National Minority Councils play a significant role in preserving the interest of national minority communities, especially in ethnically heterogeneous countries, in order to avoid the assimilation of members of minorities and, consequently, the national homogenization of respective countries. It seems that the mentioned problem is particularly pronounced in Serbia, which has been the target of criticism that the national minorities that inhabit it are in the phase of cultural and linguistic assimilation. In order to avoid these problems, it is necessary to develop mechanisms thet allow members of minorities to protect the distinctive characteristics of the national minority that they belong to. These mechanisms, among other things, are reflected in the rights of national minorities to non-territoral autonomy, which is realized in Serbia in the form of national minority councils. However, in order for the national minority councils to perform their role, the process of their election is of crucial importance. The representativness and (un)successful performance of the role assigned to them directly depends on the electoral process of these bodies, and the subject of this paper will be the analysis of the procedure of election of national minority councils.

In the 19th century developed formalism, a theory of legal reasoning and interpretation devoted to the claim that judges discover and apply law without ever creating it. It was believed that the legislator could foresee and regulate everything, and the judge’s task consisted in the mechanical application of such a ready right to a specific legal situation. However, modern legal doctrine recognizes judges a certain freedom when making decisions, the possibility to adapt the law to life and judge based on their free judicial conviction. An almost unsolvable problem is the question of how to give the judge the necessary freedom in decision-making, and on the other hand prevent possible abuses, as well as conscious and unconscious mistakes, when using broad discretionary powers. Hart’s solution to the problem represents a middle way between these two extremes, which is why special attention is paid to it. Also, the author will try to prove that formalism is a wrong theory of legal interpretation and that the highest judicial instances actually create law through interpretation.

In a world where academia's mantra increasingly demands interdisciplinary engagement, legal scholarship faces a choice: uphold its traditional boundaries or embrace disciplinary confluence. This paper explores how legal knowledge maintains its identity while adapting to contemporary academic discourse. It does so through the metaphorical address of a young legal scholar, proposing two crucial epistemic perspectives: the “legal phantasm” – a lawyer's distinct cognitive toolkit for constructing and applying law, and the “spirit of interdisciplinarity” – an attitude fostering creative engagement beyond normative boundaries. By distinguishing between knowledge of law and knowledge about law, the paper argues for a nuanced approach to scholarly engagement. Using the metaphor of dancing with disciplinary strangers, it explores how legal scholars might maintain professional rigour while pursuing intellectual innovation. It argues for epistemologically conscious inquiry that recognises both the necessity of boundaries and the value of their careful transgression. The paper calls for methodological awareness rather than mere interdisciplinary hype, suggesting that meaningful scholarship requires understanding not just whether to dance, but how.

The problem of the development of specialized knowledge is becoming increasingly relevant in legal practice, because of the significant role played by experts in judicial trials. Faced with this problem, legal theory has tried to answer the question about the relationship that is established between the judge and the experts who are summoned in the trials to provide their own knowledge about the matter of the judgement. This article provides an overview of the different theories which have analyzed when an expert deserves the trust of the legal authority. This essay aims to answer two questions: when does a person possess the necessary knowledge to be considered an expert and to what extent does reliance on the expert influence the judge's decision.

Posthumous conception is appearing more and more often both in domestic and in the practice of foreign countries. In order for such a procedure to be possible and allowed, it is first necessary to deal with the issue of disposal of reproductive cells in the event of the death of the person from whom they originate. This question opens up a Pandora's box of related questions, starting with the circle of persons who can be the addressees of such a disposition, various temporal limitations, the question of the existence and form of consent, as well as the status of a posthumous child. As a result, a myriad of different approaches is visible. The legislation of certain countries prohibits such a procedure, some allow it, and the most complicated are those that do not regulate such procedures, or fail to do so clearly and concisely. The subject and goal of this work is to present domestic laws and cases that have appeared, with reference to certain comparative legal solutions and jurisprudence.

Self is constructed by reflecting on the Other(s). The Other refers to anything external that is internalised by the subject. The digital mediascape, increasingly populating our conception of the Other today, becomes the mirror in which we reflect to emerge as subjects. The predominant aim of this paper is to explore the challenges posed regarding the idea of the Self in the digital world and how the Law responds or may respond to such challenges. How, and to what extent, does the digital world colonise the Other through which we conceive of ourselves, and ultimately upon which we construct our (digital and otherwise) Self? How is the image of the Self projected in the digital environment? What is the role of the law in this process of (re)identification? Predictive modelling will be particularly considered to assess these questions.

Law is complex and multifaceted phenomen which means that it consists of different aspects such as legal norms, values and relations. Depending on the theoretical orientation and on the particualar aspect of law, scholars use different and appropriate methods such as normative, comparative or linguistic etc. Through its development sociology has built different methods such as surveys, observation, content analysis or and interviews. Legal efficacy, being part of the application of law, is in the literature ussually considered as a field that falls within the scope of the sociology of law. Scholars who previously wrote about the efficacy of law, with occasional references to empirical research and sociological approaches to law, did not particularly consider the possibility of integrating sociological methods into discussions on how to understand the efficacy of legal norms and legal orders. This essay does not want to provide definite answers but rather to point out the question whether there is a niche in which sociological methods could find their application or descriptive usefulness in an adequate and coherent way.

Phenomenology is a 20th-century philosophical movement rooted in the thought of the German philosopher Edmund Husserl which emphasizes the way phenomena appear in their primordial givenness by bracketing their content to focus on their essences. The author of this paper interprets the philosophical method of this approach as the extraction of the universal characteristics of phenomena that permeate every individual instance of their appearance – those elements whose absence would render us unaware of the phenomena themselves, thereby constituting their essences. The first part of the paper establishes the framework of phenomenology and its fundamental premise – the intentionality of consciousness, the second part is dedicated to the structure of the phenomenological method itself, while the third applies this method to approach the universal foundations of the phenomenon of "law," firstly through determining the phenomenological elements of Hans Kelsen’s "basic norm“, followed by a phenomenological description of the nature of legal directives, the guiding role of legal norms, and the influence of legal norms on both internal and external evaluation through the formation of evental patterns.

H.L.A. Hart’s legal theory in “The Concept of Law” defines law as a system of primary and secondary rules, separating law from morality while allowing moral elements within the rule of recognition. However, Hart’s omission of human rights limits his framework’s relevance to contemporary legal philosophy, particularly regarding legal legitimacy in the international system. This article critiques Hart’s rule of recognition by integrating human rights into the legal framework, drawing on Turkish philosopher Takiyeddin Mengusoglu’s ontological approach to human phenomena. It argues that law and human rights are interwoven human achievements with shared phenomenological roots. This integration strengthens the legal framework to address global challenges such as conflicts, authoritarian regimes, and rights encroachments. By embedding human rights within the rule of recognition, this revised framework ensures the protection of human rights and enhances legal legitimacy amidst evolving international dynamics.

Artificial intelligence, as a relatively new field of technology, has the potential to bring significant changes to how individuals perform daily tasks. Its ability to analyze vast amounts of data and provide personalized support represents one of the key aspects that could influence the academic experience. In this context, the aim of this paper is to explore the extent and manner in which artificial intelligence is used among students (if it is used at all) and to examine its impact on grades, understanding of course material, and overall academic success, based on research and surveys conducted with students at the Faculty of Law, University of Belgrade. Through the analysis of this topic, we aim to gain insights into how students use artificial intelligence in their studies and identify potential areas for further research and development. Additionally, this study seeks to understand students' personal views on artificial intelligence regarding moral dilemmas and ethical issues arising from its use in an academic context, such as delineating legitimate use from potential misuse, which could undermine the establishment of a fair and ethical academic environment.