Works of Music: An Essay in Ontology

Abstract

INWorks of Music, Julian Dodd argues for what he calls ‘the simple view’ (p. 1). On this view, musical works are types that have performances and other sound-sequence events as tokens (the type–token theory), and such types are individuated solely by how they require properly formed tokens to sound (sonicism). Although a version of the simple view has been defended by Peter Kivy in a series of papers in the 1980s, it is very much a minority view in the ontology of art nowadays, thanks in part to work by Jerrold Levinson and Gregory Currie. As far as I know, Works of Music is the first book-length defence of the simple view. The type–token theory occupies the first seven chapters. Dodd begins by arguing that the type–token theory is a default (or ‘face-value’) theory: ‘the account that is prima facie correct and must be accepted as long as it is not defeated’ (p. 8, italics in original). He then argues that types are abstract, unstructured, modally and temporally inflexible, and eternal; and he defends parallel claims about works. Dodd completes his case for the type–token theory by arguing against rival views (defended by Carl Matheson, Guy Rohrbaugh, Gregory Currie, David Davies, and others) on which works are particulars or actions. Sonicism occupies the last two chapters. Dodd argues that sonicism is a default theory and argues against rival views (defended by Jerrold Levinson, Stephen Davies, and others) on which works are individuated either by the instruments that they require performances to use (instrumentalism) or by the musico-historical contexts in which they are composed (contextualism).