Worlds Falling Apart: Human and Nonhuman in Jeanette Winterson’s The Stone Gods

Abstract

Abstract This essay discusses Jeanette Winterson’s The Stone Gods (2007) in light of human and nonhuman relationships. The author presents us with quite a paradoxical situation, whereby what is human seems to be less human than what is said to be nonhuman. The ontological instability produced by such a peculiar paradigm generates interesting consequences in terms of fundamental rights, especially when applied to hybrid forms of life such as those represented by “Robo sapiens.” Hence, Winterson’s novel invites a reconfiguration of the notion of rights and “legal personhood” in the context of AI systems. Robots demand that their “humanity” is acknowledged and, as a consequence to that, they also demand that they are granted rights. One could notice that Robot’s existential condition is very similar to that of slaves, precisely like slaves they are submitted to servitude, forced or bonded labour. And yet the fact that they are not “fully human”, only very similar or close to them, puts robots in a juridical position that might be compared to that of animals and the way they are presented in animal law studies.