Yehuda Bauer’s Assessment of the US Government and American Jewry During the Holocaust: An Analysis

Abstract

ABSTRACT Beginning with well-deserved personal praise for Professor Yehuda Bauer celebrating his 95th birthday, this article then examines Bauer's brief but important work Could the US Government Have Rescued European Jewry?, in which he challenges the preferred narrative of American and Israeli Jews: that American Jews were silent, ineffective, divided, timid, self-absorbed, weak, and incapable of bringing a Judeo-centric request to the American political establishment and did not effectively come the aid of their European brethren; that American Jew had the power to do something significant, if only they had tried to use it; and that the American government was antisemitic or, at best, unconcerned about Jews. The article then examines Bauer's contentions regarding the US government's and American Jews' capabilities, interest, and responsibility in saving European Jews. Bauer's consideration is divided into four periods: from 1933 until the Reich's November Pogroms in 1938; from Kristallnacht until the onset of the war in September 1939; from the war until the beginnings of the systematic murder of the Jews, which coincided with the German invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941; and finally during the period of the mass murder, which only ended at the war's end on 8 May 1945. Bauer reconsiders the controversial issue of the bombing of Auschwitz, which he examines from the perspective of the Yishuv in Palestine and the British and American bombing capabilities and wartime priorities as well as the effectiveness of aerial bombardment. The paper also considers Elie Wiesel's challenging of multiple US presidents regarding the decision not to bomb and questions Wiesel's depiction of his discussion with President Jimmy Carter on this issue. Ultimately Bauer's conclusion is that US was not powerful or well-positioned enough to save European Jews, and the Jewish community in the United States did not have the power to impose its will even if it had tried.