WTO 분쟁해결과 미국의 통상정책

Abstract

Since the inauguration of President Trump, the U. S. trade policy has changed its course dramatically departing from more than 70 years after the GATT enacted and followed through by the WTO regime. This paper tries to find the reasons for such deviations from the U. S. dissatisfaction of the inefficient dispute settlement‘s results recent years. With a simple statistical model using ordered logit regressions, this paper finds that the U. S. had been successful in having more favorable results than other WTO members at least for the early ten years of the regime. However, using the same model, empirical tests for the periods after since shows the efficiency of the dispute settlements for the U. S. has not only been deteriorated but also lost much statistical significances. Looking back to the long history of the protective U. S. trade policy birthed even soon after the independence, it's not surprising to witness the changes in her make overs. Multilateral trade regimes after all were designed to serve the U. S. trade interests and, with its decreased effectiveness in recent years, they want to have a new system toward more of their favors. This paper empirically proves why that changes has started with focused on the WTO dispute settlement's performances.