World views and the concept of development: A reply to Lerner and Kauffman

Abstract

I reply here to the argument of R. M. Lerner and M. B. Kauffman (1985, Developmental Review, 5, 309–333) that an adequate concept of human development is incompatible with a mechanist “world view” but rests instead on a principled integration of contextualist and organicist “world views.” I review how each of these metatheoretical positions is described by the philosopher who proposed them and conclude that the version of contextualism and organicism presented by Lerner and Kauffman is so diluted as to lose the essence of their original meaning. In consequence, the concept of development they propose, which includes the notion of integrative levels, causal variables that interact differently at different times in the course of ontogeny, and probabilistic outcomes is more compatible with the mechanistic metatheory they eschew than with the contextualist and organismic ones they ostensibly espouse.