You can’t always forget what you want, but if you try sometimes you just might find you’ll forget what you need.

Abstract

You Can't Always Forget What You Want, But If You Try Sometimes You Just Might Find You'll Forget What You Need. A Review of J. Golding and C. MacLeod (Eds.) Intentional Forgetting: Interdisdplinay Approaches. Hillsdale, New Jersey: Erlbaum, 1998. (499 pages). Over the past two decades I have had only a passing familiarity with on directed forgetting. My knowledge was acquired more through incidental rather than intentional means. Last spring I heard Colin MacLeod give an Ebbinghaus Empire (the weekly meeting of the cognitive group at the Department of Psychology, University of Toronto) presentation on directed forgetting. He both inspired my interest and made me aware of the gaps in my knowledge and I decided to purchase a copy of this volume. When I was, coincidentally, invited to write a review, I was only too happy to do so. In hindsight, I feel somewhat guilty for not having bought a copy, because I certainly would have got my money's worth. This collection begins with two extensive literature reviews. MacLeod surveys the experimental cognitive literature on directed forgetting from a largely historical perspective. It is exemplary in its organization and completeness, and provides a firm foundation for chapters 3 through 7 in which the authors examine current on directed forgetting with a focus on the underlying mechanisms. The second review by Golding and Long takes a much broader perspective on intentional forgetting and sets the stage for the chapters describing on related social phenomena at the level of individuals (chapters 10 to 12) and groups (chapter 13), clinical work (chapter 14), and psychology and the law (chapters 15 and 16). Chapters 8 and 9 are concerned with the issue of directed forgetting in animals. The concluding chapter by Robert Bjork, a leading researcher in this field who has shaped the course of the experimental and theoretical study of directed forgetting since its early beginnings, provides an engaging personal history and perspective. In the course of developing his perspective, Bjork also gives readers a more complete and insightful review of this volume than I am able to write. I was left with three impressions when I finished reading this volume. The first impression (also discussed by Golding & Long, and by Bjork) concerns the degree to which in the cognitive and social/legal traditions has been largely independent. Given differences in historical antecedents, perspectives, methodologies, and results, it is easy to appreciate why the cognitive and social/legal approaches have developed separately. However, both literatures have much to contribute and gain from one another, as their juxtaposition in this volume illustrate. The second impression was the amount of consensus in terms of both data and theory. In the cognitive and in the social/legal domain, researchers are largely in agreement with regards to important issues, principal findings, and interpretations. Indeed, the most controversial debate in this volume is provided by Grant and Zentall, Roper, Kaiser, and Sherburne who argue the question of whether animals can develop control over memory processes. Finally, despite their differences, I was struck by the similarities and common themes in the cognitive, social/legal, and clinical literatures. The main goal of the editors of this volume was to bring together the various forms of on intentional forgetting in one place to highlight the commonalities that link these seemingly disparate areas of research (p. ix). Golding and MacLeod have been remarkably successful in this endeavour. In the cognitive domain, two paradigms have been studied extensively. In the item method, a cue to remember (R) or forget (F) follows each item. In the st method, a set or list of items is presented before instructions to forget the first list and remember the second are given. …