ABSTRACT Proportionality has become one of the primary standards for violations of fundamental and human rights in various constitutional and international jurisdictions. Proportionality in the strict sense requires a comparison of the infringement of a right with the achievement of a state interest pursued by a measure. The incommensurability of the two is an often-raised challenge to this comparison. The Article does not adopt a fully-fledged sceptical stance. Instead, it looks to proportionality as a means of overcoming the challenge of incommensurability. It then examines the structure of comparisons in general and of comparisons of incommensurables employing proportionality in particular. As for the latter it focuses on its performance by exploring the example of decathlon, where this type of comparison works exceptionally well. The example allows us to analyse the preconditions for comparing incommensurables. Unfortunately, most of these preconditions are lacking in the law. This explains why the proportionality principle in law only produces convincing results in cases where the disproportionality is very pronounced. In many other cases, however, the courts decide based on proportionality as well. This raises the question: What is really going on in these cases? The article concludes with a brief account of a benevolent explanation.

ABSTRACT Legal positivists typically describe law as ‘thinly’ normative to distinguish it from the ‘thick’ normative force of moral norms have; which legal norms may lack. One popular account of thin normativity is social normativity. But a number of scholars have offered accounts of what it is to be a thin norm that are distinct from social normativity. This paper addresses these alternative accounts of what it is to be a thin norm. It also explores whether law counts as necessarily ‘thinly normative’ on these accounts. I argue that some accounts of thin normativity are so generic (‘super-thin’) that they are unable to distinguish between (thin) norms and nonnormative facts and thus collapse into triviality. I also consider more metaphysically demanding accounts of thin normativity, such as the view that everything is a norm that is essentially represented by deontic modals. However, law might fail to meet the demands of these slightly thicker accounts. I thus propose a view of law as consisting in nonnormative facts (diagnostic categories) and suggest sketching accounts of thin normativity as contingent, rather than necessary, features of laws and legal systems.

ABSTRACT Criminalisation theorists who try to explain when substantive criminal law may appropriately be deployed to shrink the scope of our presumptive initial liberty, often take their project as requiring them to identify the sorts of conduct for which may the state criminally convict. I argue that this is a mistake. While such theories of ‘convictability’ have their place, they do not completely explain the use of substantive criminal law to limit our presumptive initial liberty. Convictions ensue only after pleas of justification and excuse fail, but the substantive criminal law coercively limits liberty well before conviction, when it creates a pro tanto criminal proscription. Even those who can escape conviction by pleading a justificatory or excusatory defence were, in fact, subject to authoritative criminal law guidance proscribing (or sometimes, requiring) specified conduct. Although that guidance is sometimes trumped by the additional guidance contained in defences, it is not null and void, and it continues to have a liberty-limiting effect. In other words, substantive criminal law already shrinks our initial liberty by pro tanto criminally proscribing some conduct. Therefore, I argue that we also need a theory of criminalisation that addresses the appropriate domain of pro tanto criminal proscriptions.

ABSTRACT Hermann Heller’s critique of liberalism was both theoretical and conjunctural. He derided liberalism’s erosion of the concept of sovereignty and lamented liberalism’s complicity with the substantive inequality of his time. It its place, he argued for a restoration of the concept of popular sovereignty, as a dialectical formation of political unity and material equality through the democratic process. As a matter of political practice and strategy, however, Heller equivocated in his stance on the constitutional politics of the Weimar Republic. He initially tolerated the abrogation of parliamentary democracy due to his faith in the neutrality of the state, before diagnosing the regime as a form of authoritarian liberalism determined by the capitalist economy. This article examines Heller’s theoretical and political critique of liberalism. It outlines Heller’s conception of popular sovereignty against both Kelsen’s legal rationalism and Schmitt’s political decisionism. It also examines the significance of the interwar conjuncture, highlighting that the turn of the bourgeoisie to authoritarianism and ultimately to fascism represented a continuity of the liberal elision of the principle of popular sovereignty.