Worlds, Events, and Inertia

Abstract

The semantics of progressive sentences presents a challenge to linguists and philosophers alike. According to a widely accepted view, the truth-conditions of progressive sentences rely essentially on a notion of inertia. Dowty (Word meaning and Montague grammar: the semantics of verbs and times in generative grammar and in Montague’s PTQ, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, 1979) suggested inertia worlds to implement this “inertia idea” in a formal semantic theory of the progressive. The main thesis of the paper is that the notion of inertia went through a subtle, but crucial change when worlds were replaced by events in Landman (Nat Lang Semant 1:1–32, 1992) and Portner (Language 74(4):760–787, 1998), and that this new, event-related concept of inertia results in a possibility-based theory of the progressive. An important case in point in the paper is a proof that, despite its surface structure, the theory presented in Portner (1998) does not implement the notion of inertia in Dowty (1979); rather, it belongs together with Dowty’s earlier, 1977 theory according to which the progressive is a possibility operator.