Abstract
This essay responds to Alasdair MacIntyre’s skeptical claim that human rights are like “witches” and “unicorns”—as in, they don’t exist, and thus cannot be subject to abstract rational justification. Putting aside the issue of the abstract rational justification of human rights, I focus on the more urgent practical question of how human rights might be meaningfully alleged when they do not yet exist within society, culture, law, or policy. Borrowing from MacIntyre’s narrative theory of ethics to undermine his skeptical view of human rights, I contend that human rights—whether understood as moral rights or as political rights—can be coherently alleged through the same kind of narrative framework that MacIntyre argued was essential to any intelligible ethical system of thought. In particular, imaginative narrative frameworks—such as those found in stories and films—have been crucial for the enterprise of demanding human rights for the powerless, especially girls and women. Putting at its center a feminist interpretation of the classic American film, The Wizard of Oz (1939), this article playfully, yet ultimately seriously, challenges MacIntyre’s dismissal of rights as “witches and unicorns” by showing how allegations of women’s human rights derive much of their power for fighting human wrongs from their historically (although not essentially) imaginative character as well as their deeper narrative structure.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.