Abstract
The rise of experimental philosophy (x-phi) has placed metaphilosophical questions, particularly those concerning concepts, at the center of philosophical attention. X-phi offers empirically rigorous methods for identifying conceptual content, but what exactly it contributes towards evaluating conceptual content remains unclear. We show how x-phi complements Rudolf Carnap’s underappreciated methodology for concept determination, explication. This clarifies and extends x-phi’s positive philosophical import, and also exhibits explication’s broad appeal. But there is a potential problem: Carnap’s account of explication was limited to empirical and logical concepts, but many concepts of interest to philosophers (experimental and otherwise) are essentially normative. With formal epistemology as a case study, we show how x-phi assisted explication can apply to normative domains.
Highlights
Identifying and evaluating conceptual content is at the core of philosophical practice
With formal epistemology as a case study, we show how x-phi assisted explication can apply to normative domains
This confluence, the precision agenda of both, and their shared willingness to sacrifice intuitive conceptual content suggest explication constitutes the best methodology for formal epistemology and grounds its philosophical value
Summary
Identifying and evaluating conceptual content is at the core of philosophical practice. Intuitions regarding a concept C thereby function as primary data for which analyses of C account.2 Adherence to this approach has been unsettled by serious doubts about the epistemic import of intuition, doubts exacerbated by data-driven approaches to conceptual issues championed by experimental philosophers (see Weinberg et al 2001; Weinberg 2007). These concerns, compelling, leave critical questions about proper positive philosophical methodology unaddressed. In continuity with scientific practice, Carnap considered explications valuable to the extent they enhanced what he called ‘fruitfulness.’ For empirical concepts, fruitfulness was measured in the same underlying currency in which science measures epistemic success: well-confirmed generalizations. Formal epistemology can avoid overreliance on intuition, and thereby the fate of traditional conceptual analysis
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