This article is divided into three sections. In the first and second, I examine Sartorio’s account of the causal structure of the famous Thirsty Traveler thought experiment. I argue that this account does not withstand critical scrutiny. In the third, I turn to a novel kind of moral luck that Sartorio uses the Thirsty Traveler to expose. I expand the scope of my argument to look also at other recently proposed categories of moral luck. I argue that these proposals are overhasty

The paper explores the relation between a contemporary Aristotelian conception of human flourishing and two critical perspectives on work. The meaningful work perspective inquires what kind of work would be meaningful, by arguing that meaningful work is essential for human flourishing. The post-work perspective argues that good life lies outside work and workplaces and calls to eliminate work as much as possible. The paper suggests that it is possible to acknowledge the insights of both perspectives via contemporary Aristotelian notions of practice and human flourishing. The notion of practice incorporates the conception of meaningful work, yet it applies to nonwork activities as well. Conceptualization of human well-being via the notion of practice also responds to the post-work challenge of conceiving human flourishing without prioritizing work over other meaningful activities. In this way, a contemporary Aristotelian conception of human flourishing supports both the need for better work and less work.

This article considers the problem of immediacy of experience in the philosophy of Michel Henry and Tomas Sodeika. The article argues that the tension between the requirements of descriptiveness and performativity in phenomenological philosophy emerges particularly vividly in the work of these philosophers. Both philosophers understand the immediacy of experience as an oxymoronic structure that cannot be directly described, requiring very specific efforts and ingenuity from the phenomenologist in order to convey it to the reader. The article analyses and compares the strategies for reflecting on the immediacy of experience in the work of the authors in question. Both philosophers, while emphasising the imperative of performativity in phenomenology, face the intractable contradiction between experience mediated by its description and life that, strictly speaking, cannot be mediated. This raises the question not only about the limitations of phenomenology, but also, more generally, about the limitations of philosophy itself.

This paper aims to explore Hegel’s conception of hypnosis, which he considers a pathological state. Much of the literature on Hegel’s views on hypnosis suggests that his conception is influenced by the Marquis de Puységur, the discoverer of this phenomenon. However, this paper explores the possibility that Hegel’s conception of hypnosis originates from the mesmerist Kluge. To show this, we analyse Hegel’s critique of hypnosis, which aligns more closely with Kluge’s proposal on hypnosis than that of Marquis de Puységur.

Nietzsche criticises religious interpretations of nature (Natur) and advocates the ‘naturalisation of humanity’. The various usages of the term ‘nature’ (Natur) have no clear, systematic definition in Nietzsche’s works, which is why the interpretations of this concept in Nietzsche’s studies are controversial. Two opposing perspectives emerge: Vanessa Lemm interprets nature as a Dionysian chaos which promotes an emancipatory rejection of the prevailing ideas, while Costin Alamariu sees it as an aristocratic phusis that fosters higher human types. This article argues that these seemingly contradictory views are compatible. Nietzsche uses the concept of nature as chaos to criticize anthropocentric views, while presenting the possibility of an understanding of nature detached from the human perspective. This paper analyses and criticizes Lemm’s illustration of this concept through sex differences. Finally, it is argued that Alamariu’s interpretation is in line with Nietzsche’s later positive ethico-political aspirations, often ignored in Nietzschean scholarship, concerning the development of higher human types.

Leisure is both a necessary precondition for, and the ultimate purpose of, human activities. As such, it is commonly understood as a state of contemplation practiced for its own sake. However, this view raises a problem regarding its universal accessibility. Aristotle’s ethical and political theories demand leisure as a universally embraced way of life, while contemplative leisure appears impractical for common people. There are broadly two approaches to fix this problem: (a) distinguishing leisure of two sorts, and (b) expanding the semantic scope of contemplation. Nevertheless, they both come with certain limitations. I propose redefining leisure as a moral-psychological concept aligned with the allegedly hexis-state of the soul. This redefinition presents leisure as a basic human condition, offering a possible solution to the problem of its universal accessibility.

This paper argues that although Dworkin’s aim of developing a more practical understanding of moral truth is plausible, his attempt to do that while keeping the concept of moral objectivity remains deeply problematic. Because of its opposition to everything subjective, moral objectivity stands in an inherent conflict with the practical reality that we experience as persons from a first-person perspective; therefore, Dworkin’s attempt to reconceptualize moral objectivity from within a first-person perspective is inherently contradictory. The paper suggests that we should go one step further than Dworkin and give up the concept of moral objectivity altogether. A notion of moral certainty instead of moral objectivity would satisfy Dworkin’s intention of finding a practical conception of moral truth more adequately. A brief preliminary conception of it is developed while invoking the German philosopher Robert Spaemann’s ontology of a person.

This article examines the subtle nuances of Hobbes’s and Kant’s perspectives on rhetoric and materialism, contextualising them within the broader framework of political philosophy. Despite both philosophers being critics of rhetoric, their approaches exhibit notable divergences. Hobbes, who advocated for monarchy, criticized rhetoric from the perspective of a materialist anthropology influenced by Lucretius. However, he paradoxically employed rhetorical strategies in his new scientia civilis. Despite critiquing both Lucretian materialism and rhetoric, Kant incorporated certain rhetorical elements compatible with his philosophical framework, particularly in relation to Epicureanism. This study analyses their interpretations of paradiastole and the implications for the political thought. The argument is that both thinkers, in seeking a rational foundation for the political order, anchor their notions of rationality in Epicurean materialism, by reconfiguring rhetorical elements to suit their respective philosophies. The article elucidates Kant’s republican proclivities and his aspiration to maximize the citizens’ autonomy, which contrasts with Hobbes’s monarchical orientation. This research contributes to a more nuanced understanding of the early modern political thought and its relevance to the contemporary republican and democratic theory.

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This article reinterprets the theory of mimesis in the Cratylus, exploring how language functions as an image that imitates its objects. Contrary to prevailing studies contending that Socrates fails to reconcile naturalism and conventionalism, this article argues that Socrates proposes a form of naturalism that acknowledges the role of convention. This naturalism reveals that human language has a dual nature by demonstrating the relation between images and originals. Through instrumentalism and sound-symbolism, Socrates envisions language as an ideal instrument for imitating the Forms of things, whereas the difference between images and originals leads to inevitable falsehood in the establishment and use of ordinary language. The real purpose of the theory of mimesis is to defend the possibility of knowledge and language by opposing the sophists’ doctrine of flux.