Women in Philosophy

Abstract

There should be no issue about women in philosophy; there should have been no issue for women in Philosophy. Arguments that are predominantly a priori and arguments that are primarily pragmatic alike support this claim. The predominantly a priori argument runs as follows: there is no substantial content to the undeniably important moral principle 'all men (man embracing woman) are equal' unless it be given by and derived from the undeniably true principle of rationality that all differences sustain and demand an explanation. Thus, if two apparently similar objects act, or are treated, in unlike ways, then there must be in reason some explanation for, or justification of, those differences. Such justification and explanation, if one is to be rational, must be in terms of relevant features the only features that succeed in justifying or explaining. Here the empirical element of the argument enters in: it is impossible to argue that the sex of an individual is relevant to his or her ability to teach or to write philosophy. Hence in academic establishments generally, in philosophy, and one would hope in Philosophy, the sex of a professor, of an applicant, or of an author, must be considered to be irrelevant; as irrelevant as is his or her size in socks. The second argument is much more empirical. Either one thinks that women as such get an unfair deal from the academic establishment, or one does not. (I think myself that women are doing all right, but that is a personal opinion that does not affect the argument.) If one does not believe that they are unjustly treated, then the argument just cited says all that needs to be said: sex is treated as irrelevant, which is just as it should be. But suppose that one thinks that there is discrimination against women, both in the universities and in the journals. It might then appear that some kind of reverse discrimination, practised either by appointments boards or by journal editors, has some prima facie appeal. But on reflection this appearance fades; reverse discrimination is, in the late I970S, a thoroughly regressive step. It is regressive first and foremost because it draws the teeth of the powerful first argument, the argument from rationality for the force of that argument lies in its insistence that the academic establishment should neglect, and not as reverse discrimination does underline, the fact of sex. It would be a great pity to undermine the strength of that argument, for its conclusion is so obviously irrefutable that, so long as it is acknowledged, it cannot fail to restrain the worst excesses of male and female chauvinists alike. The point may be recast in psychological terms: any