Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to examine how the timing of market entry affects the shareholder wealth gains in cross-border acquisitions made by U.S. firms. We find that cross-border acquisition announcements are generally favorable for late-movers, especially in countries most similar to the U.S. These late movers may be able to learn from early-movers and thereby avoid costly mistakes. While early mover advantages are not evident in the sample as a whole, benefits for early-movers are more apparent in takeovers in countries more dissimilar from the U.S., namely civil law countries and countries with high corruption.
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