Abstract
Wormhole attack is one of the most severe security threats in wireless mesh network that can disrupt majority of routing communications, when strategically placed. At the same time, most of the existing wormhole defence mechanisms are not secure against wormhole attacks that are launched in participation mode. In this paper, we propose WRSR, a wormhole-resistant secure routing algorithm that detects the presence of wormhole during route discovery process and quarantines it. Unlike other existing schemes that initiate wormhole detection process after observing packet loss, WRSR identifies route requests traversing a wormhole and prevents such routes from being established. WRSR uses unit disk graph model to determine the necessary and sufficient condition for identifying a wormhole-free path. The most attractive features of the WRSR include its ability to defend against all forms of wormhole (hidden and Byzantine) attacks without relying on any extra hardware like global positioning system, synchronized clocks or timing information, and computational intensive traditional cryptographic mechanisms.
Highlights
Wireless mesh networks (WMNs) have emerged as a promising technology to provide low-cost, high-bandwidth, wireless access services in a variety of application scenarios [1]
A typical WMN as shown in Figure 1 is comprised of a set of stationary mesh routers (MRs) that form the mesh backbone and a set of mesh clients that communicate via mesh routers
We mainly focus on wormhole attacks launched by MRs, since route discovery is carried out by MRs on behalf of mesh clients
Summary
Wireless mesh networks (WMNs) have emerged as a promising technology to provide low-cost, high-bandwidth, wireless access services in a variety of application scenarios [1]. Byzantine wormhole attack is relatively much difficult to detect than a hidden wormhole, as the nodes involved in the former form legitimate part of the network, and can bypass existing security mechanisms [5]. Location-based schemes can successfully defend hidden wormhole attacks but cannot prevent Byzantine wormholes from being established as the colluded nodes involved in the attack are legitimate part of the network. We present a novel routing protocol (WRSR) that addresses both hidden and exposed wormhole attacks in WMN It depends on neighbourhood connectivity information and relies on existence of shorter alternate sub-paths. We propose a wormhole-resistant secure routing protocol (WRSR) that detects and prevents the selection of wormhole paths based on neighbourhood connectivity information and alternate shorter paths
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