ZKSA: Secure mutual Attestation against TOCTOU Zero-knowledge Proof based for IoT Devices

Abstract

With the widespread adoption of Internet of Things (IoT) devices, remote attestation is crucial for ensuring their security. However, current schemes that require a central verifier or interactive approaches are expensive and inefficient for collaborative autonomous systems. Furthermore, the security of the software state cannot be guaranteed before or between successive attestations, leaving devices vulnerable to Time-Of-Check-Time-Of-Use (TOCTOU) attacks, as well as confidentiality issues arising from pre-sharing software information with the verifier. Therefore, we propose the Secure mutual Attestation against TOCTOU Zero-Knowledge proof based for IoT devices (ZKSA), which allows devices to mutually attest without a central verifier, and the attestation result is transparent while preserving confidentiality. We implement a ZKSA prototype on a Raspberry Pi 3B, demonstrating its feasibility and security. Even if malware is removed before the next attestation, it will be detected and the detection time is typically constant. Simulations show that compared to other schemes for mutual attestation, such as DIAT and CFRV, ZKSA exhibits scalability. When the prover attests to numerous verifier devices, ZKSA reduces the verification time from linear to constant.