Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem

Abstract

Abstract A reason is said to be “of the wrong kind” when, although it counts as a consideration broadly in favor of (or against) having an attitude such as belief or desire toward some proposition or object, it does not bear on whether the proposition is true or the object valuable ( see Reasons). To say that something is a wrong kind of reason (WKR), however, is not to say that it is a bad reason. Some WKRs seem to provide excellent reasons to believe or desire – or to have some emotion such as amusement, admiration, fear, and so forth. (Even this claim will prove contentious, as we shall see, but not in a way that calls into question the goodness of certain WKRs, only what they are good reasons for.) The central case in the recent literature concerns what can be called a demonic incentive: A demon credibly threatens to punish you unless you desire or admire something that, quite obviously, is not desirable or admirable. When the incentive is compelling enough, it apparently provides conclusive reason to believe p , desire x , or admire y , if you can; but it is not a reason that shows p to be true, x good, or y admirable. The fact that a demon will punish you unless you desire a cup of mud is thus the quintessential example of a wrong kind of reason to desire the mud, since such an exogenous incentive obviously does not make the mud desirable (Crisp 2000).