Actors in grand corruption schemes often conspire and deliberately create sophisticated networks to extract huge amounts of public resources from government systems. They hide such conspiracies behind hybrid formal/informal arrangements. Using a mixed methods approach, this study investigates the corruption scheme initiated by former Peruvian President Alejandro Toledo and the Brazilian construction giant Odebrecht Group. We argue that separating the networks of the client (Odebrecht) and the agent (Toledo) sides provides analytical leverage for studying complex corrupt arrangements. We found that the organizational forms designed by corrupt actors on either side were essential to ensuring the secret and safe operation of the network. Introducing the concept of organizational form into corruption research helps better understand the nature of these networks. We also found that different parts of the networks are shaped by different types of corruption. The article concludes with implications for practice.

This Working Paper presents international case studies of legal frameworks addressing conflicts of interest and highlights common challenges, opportunities and lessons for practitioners and other interested stakeholders. The report covers three contexts: two national (South Korea, Brazil) and one supranational (the European Union). 
 The analysis is based on the international standards in the 2020 guide Preventing and Managing Conflicts of Interest in the Public Sector, produced by the World Bank Group, OECD and UNODC at the request of the G20 Anticorruption Working Group. 
 The Working Paper is published in the context of the USAID Indonesia Integrity Initiative (INTEGRITAS) project, which supports the Government of Indonesia in preventing corruption via enhancing civic engagement and strengthening integrity in the public and private sectors. The case studies and analysis will be of value to anyone interested in drafting, revising or monitoring conflict of interest legislation in any context.

This Working Paper is intended to guide practitioners who are seeking to complement conventional anti-corruption measures by adopting a behavioural communications approach.
 It aims to connect a typology of anti-corruption messages with behavioural change theories, and discuss their impact.
 Subsequently, it suggests practical implications for designing anti-corruption communication as part of behaviour change interventions. This includes outlining how to develop a robust Theory of Change as a means to enhance the success of such efforts. 
 The guidance is based on a review of seven key topically pertinent studies that have been recently published. 
 This publication is prepared as guidance for the USAID Indonesia Integrity Initiative (USAID INTEGRITAS).

This report offers a detailed deep dive into how corruption fuelled illegal logging in Ukraine during the period before the full-scale war. It explains how the Russian invasion has raised the risks of illegal logging, by increasing demand for wood and its relative value as a resource, and by reducing inspections and civil society oversight.
 Building on pre-war case studies, selected interviews and a review process with various stakeholders, the report outlines the widespread corruption challenges in Ukraine's forestry sector and proposes relevant interventions in the war and reconstruction contexts. 
 The report identifies specific corruption patterns linked to three main types of illegal logging:
 
 By private actors such as communities and criminal groups, who can evade justice by corrupting law enforcement officials.
 By forest management officials, who sometimes obtain false paperwork to fell trees – thus easing their export abroad.
 Following the illegal appropriation of forests through manipulation of land documents. 
 
 A significant proportion of wood illegally logged in Ukraine comes with (illegally obtained) permits, so can be "legally" exported to foreign markets in the European Union and elsewhere.
 Both governments and the private sector in countries that import wood and/or support Ukraine's reconstruction efforts have a role to play in preventing the illegal destruction of Ukraine's forests.

The final recommendation of the Commission of Inquiry into Money Laundering in British Columbia (‘the Commission’) urged the government to legislate an unexplained wealth order (‘UWO’) as part of a wider approach to counter the prevalence of money laundering and proceeds of crime in the province.
 This document analyses the feasibility of this recommendation. It:
 
 briefly explains the concept of unexplained wealth and how it can be targeted through legislative instruments;
 outlines the reasons for which the Commissioner proposed a UWO for British Columbia;
 explains how a UK-style UWO works and assess the probability that a mechanism of this kind would successfully recover unexplained wealth in British Columbia; 
 addresses the constitutional issues that may arise if a UK-style UWO was introduced, as outlined by former Supreme Court Justice, the Honourable Thomas A. Cromwell C.C., in his annexed opinion to the report;
 explains other legislative options that target unexplained wealth (including those in Western Australia and Ireland) and assess their constitutional compatibility and potential effectiveness as compared to a UK-style UWO;
 explores the legal rights issues that may arise if either a UK-style UWO or a traditional UWO was introduced; and
 outlines the legislative safeguards that could be put in place to reduce the risk that any such mechanisms would negatively impact on established legal rights.
 
 This document has been prepared by experts working with the Basel Institute on Governance, an independent not-for-profit organisation dedicated to countering corruption and other financial crimes, and the Vancouver Anti-Corruption Institute, an organisation devoted to anti-corruption efforts and legislative change.

This Working Paper provides guidance on developing anti-corruption interventions based on a Social Norms and Behaviour Change (SNBC) approach. Still a relatively nascent field, SNBC interventions typically address social norms that make corruption acceptable or expected, and attempt to influence behaviours away from corrupt practices. 
 The guidance is based on lessons learned from a largely successful pilot project in Tanzania that targeted social norms fuelling bribery ("gift giving") in health facilities and attempted to change the behaviours of both health care providers and users away from exchanging gifts. Survey results showed a 14–44% decrease in gift-giving intentions, attitudes and positive beliefs among hospital users following the pilot intervention.
 The guidance covers:
 
 How to identify when a SNBC approach is suitable
 Essential background research needed to design anti-corruption SNBC interventions
 Frameworks to formulate theories of change
 Specific elements to build into SNBC interventions
 What practitioners should expect when embarking on an SNBC intervention
 Ways they can help build evidence and understanding of SNBC approaches in the anti-corruption field.
 
 About and acknowledgements
 This publication was supported by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH on behalf of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). The contents of this publication do not represent the official position of either BMZ or GIZ.
 The pilot intervention that serves as the basis for most of the reflections included in this document was funded by the Global Integrity Anti-Corruption Evidence Programme (GI-ACE), funded with UK aid from the UK government.

AbstractThe paper interprets informal networks as investments made by citizens and business people to cope with the public sphere. Informal networks often orchestrate corruption, connecting public and private actors. The paper aims to understand their key characteristics, scopes, and functional roles. Ten mini case studies from Tanzania and Uganda are studied. The research applies narrative analysis to explore the experiences of citizens, entrepreneurs, and low‐level public officials, who built informal networks as a problem‐solving mechanism. It uses a grounded theory approach. The findings serve as working hypotheses about variables and patterns emerging from the bottom‐up analysis. The paper outlines: (a) whether there are distinct types of informal networks associated with particular types of corruption; (b) how, why and by whom these networks are built; (c) whether different individuals play specific roles; (d) the unwritten expectations and norms that govern such networks. The results highlight critical implications for anti‐corruption practice, showing, for example, how this can be strengthened by shifting the intervention unit from individuals to networks.

This Problem Analysis is a review of the efficacy and opportunities for using social norm and behaviour change (SNBC) approaches to combat illegal wildlife trade (IWT) and other natural resource-related corruption.
 Behavioural science is a rich and expansive field that has received prominent coverage in recent years for the promise it offers as a foundational yet underutilised approach to achieving biodiversity conservation. Extensive literature shows how SNBC initiatives can help combat diverse corruption problems, although for those related to natural resource management the evidence for doing so is sparse.
 This report synthesises the available information and suggests the next steps to redress this current lack of evidence. It seeks to:
 
 Understand what SNBC approaches might or might not work in fighting corruption.
 Identify entry points for designing SNBC interventions that can effectively reduce corruption related to IWT.
 
 This Analysis has been produced in association with the Targeting Natural Resource Corruption (TNRC) project. The TNRC project is working to improve biodiversity outcomes by helping practitioners to address the threats posed by corruption to wildlife, fisheries and forests. TNRC harnesses existing knowledge, generates new evidence, and supports innovative policy and practice for more effective anti-corruption programming. Learn more at tnrcproject.org.
 This publication is made possible by the generous support of the American people through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The contents are the responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID, the United States Government, or individual TNRC consortium members.

In February 2020, Uganda made a high-level political commitment to work with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) to strengthen the effectiveness of its anti-money laundering (AML) regime. Among other commitments, Uganda undertook to demonstrate that law enforcement agencies and judicial authorities apply the money laundering offence consistent with the identified risks. 
 Studies show that Uganda has high risks for cross-border movement of illegally obtained wildlife and wildlife products, both as a source and transit country. In addition, Uganda and the East African region in general have made some massive seizures of illegal wildlife products, which points to organised criminal activity. Notably, no money laundering prosecutions have to date arisen out of illegal wildlife trade (IWT) as a predicate offence in Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania.
 This short Policy Brief provides an outline of how the AML framework (intelligence, investigations and prosecutions) can be utilised to help combat IWT and the corruption that facilitates it. The insights are drawn from the Ugandan context, but can be applied with appropriate adjustments to other jurisdictions seeking to strengthen efforts to combat IWT and related corruption/money laundering.