The objectivity of the fact adds a further element of objectivity to the objective truth of the assertion. True assertions of fact are true because truth is objective and because the facts that make them true are objective. True assertions of fact are objective twice over. Their objectivity is twofold. Or, at least, that is the point I seek to establish here.