Abstract
It is currently widely held that the Chinese rural commune system (1960s-1970s) was beset by a general failure of work incentives. This view is questioned. Two sets of members' labour allocation decisions are distinguished. Analysis shows that although members tended to shirk whilst performing collective work, they had good reasons to participate in it. The result tallies with an earlier finding by Sen (Review of Economic Studies 33 (1966), 361–71), and helps to explain the commune's impressive labour investment and absorption record, for long a highly regarded feature of the system but ignored or attributed to coercion in the current literature. The charge of coercion is rejected.
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