In times of new geopolitical challenges, many states have revived the concept of total defence, in which all citizens contribute to national defence efforts. How authorities communicate the need of this new defence strategy and when such crisis communication leads to an increased defence willingness is an important research question. We hypothesise that individuals who feel a sense of empowerment or an increased risk of war when exposed to crisis communication are more willing to engage in the defence. To evaluate our hypotheses, we collected representative survey data from 2,068 Swedish respondents, at the same time as the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency was distributing a new brochure on expectations on and advice for citizens in case of war. By analysing the responses of individuals who had read or not read the brochure, we gauge the impact of the crisis communication on defence willingness. The results show that individuals experiencing a higher sense of empowerment and perceiving a higher risk of war when having read the booklet were more willing to engage in total defence activities. This has important implications for our understanding of how specific types of crisis communication influence commitment and defence willingness in the population.

Abstract The assumption that state behaviour is primarily driven by a survival interest remains widespread within international relations (IR), even as many others attract critique. This article problematises that assumption, arguing that the meaning of survival itself, not just states’ means of pursuing it, varies significantly. Common conceptions of state survival reflect a legal definition of sovereign statehood encompassing a permanent population, defined territory, government institutions, and political autonomy. Yet leaders and publics do not uniformly conceive and value these aspects of statehood, which often generate contradictory policy incentives. Expanding on recent works in ontological security studies, this article argues that national narratives produce diverse interpretations of state survival that generate distinct meanings and prioritisations among the core aspects of statehood. Put another way, states’ physical bodies and physical survival – as IR scholars frequently discuss these concepts – are chiefly ideational. These theoretical arguments are illustrated through case studies of Georgia and Kazakhstan, which displayed radically different interpretations of survival and, hence, threat perceptions and security choices during the early 1990s. Accounting for variations within the concept of survival – both across states and within a state over time – can help future research explain a broader range of state behaviour.

What societal factors influence the reach of Russian propaganda outlets among fringe audiences? Recent debates within international relations and political communication have questioned the ability of Russia’s information warfare practices to persuade general public opinion in the West. Yet, Russian propaganda outlets have historically focused on reaching Western fringe communities, while a growing literature on societal resilience argues that variance in specific societal factors influences the effect of information warfare. Here I study the degree to which various societal factors condition Russia’s ability to reach fringe audiences. I measure the reach of Russian propaganda outlets among online fringe communities in ten Western European countries in the three months before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. I compare national measures of public service media, media trust, affective polarisation, and populism and find descriptive indications that the latter two are tied to performance of Russian propaganda outlets in fringe communities. In addition, I find reach to be concentrated among regional great powers, highlighting the need to consider strategic risks when discussing societal resilience.

What do people in liberal polities believe they owe soldiers for their service? The UK’s Armed Forces Covenant, promulgated in 2000 and enshrined in law in 2021, presents a real-world opportunity to examine the effects of inducing citizens to reflect on soldiering. We develop and test two contending theoretical logics, grounded in the liberal political culture from which the Covenant emerged, using unique observational data and a novel survey experiment. Does prior knowledge of the Covenant or exposure to a Covenant prime highlight the abiding tensions between liberal ideals and military service and underscore the debt that citizens owe soldiers? Or does it prompt liberal citizens to resolve their discomfort with military service in a distinctively liberal way – by emphasising soldiers’ contractual terms and their willing consent to deployment? In line with the latter logic, respondents with prior knowledge of the Covenant or exposure to the Covenant prime were more likely to endorse the use of force and were less sensitive to casualties, and they were no more likely to grant soldiers and veterans additional benefits or preferential treatment. This paper has significant implications for public support for military missions and the relationship between military service and citizenship.

Abstract This paper examines China’s strategic response to the Japan–South Korea entente within the broader context of US-led trilateral security cooperation since the 2010s. Rather than employing conventional wedge strategies such as selective accommodation and coercion, China has pursued a ‘soft wedging’ approach, leveraging rhetoric to subtly reinforce pre-existing divisions without direct intervention. This strategy seeks to discourage South Korea from deepening its alignment with Japan and the United States while minimising the risk of alienating either Japan or South Korea. Drawing on official materials and expert interviews, this study analyses China’s rhetorical tactics in public statements and diplomatic engagements, along with the strategic calculus underpinning its preference for soft wedging. By providing an alternative to more resource-intensive and risk-prone measures, soft wedging broadens the existing theoretical framework of wedge strategies. The empirical analysis further deepens our understanding of multi-target wedging dynamics and China’s strategic objectives in Northeast Asia’s evolving security landscape.

Abstract What factors make aligned relationships possible, and how can we account for transformation of alignments? Alignment patterns and the durability of some aligned relationships above others have often raised questions about factors that influence cooperative arrangements. This article makes a twofold contribution by proposing a tentative process-centred alignment typology as an analytical tool and by empirically applying this tool to examine Sino–Russian alignment (1991–2024). Our conceptual typology differentiates among six primary alignment types: thin strategic partnerships, coalitions, thick strategic partnerships, alliances, non-allied security communities, and allied security communities. We propose that these types become possible due to varying compatibility between prospective or existing alignment partners in their assessment of threats, interpretations of identities, and status expectations. Our empirical analysis focuses on specific upgrades in the Sino–Russian relationship as presented by both states in 1996, 2001, 2011, and 2021 while also discussing more recent developments after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Abstract Contemporary deterrence scholarship remains disproportionately focused on military instruments, often neglecting the strategic utility of diplomacy, information, and economic statecraft. Our study addresses this imbalance through a new methodology for analysing how authoritarian states respond to the range of foreign policy tools: diplomatic, information, military, and economic (the DIME framework). Using a state’s propaganda, official statements, and media (POSM) to capture target states’ reactions to adversarial DIME actions, we offer an innovative analytical framework that enhances understanding of deterrence dynamics beyond the military sphere. Within the framework, we use computational text analysis, statistical analysis, and data visualisation to create a replicable process for analysing POSM big data. Applying this methodology to a case study of China, we find that Beijing’s POSM-based responses to information tools – such as public criticism of censorship and information control by NGOs – are more negative than to diplomatic, military, or economic tools. Our methodology contributes to deterrence theory and policy through its insight into non-military effects and by offering a scalable process for empirical analysis ripe for AI implementation. For policymakers, our process and findings hold implications for crafting more effective and sustainable deterrence strategies in an increasingly complex international security environment.

Abstract A growing literature examines why and under what conditions citizens are willing to fight for their country, yet it often overlooks societal heterogeneity. In multiethnic states, ethnic minorities may hold fundamentally different views about defending a majority-dominated nation-state. We argue that in divided societies, citizens’ willingness to fight is deeply shaped by cultural identity and historical narratives, which influence threat perceptions and, ultimately, readiness to fight. We test our argument in the crucial case of Latvia, a country with a sizable Russian-speaking minority and heightened security concerns about neighbouring Russia. Using three waves of original survey data (2022–2024) and logistic regression models, we find evidence of a ‘minority effect’: On average, Russian speakers are less willing to fight for Latvia than ethnic Latvians. A mediation analysis shows that this disparity is substantially driven by divergent historical memories. Russian speakers display greater Soviet nostalgia and are less likely to perceive Russia as responsible for the war in Ukraine, which in turn reduces their willingness to fight. Our findings have important implications for defence planning and resilience in multiethnic states facing external threats.

A recent wave of survey experiments has advanced scholarly understanding of public attitudes towards the use of nuclear weapons. In this article, we address the central question: can public opinion influence decision-makers’ views on nuclear weapon use? We bridge this critical gap in the literature with a survey experiment conducted on samples of UK parliamentarians and US and UK government employees in official policy roles. We varied public support for nuclear strikes in realistic scenarios to examine participants’ responsiveness to public preferences when considering nuclear first use, nuclear retaliation, and third-party nuclear threats. We show that high public support notably increases willingness to endorse nuclear first use against non-nuclear adversaries. Furthermore, public backing shapes beliefs about national leaders’ willingness to order nuclear strikes. However, the effect of public opinion is weaker in nuclear retaliation contexts, suggesting that different considerations become prominent when the ‘nuclear taboo’ has been breached. Importantly, sympathetic public opinion strongly influences perceptions of the credibility of third-party nuclear threats, carrying implications for the practice of nuclear deterrence. Our findings highlight the role of public opinion as both an enabling and constraining force on nuclear use and provide new theoretical and empirical insights into elite decision-making in nuclear politics.

This article provides novel insights into Russia’s strategic use of migrants, using the Federal Security Service (FSB)-enabled migration flows towards Norway and Finland in 2015/16 as a case study. Through the use of semi-structured interviews and an empirical study, we identify several potential Russian goals tied to its use of migration, including restoring bilateral relations to the levels before Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine, influencing the European Union’s (EU’s) decisions on sanctions and cooperation, warning Finland against seeking NATO membership, testing the effectiveness of a new tool, collecting intelligence, and weakening Western influence per Russia’s broader information confrontation towards the West. These objectives served the broader regional and grand strategic goals of maximising Russia’s influence and minimising the EU’s and NATO’s sway in the region. Our findings challenge earlier interpretations that downplayed Russia’s role, arguing instead that the operation established coercive potential rather than immediate concessions. We contribute to the literature on the strategic use of migration and authoritarian states’ innovative use of unconventional methods.