AbstractPublic goods are an anomaly in neoclassical economics, a form of ‘market failure’. They exist outside the efficient and equitable optimality of market exchange. It can be shown however that competitive markets are only efficient in short product cycles. Long-term objectives require social support. Corruption arises from the consequent private public interaction. Integrity, the absence of corruption, is a public good. Corruption has risen since the 1980s with privatization and outsourcing. How did European governments become honest in the first place? In the century after the 1770s, they moved from regarding public office as a form of private property to a conception of serving the public good. This integrity revolution was facilitated by Weberian bureaucracies, selected by academic merit and committed to impartiality by long-term incentives. The neoliberal revolution of the 1980s regarded bureaucracies as obstructive and slow. It admired the business corporation with its opaque procedures and charismatic leadership. Concurrently economics moved from neoclassical harmony theory to an asymmetric information model of ‘opportunism with guile’, providing doctrinal legitimacy for corruption. Corporate advertising is deliberately deceptive, and undermines the public good of trustworthiness. Digital platforms, powered by advertising, have subverted public discourse. Misinformation and disinformation have become prime risk factors for current societies. The practical operation of markets undermines the public goods of integrity and trustworthiness. The public good of a habitable climate cannot be achieved by market methods. For long-term payoffs, ‘free markets’ are a harmful delusion, inefficient, corrupt, impossible to achieve, and not sustainable.

AbstractEurope and the United States are spending billions on the fortification of borders to stop migrants deemed unwanted by the government. The questionable effectiveness of this policy and its disastrous, often deadly consequences for people on the move have been studied extensively. The political project of closing borders to racially stigmatized migrants has serious consequences not only for outsiders who want to get in, but also for the internal organization of the society that is responsible for governing those borders. Taken together, these social and normative consequences constitute what we call the “internalization of borders.” Borders reach out far into society and are felt not only by would-be migrants in the places where they are stuck. Societies in the Global North, too, are being adversely affected and harmed by restrictive border regimes and their internalizing effects. Yet, unlike the “externalization” of borders, their “internalization” has so far not been researched systematically. To address the gap, this Introduction proposes a conceptual framework of how to study border internalization. The other articles in the Forum will offer diverse case studies on the dark side of border internalization as well as on ways of countering it.

AbstractThe point of doing the history of philosophy is to confront that which is completely foreign to us and seems unassimilable, in the hope of thereby getting some distance from our own form of life, and of learning to treat what is alien on its own terms. This is more difficult to do than might first seem to be the case, because of our almost irresistable tendency to assimilate that which is radically different to that which seems familiar to us. In history, one of the major forms this takes is anachronism. How can one avoid making them-then too much like us-now? The motivation for doing the history of philosophy is, therefore, basically ethical and political. In a society characterised by the division of labour, it is perfectly permissible for individual philosophers to pursue different goals, and deploy different parts of the huge corpus of knowledge which we have at our disposal. There is no need for each individual philosopher to integrate the study of the history of philosophy into each of their individual projects. The essay leaves it to the judgment of the reader to decide to what extent the active, sympathetic engagement with the alien is an ethical and political goal which is desirable — perhaps even so desirable as to count as a demand. In any case, this is a demand on the institution, not on individuals. Even if one thought that it was highly advisable that the history of philosophy form an integral part of the discipline of philosophy, it is hard to see this as a “necessity”.

AbstractThere are numerous conceptions of violence today, such as physical, psychological, emotional, structural, and epistemic. The question of which social phenomena are to be described as violence is itself a matter of furious dispute. In social theory, there is a widespread tendency to distinguish between ‘modern’ and ‘postmodern’ conceptions of violence. In this scheme, modern violence is primarily physical, while postmodern violence takes places across a broad spectrum of forms. The paper questions this binary. The co-occurrence and conflict between these forms of violence leads to a third form, which I call refigured violence. The refiguration of violence can be observed in three developments, which are mediatisation, polycontexturalisation, and translocalisation. I provide one illustration of these considerations with the example of so-called shock sites on the internet. In so doing, I emphasise that the sociology of knowledge can provide a valuable perspective for making sense of contemporary discourses about violence in all their complexity.

AbstractLists of basic needs necessary for a decent human life have found their way into approaches to sustainable development such as the “Safe and Just Space for Humanity” framework. The “dominant” conceptions of a decent human life have been criticised by social groups which find themselves at the margins of public debates such as the Degrowth or Post-colonial movements. According to the latter, the dominant conceptions neglect certain values which are necessary constituents of a decent human life: meaningful activities, convivial activities, and relationships of certain quality (love, respect, harmony, care) towards human and other-than-human beings. With this paper, we present results of interviews with male Maasai pastoralists in a village in Northern Tanzania in which we elicited what they consider as requirements for a good human life. According to our results, Maasai pastoralists disagree about the necessary constituents of a decent human life as well, replicating the controversy from the international debates between the proponents of the dominant approaches and their critics from Post-colonial and Degrowth movements.