Zero knowledge proof for secure two-party computation with malicious adversaries in distributed networks

Abstract

Distributed networks remarkably enhance the convenience of network connectivity. How to achieve efficient cooperative computation while preserving data privacy is a challenge in the scenario of distributed networks. Secure computation, as the key technology of information security and privacy protection in the distributed networks, attracts more and more attention. In the paper, we develop the protocols of secure two-party computation in the presence of malicious adversaries which are constructed with homomorphic probabilistic cryptosystem, and propose four honest-verifier zero-knowledge proof protocols to detect two cheating behaviours of the malicious adversary. The proposed protocols are more targeted than the existing work. The analysis shows that the proposed protocols are complete, sound and zero-knowledge. As an application, we show how to use our protocols in a secure two-party protocol to detect cheating, which can make it secure in the presence of malicious adversaries.